Christie v. Forecki
| Decision Date | 28 August 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 17-cv-6783,17-cv-6783 |
| Citation | 404 F.Supp.3d 1206 |
| Parties | Laura CHRISTIE, Plaintiff, v. Doree FORECKI, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
John Thomas Peluso, John T. Peluso, Attorney at Law, LLC, Valparaiso, IN, for Plaintiff.
Matthew Joseph Kowals, Morse, Bolduc & Dinos, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.
Defendants' motion for summary judgment [27] is denied in part and granted in part. Civil case terminated.
MEMORANDUM OPINIONThis is a diversity action brought under 28 U.S.C. 1332, in which the Plaintiff Laura Christie, a citizen of Indiana, alleges she sustained injuries while riding a horse owned by Defendants Doree Forecki and Terry Forecki—both citizens of Illinois. In her complaint, Christie brings negligence claims, along with a claim for a violation the Animal Control Act, 510 ILCS 5/1, et seq ("ACA"). Defendants have moved for summary judgment. The thrust of Defendants' motion is that the Illinois Equine Activity Liability Act, 745 ILCS 47, et seq. ("EALA"), prohibits liability from Plaintiff's claims. For the reasons stated below, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part.
The Court takes the relevant facts from the parties' Local Rule 56.1 statements of undisputed material facts and supporting exhibits. Because Plaintiff is the nonmoving party, the Court construes the facts in the light most favorable to her. The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. "When we cite as undisputed a statement of fact that a party has attempted to dispute, it reflects our determination that the evidence cited in the response does not show that the fact is in genuine dispute." King v. Chapman, 4 F.Supp.3d 1017, 1022 (N.D. Ill. 2013).
On July 7, 2015, Plaintiff Laura Christie and Defendant Doree Forecki went horseback riding together. The parties both owned horses that were boarded near the Plum Creek Forest Preserve adjacent to the Timberland Ranch in Chicago Heights, Illinois. The parties had different levels of experience riding horses. Plaintiff Christie was the most experienced, having received formal horseback riding training beginning at four years old in the 1970s, and has been riding horse since.
The equine excursion began around seven o'clock in the evening with Plaintiff Christie riding her horse, Shooter, and Defendant Forecki riding Romeo, a horse known to have a gentle demeanor. After twenty minutes of walking their horses, the parties entered an open field and decided to switch horses. Up to this point in the ride neither party saw Romeo act violently or aggressively.
This was Plaintiff's second time riding Romeo. Within the first couple minutes, Plaintiff circled around the open field by first walking, trotting, and finally cantering Romeo. Plaintiff recalled riding Romeo in English style, also known as "plough reigning." Headed in the direction of a large tree, Plaintiff attempted to adjust Romeo's course to the left, at which point Romeo reared up on his back legs three times. Plaintiff remained on Romeo, holding the reigns, until Romeo flipped backwards, ultimately causing injuries to Plaintiff.
Initially, on July 6, 2017, Plaintiff filed this complaint in the Superior Court of Lake County, Indiana. The case was removed to the Northern District of Indiana and subsequently transferred to the Northern District of Illinois. In her complaint. Plaintiff alleges claims for negligence, and a claim under the ACA. Defendants have motion for summary judgment on several issues of law: the application of the EALA, claims for willful and wanton conduct, and the application of the ACA. This motion is now pending before the Court.
"Summary judgment is appropriate when ‘the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ " Northfield Ins. Co. v. City of Waukegan, 701 F.3d 1124, 1128 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ). "There is no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; see also Crawford v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 647 F.3d 642, 648 (7th Cir. 2011) (). "When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
The Court views the evidence and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Benuzzi v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., 647 F.3d 652, 656 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Groesch v. City of Springfield, Ill., 635 F.3d 1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 2011) ). The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. When the Court cites a fact as being undisputed that a party has attempted to dispute, it means the Court has made a determination that the "evidence cited in the response does not show that the fact is in genuine dispute." King v. Chapman, 4 F.Supp.3d 1017, 1022 (N.D. Ill. 2013).
The Court does not Gonzalez v. City of Elgin, 578 F.3d 526, 529 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ). "Summary judgment is the ‘put up or shut up’ moment in a lawsuit." Siegel v. Shell Oil Co., 612 F.3d 932, 937 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Johnson v. Cambridge Indus., Inc., 325 F.3d 892, 901 (7th Cir. 2003) ). "Once a party has made a properly-supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party may not simply rest upon the pleadings but must instead submit evidentiary materials that ‘set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ " Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) ). If the nonmovant "is unable to ‘establish the existence of an element essential to [his] case, and on which [he] will bear the burden of proof at trial,’ summary judgment must be granted." Benuzzi, 647 F.3d at 662 (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ).
A federal court sitting in diversity applies state law to resolve all substantive questions. Havoco of America, Inc. v. Hilco, Inc., 799 F.2d 349, 352-53 (7th Cir. 1986). Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims are barred under the EALA. Plaintiff asserts that because the EALA derogates common law, particularly to claims brought under a negligence theory, this Court must construe the statute in Plaintiff's favor. Specifically, Plaintiff states that neither she nor Defendants of qualify as members the protected of the classes—equine activity sponsors or equine professionals—under the statute, and Defendants' reliance on Carl v. Resnick, 306 Ill.App.3d 453, 239 Ill.Dec. 443, 714 N.E.2d 1, 2 (1999), as modified on denial of reh'g (July 28, 1999), and section 15 of the EALA, in isolation, is misplaced.
The EALA prevents certain persons from being held liable for negligent acts involving equine activities. By limiting liability, the Act "encourage[s] equine activities by delineating the responsibilities of those involved in equine activities" and to recognizing that "persons who participate in equine activities may incur injuries as a result of the risks involved in those activities." 745 ILCS 47/5. The statute recognizes that equine activities can be hazardous to those involved even when reasonable precautions are taken. Section 15 defines equine participant's responsibilities: "Each participant who engages in an equine activity expressly assumes the risk of and legal responsibility for injury, loss, or damage to the participant or the participant's property that results from participating in an equine activity ..." 745 ILCS 47/15.
"[T]he Act does not preclude negligence liability for persons other than equine activity sponsors and equine professionals." Kush v. Wentworth, 339 Ill.App.3d 157, 274 Ill.Dec. 139, 790 N.E.2d 912, 918 (2003). However, section 20 provides the limited situations when an "equine activity sponsor" or "equine professional" could be subjected to liability if their actions are deemed willful or intentional. 745 ILCS 47/20. The parties do not dispute that at the time of the incident both Plaintiff Christie and Defendant Forecki were not acting as equine activity sponsors or equine professionals, but rather they were riding recreationally. Def. LR 56.1 ¶ 16; Pl. LR 56.1(b) ¶ 16. Defendants, however, assert that the EALA prevents liability in situations when defendants are not equine activity sponsors or equine professionals.
Plaintiff argues Defendants are using selective citations to cobble together their argument. First, Defendants argue that under section 10(c)(4) Plaintiff is a participant engaged in equine activity. According to Defendants, recreationally riding a horse belonging to another is an "equine activity" as defined under section 10(c)(4). Thus, Plaintiff qualifies as a participant in an equine activity because she was riding Defendants' horse when she suffered injuries.
For support, Defendants rely on dictum in Carl, a case in which the Illinois appellate court held the EALA did not apply to a plaintiff that was injured while riding her own horse. Specifically, Defendants here, rely on the court's reference to the argument made on appeal that the "equine activity" defined in section 10(c)(4) applied. See Carl, 239 Ill.Dec. 443, 714...
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Hamilton v. JPMorgan Chase & Co.
...omitted). Accordingly, the court construes the willful and wanton claim as an aggravated negligence claim. See Christie v. Forecki, 404 F. Supp. 3d 1206, 1213 (N.D. Ill. 2019). Allowing Hamilton to proceed in this manner is important because she seeks punitive damages, which can be awarded ......