King v. Chapman

• Citation: 4 F.Supp.3d 1017
• Decision Date: 16 December 2013
• Docket Number: Case No. 09 C 1184
• Parties: Raymond E. King, Plaintiff, v. Chapman, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

4 F.Supp.3d 1017

Raymond E. King, Plaintiff,

v.Chapman, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 09 C 1184

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

December 16, 2013

Meredith Martin Addy, Robert G. Pluta, Thomas Arthur Rammer, II, Steptoe & Johnson LLP, Christopher Kelly Leach, Leydig, Voit & Mayer Ltd., Saira Janine Alikhan, Amin Talati, LLC, Sunil Shashikant Bhave, Illinois Attorney General, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.

James Patrick Doran, Illinois Attorney General's Office, Michael John Charysh, John J. Beribak, William Michael Lecrone, Charysh & Schroeder, Ltd., Saira Janine Alikhan, Amin Talati, LLC, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER¹

SIDNEY I. SCHENKIER, United States Magistrate Judge

On February 24, 2009, Raymond E. King brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against certain medical and dental providers employed by or under contract to the prisons in which he was incarcerated, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments (doc. # 1). ² During the relevant time period, defendants Dr. Nathan Chapman, Dr. Parthasarathi Ghosh, and Dr. Ladeane Fattore–Bruno were employed by Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (“Wexford”) (collectively, the “Wexford Defendants”), and defendants Steven Newbold, D.D.S., Jacqueline Mitchell–Lawshea, D.D.S., Sangita Garg, D.D.S., and Jeffery Saffold, D.D.S., were employed by the State of Illinois (collectively, the “State Defendants”).³ Mr. King alleges that the defendants denied him adequate treatment for his temporomandibular joint (“TMJ”) disorder (“TMD”), which involves the jaw, the jaw joint, and the surrounding facial muscles, while he was incarcerated at Menard Correctional Facility (“Menard”) from August 2004 to September 2007, and while he was incarcerated at Stateville Correctional Facility (“Stateville”) from September 2007 through the present (doc. # 88: 2d Am. Compl. at 1–4). Both the Wexford and Slate Defendants have moved for summary judgment on all of plaintiffs claims (doc. # 246: State Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J; doc. # 238: Wexford Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J.). For the reasons that follow, the Court grants in part and denies in part the State Defendants' motion (doc. # 246). and grants in part and denies in part the Wexford Defendants' motion (doc. # 238).

I.

The legal standards governing motions for summary judgment are well-established. Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the [moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A genuine issue exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

The party moving for summary judgment has an initial burden of production to inform the court why a trial is not necessary. Modrowski v. Pigatto, 712 F.3d 1166, 1168 (7th Cir.2013) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548). “Where the nonmovant bears the ultimate burden of persuasion on a particular issue, however, the requirements that Rule 56 imposes on the moving party are not onerous.... Rather, the movant's initial burden ‘may be discharged by showing—that is, point out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.’ ” Modrowski, 712 F.3d at 1168 (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548).

Upon such a showing, to withstand the motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must present evidence sufficient to establish a triable issue of fact on the essential elements of its case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. “The nonmovant need not depose her [or his] own witnesses or produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial, but she [or he] must ‘go beyond the pleadings' ( e.g., produce affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file), to demonstrate that there is evidence ‘upon which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict’ in her favor.” Modrowski, 712 F.3d at 1168–69 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548).

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, courts may not “assess the credibility of witnesses, choose between competing reasonable inferences, or balance the relative weight of conflicting evidence. The courts must view all the evidence in the record in the light reasonably most favorable to the nonmoving parties.” Stokes v. Board of Educ. of the City of Chicago, 599 F.3d 617, 619 (7th Cir.2010). When a material fact or set of facts yields competing, but reasonable, inferences, then there is a genuine issue that precludes summary judgment. Coles v. City of Chicago, 361 F.Supp.2d 740, 741–42 (N.D.Ill.2005).

II.

We begin by setting forth the material undisputed facts established by the parties' submissions, made pursuant to Local Rule 56.1. “In determining what is disputed, we focus not only on whether the parties profess to dispute a fact, but also on the evidence the parties offer to support their statements.” Barkl v. Kaysun Corp., No. 10 C 2469, 2011 WL 4928996, at *1 n. 2 (N.D.Ill. Oct. 13, 2011) (citing Zitzka v. Vill.of Westmont, 743 F.Supp.2d 887, 899 n. 2 (N.D.Ill.2010)). “We review only those facts whose substance would be admissible at trial under a form permitted by the Federal Rules of Evidence, although the form produced at summary judgment need not be admissible.” Wragg v. Vill. of Thornton, 604 F.3d 464, 466 (7th Cir.2010).

In their reply briefs, both the State and the Wexford Defendants argue that plaintiff's Additional Statement of Facts (“PSAF”) (doc. # 256) and response to defendants' statements of facts do not comport with Local Rule 56.1; specifically, they claim that most of the numbered additional facts and responses combine several discrete statements of facts § Id.) (doc. # 288: State Defs.' Reply at 1–2; doc. # 286: Wexford Defs.' Reply at 1–2). Local Rule 56.1 mandates “short numbered paragraphs” in the statement of additional facts and a “concise response” to defendant's statement of facts. Additionally,the State Defendants contend that plaintiffs responses to their statement of facts should be stricken because they are unresponsive and add new and unrelated facts (State Defs. Reply at 1–2).

We do not find that plaintiff's failure to follow Local Rule 56.1 warrants the ultimate sanction of striking his PSAF or his responses because defendants were not prejudiced by his failure to comply with the rules. See, e.g., Modrowski, 712 F.3d at 1169 (holding that the decision to enforce or relax the local rules is left to the district court's discretion provided that the rules are applied equally among the parties). The Court granted several extensions of time to defendants to respond to plaintiff's facts and response brief. Defendants used that extra time to respond to the PSAF sentence by sentence ( i.e., alleged fact by alleged fact), rather than simply paragraph by paragraph, allowing this Court to accurately gauge what matters are indeed disputed or admitted. In addition, we have reviewed plaintiff's responses to defendants' statements of fact and, while they are far from short and concise, the Court has been able to decipher whether a genuine dispute or valid objection to a fact exists. When we cite as undisputed a statement of fact that a party has attempted to dispute, it reflects our determination that the evidence cited in the response does not show that the fact is in genuine dispute. See Barkl, 2011 WL 4928996, at *1; Zitzka, 743 F.Supp.2d at 899 n. 2.

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted by the Court.

A.

Plaintiff first injured his jaw in 1987, when he was struck in the face with a baseball bat while serving time at Pontiac Correctional Center (“Pontiac”) (doc. # 283: State Defs.' Corrected L.R. 56.1 Stmt. of Facts (“State DSOF”) at ¶ 13). While housed at Pontiac, plaintiff underwent his first two jaw surgeries at the University of Illinois–Chicago (“UIC”) hospital, in 1989 and 1990 ( Id. at ¶¶ 14–15). While on parole in 1992, he injured his jaw again in a car accident ( Id. at ¶ 16). In December 1992, he had surgery that removed cartilage from his ear to repair the joint in his jaw ( Id. at ¶ 17). After that third surgery, for many years Mr. King had no pain and full range of motion in his jaw ( Id., Ex. B: King Dep. at 42–43).

In June 2004, Mr. King injured his jaw again when his head was slammed into a table while he was on trial for the offense for which he is now incarcerated (State DSOF at ¶ 18). Mr. King was taken to the hospital and x-rayed, then sent back to court without receiving any pain medications (King Dep. at 43–45).

B.

During the summer of 2004, Mr. King was convicted and sentenced. On August 19, 2004, he entered the Northern Reception Center (“NRC”) to be processed before being sent to Menard to begin serving his sentence (doc. # 286; Wexford Reply, Ex. B: King Med. Docs., KG000292).⁴ He received a panoramic x-ray of his head (“Panorex”) and a dental exam ( Id., KG000152). Mr. King's intake form noted that he had TMJ surgery three times in the past, but it did not note any current urgent medical or dental problems ( Id., KG000292–KG000293).

Mr. King arrived at Menard on August 24 or 25, 2004. Menard's dental office has a Panorex and equipment for taking...