Christie v. Smith, Case No. 3:11-cv-00581-MMD-VPC
| Decision Date | 05 June 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:11-cv-00581-MMD-VPC |
| Parties | JOHN THORPE CHRISTIE, Petitioner, v. GREG SMITH, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nevada |
This action is a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by a Nevada state prisoner. This matter comes before the Court on the merits of the petition.
On February 20, 2008, petitioner was convicted, pursuant to a guilty plea, of one count each of grand larceny and burglary. (Exh. 37.)1 Petitioner was adjudicated a habitual criminal and sentenced to two terms of 10 years to life in prison. (Id.) Petitioner appealed from his judgment of conviction. (Exh. 42.) By order filed March 4, 2009, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed petitioner convictions. (Exh. 91.)
On June 24, 2009, petitioner filed a post-conviction habeas petition in the state district court. (Exh. 101.) The state district court denied the petition. (Exh. 153.) Petitioner appealed. (Exh. 171.) On June 8, 2011, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the post-conviction habeas petition. (Exh. 181.)
While his direct appeal was pending, petitioner filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea on September 3, 2008. (Exh. 72.) The district court stayed the proceedings on the motion pending the outcome of petitioner's direct appeal. (Exh. 87.) Once the direct appeal concluded, the state district court struck the motion as a fugitive document. (Exh. 104.) Petitioner appealed that decision and the Nevada Supreme Court reversed the state district court's decision to strike the motion. (Exh. 119.) The Nevada Supreme Court's order, filed August 21, 2009, remanded the case to the state district court for consideration of the merits of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. (Id.) On remand, the state district court denied the motion on its merits. (Exh. 182.) Petitioner appealed. (Exh. 202.) On October 8, 2012, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the denial of petitioner's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (Exh. 205.) Remittitur issued on November 5, 2012. (Exh. 206.)
Petitioner dispatched his federal habeas petition to this Court on August 8, 2011. (Dkt. no. 6.) On April 2, 2012, respondents moved to dismiss portions of the petition. (Dkt. no. 19.) Petitioner filed motions to strike portions of the petition and voluntarily dismiss other portions of the petition. (Dkt. nos. 34, 36, 37.) By order filed January 28, 2013, this Court struck from the petition: "(a) the equal protection portions of Grounds 2 and 4; (b) the entirety of Ground 3; and (c) the entirety of Ground 6." (Dkt. no. 40 at 2.) On May 28, 2013, respondents filed an answer to the remaining grounds of the petition. (Dkt. no. 44.) Petitioner has filed a reply. (Dkt. no. 45.)
On May 31, 2013, respondents filed a supplemental index of exhibits in which they presented two documents from petitioner's state court proceedings: (1) an order of the Nevada Supreme Court, dated October 8, 2012, affirming the denial of petitioner's motion to withdraw his guilty plea; and (2) the remittitur that followed. (Dkt. no. 47, Exh. 205 & 206.) Nearly two years later, on May 4, 2015, petitioner filed a motion to strike the supplemental exhibits. (Dkt. no. 48.) Petitioner's motion to strike is untimely. More importantly, there is no merit to petitioner's argument that respondents lacked "leave toamend their pleading" as a basis for striking the supplemental exhibits. Supplemental exhibits 205 and 206 were presented by respondents as two documents from the state court record that were not available when respondents filed their original index of exhibits with the motion to dismiss in April of 2012. There is no basis for striking the supplemental exhibits. To the contrary, respondents fulfilled their duty of providing this Court with the state court record. Rule 5 of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts; see also dkt. no. 5, Order filed October 14, 2011, at 2. Petitioner's motion to strike the supplemental exhibits is denied.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), provides the legal standard for the Court's consideration of this habeas petition:
The AEDPA "modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state -court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693-694 (2002). A state court decision is contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent, within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254, "if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases" or "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Supreme Court's] precedent." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003) (). The formidable standard set forth in section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is "'a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,' not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102-03 (2011) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979)).
A state court decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent, within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), "if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). The "unreasonable application" clause requires the state court decision to be more than merely incorrect or erroneous; the state court's application of clearly established federal law must be objectively unreasonable. Id. (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 409). In determining whether a state court decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of federal law, this Court looks to the state courts' last reasoned decision. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991); Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 944 (2001).
In a federal habeas proceeding, "a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct," and the petitioner "shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). If a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by a state court, a federal habeas petitioner must overcome the burden set forth in § 2254(d) and (e) on the record that was before the state court. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1400 (2011).
Petitioner claims that his adjudication as a habitual criminal violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. (Dkt. no. 6 at 3-6.) Petitioner presented this claim to the Nevada Supreme Court on direct appeal, and it was rejected, as follows:
Christie argues that the life sentence is excessive. We disagree. This court has consistently afforded the district court wide discretion in its sentencing decision, see, e.g. Houk v. State, 103 Nev. 659, 664, 747 P.2d 1376, 1379 (1987), and we therefore will refrain from interfering with the sentence imposed "[s]o long as the record does not demonstrate prejudice resulting from consideration of information or accusations founded on facts supported only by impalpable or highly suspect evidence." Silks v. State, 92 Nev. 91, 94, 545 P.2d 1159, 1161 (1976). Moreover, regardless of its severity, a sentence that is within the statutory limits is not "'cruel and unusual punishment unless the statute fixing punishment is unconstitutional or the sentence is so unreasonably disproportionate to the offense as to shock the conscience.'" Blume v. State, 112 Nev. 472, 475, 915 P.2d 282, 284 (1996) (quoting Culverson v. State, 95 Nev. 433, 435, 596 P.2d 220, 221-22 (1979)); seealsoGlegola v. State, 110 Nev. 344, 348, 871 P.2d 950, 953 (1994). Here, Christie does not allege that the district court relied on impalpable or highly suspect evidence or that the relevant statute is unconstitutional. Further, we note that the sentence imposed was within the parameters provided by the relevant statute. See NRS 207.010(1)(b).
The United States Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment contains a "narrow proportionality principle." Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59-60 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). This principle "does not require strict proportionality between the crime and the sentence but rather forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime." Id. (internal quotations omitted). Still, it is exceptionally difficult for a defendant to show that his sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate. Several United States Supreme Court cases dictate upholding defendants' sentence, even where the sentence seems harsh in light of the offense committed. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial