Choate v. County of Orange
| Citation | 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 339,86 Cal.App.4th 312 |
| Decision Date | 18 December 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. G020621.,G020621. |
| Parties | Shawn CHOATE et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. COUNTY OF ORANGE et al., Defendants and Respondents. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals |
Franscell, Strickland, Roberts, & Lawrence, Tracy Strickland and S. Frank Harrell, Santa Ana, for Defendants and Respondents.
A lion produced a mouse. A seven-week jury trial in a lawsuit seeking hundreds of thousands of dollars in damages resulted in a verdict that a single sheriffs deputy committed a civil rights violation, with an award of $3,380 in compensatory and $1,000 in punitive damages.
Plaintiffs sought almost $250,000 in attorney fees for achieving this victory, which was pyrrhic in every respect save the potential of the fee request. But the court went beyond a mere denial. Acting under the misconception that turnabout is fair play, it awarded nearly the same amount (some $240,000) for defendants' attorney fees.
We hold the court had discretion to taketh away, but no discretion to giveth. Because of plaintiffs' extremely limited success on their civil rights claims, we follow Farrar v. Hobby (1992) 506 U.S. 103, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 and leave each side to bear its own attorney fees.
Plaintiffs' other grounds for reversal are without merit. They complain the denial of their right to introduce conspiracy evidence was "error per se," but we know of no such rule of automatic reversal in civil cases. And remanding this litigation for additional months of trial to recover a nominal $1 damage award on a pattern or practice theory under Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of City of New York (1978) 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (hereafter Monell) would be futile and unnecessary. This case, having overstayed its welcome, does not deserve a return visit.
The underlying incident took place in the early morning hours of October 13, 1991, when plaintiffs Shawn Choate and Jose Bernal admittedly "provoked" some off-duty sheriffs deputies into a "street fight."
Choate, then 19 years old, and Bernal, age 20, passed the evening drinking and partying with a third friend, 17-year-old Albert Valladares, a member of the "Old Town Boys" street gang. They ended up at the Dana Point apartment of Choate's 14-year-old girlfriend. Across the street defendant Brian Scanlan was hosting a birthday party at his condominium for about 10 to 20 people. Both Scanlan and many of his guests were off-duty sheriffs deputies.
The party ended between 1:00 and 2:00 a.m. As three of the guests were walking to their cars, they were confronted by a heavily intoxicated Valladares, followed by about three or four other males. Valladares was verbally combative, profane and lewd, especially to Kim Anderson, who was with her boyfriend, defendant Pat Higa. Higa repeatedly said "we didn't want any problems, we just wanted to leave the area," but to no avail. Valladares took a flying kick at defendant Kurt Bourne's head.
Fearing they were outnumbered, Higa tried for a quick exit: As Higa was walking towards his car, Valladares swung at him and hit his left jaw. Despite this, Higa "made a bee line straight for my car," but Valladares kicked the car door and shattered the driver's window. Anderson ran back for help.1
Scanlan and two remaining party guests (off-duty sheriffs deputy Doug Doyle and a civilian friend Sam Samawi) responded. They saw some eight to twelve people advancing on Higa, making hostile, belligerent and threatening statements. They chased the men into an alley. Choate picked up a board and "swung [it] like a baseball bat," shouting, "Do you want to die, motherfucker?"2 Bernal hit Samawi in the head with a brick. Valladares wildly swung a metal pipe.
Choate, Bernal, and Valladares were overpowered within five to eight minutes, "real quick." There were conflicting stories about how this occurred. Choate's girlfriend and her mother, for example, reported seeing Choate hit in the head at least three times with a big flashlight. Other eyewitnesses said plaintiffs repeatedly were told to "just lie still, the police will be here in a minute," and
Two on-duty sheriffs deputies, defendants Mark Billings and James DeKruif, responded to emergency calls just as the fracas was ending. Bernal, Choate, and Samawi were taken to a medical center for treatment. Bernal subsequently pleaded guilty to disturbing the peace. No charges were filed against Choate.
Plaintiffs sued Higa, Bourne, Scanlan (all of whom were off-duty sheriffs deputies) and civilian Samawi for "brutally attack[ing]" them during the fight. Billings and DeKruif, the on-duty deputies, were sued for conspiring "to give their off-duty colleagues enough time to `finish the plaintiffs off'" and for endeavoring "to cover up the incident by ... filing knowingly false and misleading police reports." The complaint, filed in January 1993, contained 11 causes of action, including battery, conspiracy, and federal civil rights. (42 U.S.C. § 1983.) It included a Monell cause of action against the county, alleging the sheriffs department had an official policy or custom of condoning unconstitutional conduct and conducting a "corrupt, whitewash investigation into the plaintiffs complaints." (Monell, supra, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611.)
The court bifurcated the Monell claim from the other causes of action. Deputies Higa, Scanlan, Bourne and Doyle were represented by separate counsel. Bernal briefly testified and then disappeared. The court struck his testimony because he could not be cross-examined.
After an extensive discussion, the court nonsuited plaintiffs' conspiracy claims. Plaintiffs voluntarily dropped their negligence cause of action and conceded they lacked evidence against the responding deputies, Billings and DeKruif, except on the cover-up conspiracy charges. The court granted a nonsuit as to Doyle and Higa on the section 1983 claims, finding they acted for personal reasons as private citizens and not under color of law. It denied a nonsuit on this same predicate issue as to Scanlan and Bourne because of conflicting evidence as to whether they had described themselves as police officers.3
The jury was given special verdict forms as to the remaining defendants and causes of action. It determined Scanlan and Bourne were acting under color of law. Choate recovered $3,380 in compensatory damages and $1,000 in punitive damages on excessive force and battery theories against Scanlan. Bernal recovered $1,089 in compensatory damages and $250 in punitive damages against Scanlan and Samawi on a battery theory. The jury exonerated the other defendants.
Following the verdict, the court dismissed the Monell claim as moot. It denied plaintiffs' motion for a new trial and for an additur.
The court denied plaintiffs' fee request for $248,647 in section 1988 attorney fees, but awarded fees of $241,644 to all defendants (except Scanlan) because plaintiffs' civil rights causes of action were frivolous and without merit. (42 U.S.C. § 1988.) It described plaintiffs as "several of Dana Point's more notorious local hooligans" who sought "unprovoked combat" for the fun of antagonizing "apparently passive victims." It concluded, "not even the most wildly imaginative attorney would think of suing on these facts."
Plaintiffs claim their damage awards are inadequate as a matter of law, requiring a new trial on damages or an additur. They overstate our limited role in reviewing the fact question of the amount of damages.
Unlike the jury and the trial judge, we did not see or hear the witnesses and cannot resolve evidentiary conflicts regarding the severity of injuries or their cause. (Abbott v. Taz Express (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 853, 855, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 360[ ].)
Choate's recovery under the federal civil rights law (42 U.S.C. § 1983) does not change the equation. Constitutional torts employ the same measure of damages as common law torts and are not augmented "based on the abstract `value' or `importance' of constitutional rights...." (Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura (1986) 477 U.S. 299, 310, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 91 L.Ed.2d 249.) Plaintiffs have the burden of proving compensatory damages in section 1983 cases, and the amount of damages depends "largely upon the credibility of the plaintiffs' testimony concerning their injuries." (Butler v. Dowd (8th Cir.1992) 979 F.2d 661, 669.) A finding of excessive force does not entitle plaintiffs to compensatory damages as a matter of law—both justifiable and excessive force may have been used. (Gibeau v. Nellis (2d Cir.1994) 18 F.3d 107.)
In Gibeau the Second Circuit refused to remand for a new trial on inadequate damages even though the evidence showed a prison guard struck an inmate at least three times in the head with a heavy flashlight. The court observed, "It is possible that the jury considered only the last blow to be excessive, and it may have concluded that the head contusion was caused by the first blow." (Gibeau v. Nellis, supra, 18 F.3d at p. 110.) As in Gibeau, the jury's findings against Scanlan do not necessarily mean that all the force he used was objectively unreasonable or that Choate's evidence was to be taken at face value. Perhaps the jurors concluded that defendants unnecessarily prolonged the confrontation but plaintiffs' injuries had already occurred.
It also may be that the jury concluded plaintiffs' evidence regarding the extent of their injuries...
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