Christus Good Shepherd Med. Ctr. v. Sonnier

• Decision Date: 03 September 2021
• Docket Number: 06-21-00031-CV
• Parties: CHRISTUS GOOD SHEPHERD MEDICAL CENTER, Appellant v. MICHAEL SONNIER, Appellee
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

CHRISTUS GOOD SHEPHERD MEDICAL CENTER, Appellant v. MICHAEL SONNIER, Appellee

No. 06-21-00031-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Sixth District, Texarkana

September 3, 2021

Date Submitted: July 6, 2021

On Appeal from the 71st District Court Harrison County, Texas Trial Court No. 20-0378

Before Morriss, C.J., Burgess and Stevens, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Scott E. Stevens, Justice

Michael Sonnier sued Christus Good Shepherd Medical Center (Christus)^[1] and alleged that he suffered damages and emotional distress from the conduct of certain members of Christus's staff while he was under Christus's care. After Sonnier failed to file an expert report as required by the Texas Medical Liability Act (Act), ^[2] Christus moved to dismiss his claims.^[3]The trial court denied the motion, and Christus filed this interlocutory appeal.^[4] We find that this claim was a health care liability claim (HCLC) subject to the Act's expert report requirement, reverse the trial court's judgment, dismiss Sonnier's claims against Christus, and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

I. Background

Sonnier filed his original petition in April 2020 and named only Christus as a defendant. According to the original petition Sonnier had been working as a charge nurse in Christus's surgery department for over ten years when he was admitted to Christus to have a hernia repaired in January 2020. Sonnier alleged that, as a patient under Christus's care, he had the expectation that Christus would adhere to a reasonable standard of care. Although there were no complications with the hernia surgery, when Sonnier awoke from the procedure, he discovered that, while he was under anesthesia, certain members of Christus's staff had:

--placed a diaper on him "despite the fact that it [was] outside of the standard of care for most hernia patients to be placed in a diaper post-surgery";

--taped a plastic baggie containing mixed nuts to the diaper and written, "These nuts!" on the baggie;

--signed the diaper, both inside and out, with messages such as, "Robin was here! Get well soon!" in the area of his genitals, and "poop shoot" on the buttocks;

--affixed a colostomy bag to him, even though his procedure and recovery did not require him to wear a colostomy bag and

--again deviated from the standard of care by painting his toenails bright red.

Sonnier also alleged that, while recovering at home, he received text messages from one of the staff members that had cared for him, Alcox, who inquired how he was doing. When Sonnier replied that he was sore but doing well, Alcox texted, "Great. I guess you are not in pain are [sic] constipated!!!!!" Sonnier replied, "Not too bad," to which Alcox texted, "That's good. By the way, I did not paint your toenails . . . Anna did. I would have painted them better than that, but I did put the diaper on you, lol. Take care. I will check on you later." Davis, another staff member who had cared for Sonnier, also exchanged text messages with him. Davis asked how he was doing and texted, "How's the toe polish," followed by a crying emoji.

Sonnier alleged that Christus "was at all times in a position that required it to provide medical care and treatment and [Sonnier] was at all times physically incapable of defending himself against the actions committed by" Christus. Sonnier asserted claims against Christus for intentional infliction of emotional distress for placing him in a diaper, painting his toenails, and affixing the colostomy bag, which he alleged "went beyond any duties or responsibilities as a Medical Center." He also asserted claims against Christus for assault, battery, and gross negligence based on this same conduct. Along with these direct claims, Sonnier asserted that Christus was vicariously liable for the actions of its employees through the doctrines of respondeat superior and ratification.

Christus filed its original answer on May 22, 2020, and entered a general denial. After Sonnier failed to serve an expert report required by the Act, Christus moved to dismiss his claims and for attorney fees and costs. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(b)(2).

Sonnier then filed his first amended petition and joined Alcox, Davis, and Travis as defendants. The factual allegations in the first amended petition were the same as in the original petition, except that Sonnier removed all (1) references to any standard of care, (2) references to any deviation from any standard of care, and (3) references that the conduct went beyond Christus's duties and responsibilities as a medical center. Sonnier asserted claims against Alcox, Davis, and Travis for intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault, and battery and asserted that Christus was vicariously liable for the actions of its employees through the doctrines of respondeat superior and ratification. Sonnier also opposed the motion to dismiss, alleged that his first amended petition had addressed any pleading deficiencies, and argued that the motion should be denied because his claims against Christus were not HCLCs.

Christus filed special exceptions to the first amended petition objecting that Sonnier had pleaded no facts supporting his theories of respondeat superior and ratification. As a result, Sonnier filed a second amended petition and added certain allegations to address the special exceptions. After a hearing, the trial court denied Christus's motion to dismiss.

On appeal, Christus argues that the claims Sonnier asserted against Christus were HCLCs and that the Act required Sonnier to serve Christus with an expert report no later than the 120th day after it filed its original answer. Since Sonnier failed to comply with this requirement, Christus contends that the trial court was required to dismiss Sonnier's claims against it and to award it reasonable attorney fees and costs. We agree.

II. Standard of Review

The determination of whether claims come "within the purview of the Act is a question of law" that we review de novo. Watson v. Good Shepherd Med. Ctr., 456 S.W.3d 585, 587 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2015, pet. denied) (citing Tex. W. Oaks Hosp., LP &Tex. Hosp. Holdings, LLC v. Williams, 371 S.W.3d 171, 177 (Tex. 2012)). We also apply a de novo standard of review "when the resolution of an issue on appeal requires interpretation of a statute." Stanford v. Cannon, No. 06-11-00011-CV, 2011 WL 2518856, at *2 (Tex. App.- Texarkana June 23, 2011, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Vanderwerff v. Beathard, 239 S.W.3d 406, 408 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.)).

III. The Texas Medical Liability Act

Under the Act, a claimant that files an HCLC against a physician or health care provider must serve the physician or health care provider (or its attorney) one or more expert reports, and the expert's curriculum vitae, no later than the 120th day after the date the physician's or health care provider's original answer is filed. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(a). If the 5 claimant fails to serve a physician or health care provider with an expert report within that time, the trial court, on motion by the physician or health care provider, must dismiss the claim with respect to that physician or health care provider and award the physician or health care provider reasonable attorney fees and costs. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(b).

The Act defines an HCLC as:

a cause of action against a health care provider or physician for treatment, lack of treatment, or other claimed departure from accepted standards of medical care, or health care, or safety or professional or administrative services directly related to health care, which proximately results in injury to or death of a claimant, whether the claimant's claim or cause of action sounds in tort or contract.

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.001(a)(13). Under this definition,

an HCLC has three elements: (1) the defendant is a health care provider or physician; (2) the claimant's cause of action is for treatment, lack of treatment, or other claimed departure from accepted standards of medical care, health care, or safety or professional or administrative services directly related to health care; and (3) the defendant's alleged departure from accepted standards proximately caused the claimant's injury or death.

Loaisiga v. Cerda, 379 S.W.3d 248, 255 (Tex. 2012) (citing Marks v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 319 S.W.3d 658, 662 (Tex. 2010) (plurality op.)). The Act defines "health care" as "any act or treatment performed or furnished, or that should have been performed or furnished, by any health care provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient's medical care, treatment, or confinement." TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.001(a)(10). Although the Act does not define "safety," the Texas Supreme Court "has defined it as 'the condition of being "untouched by danger; not exposed to danger; secure from danger, harm or loss."'" Rogers v. Bagley, 623 S.W.3d 343, 350 (Tex. 2021) (quoting Williams, 371 S.W.3d at 184 (quoting Diversicare Gen. Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, 185 S.W.3d 842, 855 (Tex. 2005))).

Because of the Act's broad language, the Texas Supreme Court has held that the Legislature's intent was "for the statute to have expansive application," Loaisiga, 379 S.W.3d at 256, and that the Act "creates a rebuttable presumption that a patient's claims against a physician or health care provider based on facts implicating the defendant's conduct during the patient's care, treatment, or confinement are HCLCs," id. at 252. When considering whether a claim is an HCLC, we "focus[] on the facts underlying the claim, not the form of, or artfully-phrased language in the plaintiff's pleadings describing the facts or legal theories asserted." Id. at 255 (citing Yamada...