Christopher R., In re, 1
| Decision Date | 15 July 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 1,CA-CV,1 |
| Citation | 957 P.2d 1004,191 Ariz. 461 |
| Parties | , 247 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 44 In re CHRISTOPHER R. 96-0216. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
This case arises out of damage to a house. The Juvenile's grandmother had leased the house as a residence for herself and the Juvenile. The house was never occupied under the lease, however, because the grandmother died before the term began. Shortly after her death, the Juvenile invited a group of friends to a party at the house. As many as thirty or forty young people showed up, and the guests began breaking windows, damaging the walls and damaging other items in the house. Although the Juvenile was present and heard the destruction taking place, he told the police that he had not actually seen it committed, and he did not call the police to stop any further damage.
The State charged the Juvenile with delinquency for facilitating criminal damage and for trespass. After finding that he had committed both offenses, the court adjudicated him delinquent. The court placed him on probation and left open the possibility of restitution if the State received a verified statement of damage from the victim.
We agree with the Juvenile that the evidence is insufficient to support a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he facilitated criminal damage. A person commits facilitation when:
acting with knowledge that another person is committing or intends to commit an offense, such person knowingly provides such other person with means or opportunity for the commission of the offense and which in fact aids such person to commit the offense.
Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. (A.R.S.) § 13-1004(A) (1989).
The State argues that his extension of invitations to the party and his knowledge that damage was occurring provided these other persons with the means or opportunity for committing criminal damage and aided them in committing the damage. The problem with this theory is that there is no evidence that, at the time the Juvenile made the house available to the partygoers, he knew they would damage it.
The State anticipates this problem by arguing that the Juvenile "had to have known that inviting thirty or forty kids to a party in a vacant house would result in the house being 'trashed.' " While a reasonable person might suspect that such a teenage party would result in damage, the Juvenile is not charged with negligent or reckless behavior. He is charged with knowingly facilitating a crime. One acts knowingly when "with respect to conduct or to a circumstance ... [the individual] is aware or believes that his or her conduct is of that nature or that the circumstance exists." A.R.S. § 13-105(9)(b) (Supp.1996). It is reasonably possible, on this record, that the Juvenile was neither aware nor believed that the party would result in the damage that occurred.
The State has another and better argument. It points out that the damage was so extensive that it took some time to accomplish. At the very least, the State says, the Juvenile knew it was occurring and did nothing to stop it. This, the State argues, amounts to facilitation. Other than his failure to call the police, the record is silent about what the Juvenile did or did not do to stop the damage. The State's argument assumes that the Juvenile had a duty to stop the damage, that he could have done something to stop it, but that he did nothing. Even if we assume the existence of a duty, the State's argument is flawed because it rests on speculation about facts as to which it, the State, has the burden of proof. For all the record shows, the Juvenile might have made a desperate effort to rein in his riotous guests. For all we know, he may have prevented more extensive damage than actually occurred. But whether he did or not, for all the record shows, it is possible that by the time the Juvenile was...
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