Christ by Christ v. Maryland Dept. of Natural Resources

• Decision Date: 01 September 1992
• Docket Number: No. 136,136
• Citation: 335 Md. 427,644 A.2d 34
• Parties: Charles R. CHRIST, Jr., a Minor, by His Next Friend and Father Charles R. CHRIST v. MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES. ,
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 427

335 Md. 427

644 A.2d 34

Charles R. CHRIST, Jr., a Minor, by His Next Friend and Father Charles R. CHRIST v. MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES.

No. 136, Sept. Term, 1992.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

July 14, 1994.

Bradford I. Webb, (Siskind, Burch, Grady & Rosen, all on brief), Baltimore, for appellant.

J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen. (Andrew H. Baida and Stuart G. Buppert, II, Asst. Attys. Gen., all on brief), Baltimore, for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, McAULIFFE, ^* CHASANOW, KARWACKI and BELL, JJ.

ELDRIDGE, Judge.

The dispute in this case concerns the validity of a Maryland Department of Natural Resources regulation, COMAR 08.18.02.05A, prohibiting the operation of personal watercraft in Maryland waters by any individual who is less than 14 years old. ¹ The challenge to the regulation presents two issues: (1) whether Maryland Code (1974, 1990 Repl.Vol., 1993 Cum.Supp.), § 8-704 of the Natural Resources Article, ² grants to the Department the authority to adopt a prohibition against the operation of a particular type of vessel by persons under a certain age; (2) if the regulation is authorized by the statute, whether the delegation by the General Assembly to the Department of such broad authority violates the separation of powers requirement of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. ³

I.

The relevant facts underlying this action are not in dispute. The COMAR 08.18.02.05A age restriction was promulgated by the Department in August 1990, after the Department concluded that public concern over the use of personal watercraft on Maryland's crowded waterways had greatly increased. ⁴ Prior to the implementation of the regulation, Charles R. Christ, Jr., had been free to operate his personal watercraft on Maryland waters. When the regulation went into effect, however, Mr. Christ, who was then under 14 years of age, was precluded from using his personal watercraft in the State.

Charles R. Christ, Jr., by his father, brought this action in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, seeking both a declaratory judgment that COMAR 08.18.02.05A was invalid and a permanent injunction against the enforcement of the regulation. ⁵ Christ argued in the circuit court that the regulation was not authorized by statute. He also argued that, if authorized, such delegation to the Department by the General Assembly violated the constitutional requirement of separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches of government. According to Christ, an age restriction for operating a particular type of vessel involves a "fundamental policy making decision" that "has to be retained, and can only be done by the General Assembly." The Department filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the regulation was valid.

After a hearing, the circuit court issued an opinion rejecting both of the plaintiff's arguments, stating that "the Department has not acted in an unconstitutional manner or exceeded its statutory authority," and concluding that the action should be "dismissed." Specifically, the circuit court held that the language of § 8-704(b-1)(1) of the State Boat Act, directing the Department to "adopt regulations governing" the "operations of any vessels," clearly included regulations concerning who may operate vessels. The circuit court additionally rejected Christ's separation of powers argument, holding that

"[t]he contention that the regulation is unconstitutional because the State legislature delegated authority to the Department for action on an issue which can only be controlled by the legislature is without merit. Age regulation for the operation of vessels on the waterways of the State is not so fundamental as to require action by the legislature itself."

A judgment was entered on the circuit court's docket ordering "that this case is dismissed."

Christ timely noted an appeal from the circuit court's dismissal, and this Court issued a writ of certiorari prior to argument in the Court of Special Appeals, 329 Md. 168, 617 A.2d 1085.

II.

Before turning to the merits of the dispute in this case, it is necessary to address a procedural matter. As mentioned above, the circuit court, disagreeing with the plaintiff's contention that the regulation was invalid, dismissed the declaratory judgment action. This was clearly in error. Although, for the reasons set forth later in the opinion, we find ourselves in agreement with the circuit court's conclusions concerning the validity of the regulation, the judgment dismissing the case must be vacated.

This Court has emphasized, time after time, that dismissal "is rarely appropriate in a declaratory judgment action." Popham v. State Farm, 333 Md. 136, 140 n. 2, 634 A.2d 28, 30 n. 2 (1993), quoting Broadwater v. State, 303 Md. 461, 465, 494 A.2d 934, 936 (1985). See, e.g., Turnpike Farm v. Curran, 316 Md. 47, 49, 557 A.2d 225, 226 (1989); Boyds Civic Ass'n v. Montgomery County, 309 Md. 683, 687 n. 2, 526 A.2d 598, 600 n. 2 (1987); Jennings v. Government Employees Ins., 302 Md. 352, 355, 356, 488 A.2d 166, 167-168 (1985); State v. Burning Tree Club, 301 Md. 9, 17, 481 A.2d 785, 789 (1984); Koontz v. Ass'n of Classified Emp., 297 Md. 521, 529, 467 A.2d 753, 758 (1983); Carroll Co. Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ., 294 Md. 144, 155-156, 448 A.2d 345, 351 (1982); East v. Gilchrist, 293 Md. 453, 461 n. 3, 445 A.2d 343, 347 n. 3 (1982); Mauzy v. Hornbeck, 285 Md. 84, 90-92, 400 A.2d 1091, 1095 (1979), and cases there cited.

It is proper to dismiss a declaratory judgment action only where there is a lack of jurisdiction or where a declaratory judgment is not an available or appropriate type of remedy. See, e.g., Popham v. State Farm, supra, 333 Md. at 140-141 n. 2, 634 A.2d at 30 n. 2 (declaratory judgment ordinarily is not available when the issue has become moot); Turnpike Farm v. Curran, supra, 316 Md. at 49, 557 A.2d at 226 (declaratory judgment action is not available, and should be dismissed, where there is a pending action between the parties presenting the same issue); Boyds Civic Ass'n v. Montgomery County, supra, 309 Md. at 688-700, 526 A.2d at 600-607 (declaratory judgment action, to be entertained by the court, must present a justiciable controversy); State v. Burning Tree Club, supra, 301 Md. at 18, 481 A.2d at 789 (declaratory judgment action should be dismissed where the plaintiff lacks standing); Koontz v. Ass'n of Classified Emp., supra, 297 Md. at 529-530, 467 A.2d at 758 (declaratory judgment action was properly dismissed where the dispute had become moot).

Where a controversy is appropriate for resolution by declaratory judgment, however, the trial court must render a declaratory judgment. The court's rejection of the plaintiff's position on the merits furnishes no ground for dismissal. In East v. Gilchrist, supra, 293 Md. at 461 n. 3, 445 A.2d at 347 n. 3, this Court, in language directly applicable to the present case, pointed out that

"where a plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that a particular legal provision is valid (or invalid), and the court's conclusion regarding the validity of the provision is exactly opposite from the plaintiff's contention, nevertheless the court must, under the plaintiff's prayer for relief, issue a declaratory judgment setting forth the court's conclusion as to validity."

Judge Prescott for the Court in Shapiro v. County Comm., 219 Md. 298, 302-303, 149 A.2d 396, 399 (1959), stated that, under Maryland's declaratory judgment statute,

"it is immaterial that the ultimate ruling may be unfavorable to the plaintiff. The test of the sufficiency of the [complaint] is not whether it shows that the plaintiff is entitled to the declaration of rights or interest in accordance with his theory, but whether he is entitled to a declaration at all; so, even though the plaintiff may be on the losing side of the dispute, if he states the existence of a controversy which should be settled, he states a cause of suit for a declaratory decree."

See, e.g., Broadwater v. State, supra, 303 Md. at 467, 494 A.2d at 937 ("[T]he trial judge should have declared the rights of the parties even if such declaration might be contrary to the desires of the plaintiff"); Woodland Beach Ass'n v. Worley, 253 Md. 442, 448, 252 A.2d 827, 830 (1969) ("a declaration should be given even if it is not the declaration sought by the plaintiff and, indeed, is entirely ... contrary to the theory of the plaintiff on which declaratory relief is sought"). ⁶

Under our cases, where a circuit court erroneously dismisses a declaratory judgment action, the dismissal must be vacated, and an appropriate declaratory judgment must be entered. Broadwater v. State, supra, 303 Md. at 469-470, 494 A.2d at 938; Carroll Co. Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ., supra, 294 Md. at 155-156, 448 A.2d at 351; Mauzy v. Hornbeck, supra, 285 Md. at 92, 400 A.2d at 1095.

III.

The plaintiff's position that COMAR 08.18.02.05A was not authorized by the General Assembly is based on two theories. First, the plaintiff argues that the language of the State Boat Act, Code (1974, 1990 Repl.Vol.), § 8-704(b-1)(1) of the Natural Resources Article, directing the Department to adopt regulations governing the "operations of any vessels," does not encompass age restrictions for operating certain types of vessels. Second, the plaintiff maintains that the age restriction conflicts with the overall spirit of the State Boat Act, in which, according to the plaintiff, the Legislature indicated its preference for educating young boaters rather than prohibiting their operation of certain vessels.

Regulations promulgated by an administrative agency must, of course, be "consistent with the letter and spirit of the law under which the agency acts." Department of Transportation v. Armacost, 311 Md. 64, 74, 532 A.2d 1056, 1061 (1987). See, e.g., Maryland State Police v. Warwick, 330 Md. 474, 481, 624 A.2d 1238, 1241 (1993); Insurance Comm'r v. Bankers, 326 Md....