Chiuccariello v. Campbell

• Decision Date: 03 January 1912
• Citation: 96 N.E. 1101,210 Mass. 532
• Parties: CHIUCCARIELLO v. CAMPBELL et al. (two cases).
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

210 Mass. 532

96 N.E. 1101

CHIUCCARIELLO v. CAMPBELL et al. (two cases).

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

January 3, 1912

COUNSEL

Elisha Greenhood, for plaintiffs.

Walter I. Badger, Wm. Harold Hitchcock, and Chester M. Pratt, for defendants.

OPINION

SHELDON J.

The jury could have found that the plaintiff in the first case was in the exercise of due care, and had not assumed the risk of the accident which happened. Murphy v. Marston Coal Co., 183 Mass. 346, 67 N.E. 342; O'Neil v Ginn, 188 Mass. 346, 74 N.E. 668; Donovan v Chase-Shawmut Co., 201 Mass. 357, 87 N.E. 580.

The evidence tended to show that his injury was caused by the machine on which he was at work starting from a full stop without his having put it in motion by placing his foot upon the treadle, which was the way it was intended to be started. An expert testified that this could not have happened without some defect in the machine. The machine was comparatively new, having been in use less than six months.

There is no dispute that from the fact of this unexplained starting at a time and under circumstances when it ought not to have started at all, the jury could have found that there was a defect of some kind in the machine, and that this defect was the cause of the undue starting or 'repeating' to which the injury was due. But the defendants contend that this, standing by itself, would not have warranted the further inference of any negligence of failure of duty on their part; and, unless such negligence could have been found, the judge acted correctly in ordering a verdict in their favor.

It is perfectly true that negligence ordinarily cannot be inferred from the happening of an accident to an employé or from the discovery in a machine or other instrumentality of a latent defect for which under the existing circumstances no responsibility can be imputed to the employer. There is no liability for injury to a servant unless there has been some negligence for which the master is liable. Flynn v Beebe, 98 Mass. 575; Roughan v. Boston & Lockport Block Co., 161 Mass. 24, 36 N.E. 461; Kenneson v. West End St. Ry., 168 Mass. 1, 46 N.E. 114; Harnois v. Cutting, 174 Mass. 398, 54 N.E. 842; Hofnauer v. R. H. White Co., 186 Mass. 47, 70 N.E. 1038; Hill v. Iver Johnson Sporting Goods Co., 188 Mass. 75, 74 N.E. 303; Saxe v. Walworth Manuf. Co., 191 Mass. 338, 77 N.E. 883, 114 Am. St. Rep. 613; Curtin v. Boston Elevated Ry., 194 Mass. 260, 80 N.E. 522; Thompson v. National Fireworks Co., 195 Mass. 327, 81 N.E. 256; Childs v. American Express Co., 197 Mass. 337, 84 N.E. 128. And in most cases of the unexplained starting of a machine, in which an action has been maintained for injuries thereby caused, there has been some further evidence of negligence on the part of the employer, either by evidence of previous instances of such starting, or of other trouble in operation, that were or ought to have been known to him, or that it was old, worn-out, secondhand, or otherwise in need of more inspection or repairs than it had received, or that it was improperly set up or adjusted, or that recent repairs had left it in bad condition, or otherwise. Donahue v. Drown, 154 Mass. 21, 27 N.E. 675; Mooney v. Connecticut River Paper Co., 154 Mass. 407, 28 N.E. 352; Connors v. Durite Manuf. Co., 156 Mass. 163, 30 N.E. 559; Packer v. Thomson-Houston Electric Co., 175 Mass. 496, 56 N.E. 704; Gregory v. American Thread Co., 187 Mass. 239, 72 N.E. 962; Lynch v. Stevens & Sons Co., 187 Mass. 397, 73 N.E. 478; O'Neil v. Ginn, 188 Mass. 346, 74 N.E. 668; Fountaine v. Wampanoag Mills, 189 Mass. 498, 75 N.E. 738; Byrne v. Boston Woven Hose Co., 191 Mass. 40, 77 N.E. 696; Ryan v. Fall River Iron Works, 200 Mass. 188, 86 N.E. 310; Donovan v. Chase-Shawmut Co., 201 Mass. 357, 87 N.E. 580. But, although in many of the above-named cases the conclusion reached was supportted by much additional evidence, yet in others the employer was held liable by reason merely of the unexplained starting. This was so for example in Byrne v. Boston Woven Hose Co., 191 Mass. 40, 77 N.E. 696. In Mulvaney v. Peck, 196 Mass. 95, 81 N.E. 874, the court approached this doctrine. In Ryan v. Fall River Iron Works, 200 Mass. 188, 86 N.E. 310, the judge at the trial instructed the jury...