Rogers v. Bagley

• Decision Date: 16 April 2021
• Docket Number: No. 19-0634,19-0634
• Citation: 623 S.W.3d 343
• Parties: Ramona ROGERS, M. D., Modesto Zamorano, Stephanie Cumpian, Rolando Flores, Hector Ontiveros, Priscilla Nieto, Sonia Hernandez-Keeble, Blas Ortiz, Jr., David Moron, M. D., Jaime Flores and Rio Grande State Center, Petitioners, v. David Saxon BAGLEY, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Jeremiah Ray Bagley, Respondent
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

623 S.W.3d 343

Ramona ROGERS, M. D., Modesto Zamorano, Stephanie Cumpian, Rolando Flores, Hector Ontiveros, Priscilla Nieto, Sonia Hernandez-Keeble, Blas Ortiz, Jr., David Moron, M. D., Jaime Flores and Rio Grande State Center, Petitioners,

v.David Saxon BAGLEY, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Jeremiah Ray Bagley, Respondent

No. 19-0634

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued February 2, 2021

OPINION DELIVERED: April 16, 2021

Rehearing Denied June 18, 2021

Kara Lynne Kennedy, Bill Davis, Austin, Brantley David Starr, Dallas, Dallas County, Brent Webster, Houston, Warren Kenneth Paxton, Austin, Chelsea L. Fullwood, Jeffrey C. Mateer, Philip A. Lionberger, Austin, Kyle D. Hawkins, James Edward Davis, Dallas, for Petitioners Rogers, M.D., Ramona.

Jeffrey C. Mateer, Warren Kenneth Paxton, Austin, Brantley David Starr, Dallas, Dallas County, Kara Lynne Kennedy, Austin, Chelsea L. Fullwood, James Edward Davis, Dallas, Philip A. Lionberger, Austin, Kyle D. Hawkins, Bill Davis, Austin, for Petitioners Ontiveros, Hector, Moron, M.D., David, Ortiz, Jr., Blas, Zamorano, Modesto, Flores, Rolando, Flores, Jaime, Hernandez-Keeble, Sonia, Nieto, Priscilla, Cumpian, Stepahnie, Rio Grande State Center.

Katie P. Klein, McAllen, Julian Carlos Gomez, William D. Mount Jr., McAllen, for Respondent.

Justice Huddle delivered the opinion of the Court.

The questions before us are (1) whether claims asserted against a state mental health facility and its employees arising from the death of a patient, pleaded as claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are health care liability claims under the Texas Medical Liability Act (TMLA); and (2) if so, whether section 1983 preempts the TMLA's requirement to timely serve an expert report. We hold that the claims are health care liability claims subject to the TMLA and that section 1983 does not preempt the TMLA's expert-report requirement. We therefore reverse the court of appeals' judgment and remand the case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Background

David Bagley sued Rio Grande State Center (RGSC) and several of its employees after the death of his thirty-seven-year-old son, Jeremiah Bagley. Jeremiah, who had a history of mental illness, was committed to RGSC, a state mental health facility. While there, Jeremiah was involved in multiple altercations with other patients. After one such altercation, Jeremiah was assigned one-to-one supervision. The incident that led to Jeremiah's death began when Jeremiah physically struck his one-to-one monitor. Five psychiatric nurse assistants (PNAs) intervened to restrain him and administer injectable anti-psychotic and sedative drugs, Olanzapine and Diphenhydramine.

After Jeremiah calmed, he walked to his room, but he soon became agitated, disoriented, pale, and incoherent. Minutes later, Jeremiah went into cardiac arrest. RGSC staff performed CPR and called EMS. When EMS arrived, they administered CPR using an automated chest compression device. EMS transported Jeremiah to a hospital, where he was pronounced dead.

An autopsy revealed Jeremiah had several fractured vertebrae, cracked ribs, a lacerated spleen, and contusions on his head, shoulders, back, and chest. The stated cause of death was "excited delirium due to psychosis with restraint-associated blunt force trauma."

David Bagley sued individually and as the representative of Jeremiah's estate. He named RGSC itself, along with ten individual defendants: the five PNAs involved in the incident, four RGSC supervisors, and Jeremiah's treating doctor.¹ As to RGSC, Bagley alleged negligence under the Texas Tort Claims Act for "dispens[ing] and/or administer[ing] various drugs proximately causing [Jeremiah's] personal injury and death." Against the individual defendants, Bagley asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging (1) excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment against the PNAs, (2) deliberate indifference by the supervisors in their training and supervision of the PNAs, and (3) deliberate indifference as to Bagley's medical care against Dr. Ramona Rogers.

In their respective original answers, the defendants all referenced "the provisions of Chapter 74 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code." Chapter 74 is the Texas Medical Liability Act, which governs health care liability claims (HCLCs) and requires that the plaintiff, to avoid dismissal, serve an expert report addressing liability and causation as to each defendant within 120 days after the defendant files an original answer. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.351(a). Bagley served no such expert report.

After the 120-day deadline passed, RGSC amended its answer to state: "Plaintiff's claims against Defendant RGSC are health care liability claims subject to the substantive and procedural requirements of the Texas Medical Liability Act (‘TMLA’), set forth in Chapter 74 Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code." The individual defendants made analogous amendments.

All defendants jointly moved to dismiss Bagley's claims for failure to serve an expert report under section 74.351(b).² In response, Bagley argued that his claims are not HCLCs and, even if they were, the TMLA's expert-report requirement is preempted by section 1983. Bagley later supplemented his response with a copy of the autopsy and the Inspector General's report of the incident, arguing the defendants "wholly failed to show that TMLA has any application to Plaintiff's case."

At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Bagley announced his nonsuit of the negligence claim against RGSC. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and all defendants (including nonsuited RGSC) filed an interlocutory appeal. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(9).

The court of appeals first held that RGSC was a proper party to the appeal despite being nonsuited because its motion to dismiss with prejudice and for attorney's fees and costs was pending at the time of the nonsuit. 581 S.W.3d 362, 367 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2019). The court concluded that all of Bagley's claims were HCLCs, but it held that the expert-report requirement of the TMLA was preempted by section 1983. Id. at 369, 374. Both Bagley and the defendants petitioned for review.

II. Analysis

In the 1970s, the Texas Legislature found that health care liability claims were increasing "inordinately," adversely affecting the availability and affordability of adequate medical malpractice insurance and driving up the costs of medical care for patients. See Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act of Texas, 65th Leg., R.S., ch. 817, § 1.02(a)(1), (4), (8), 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 2039. In response to this "medical malpractice insurance crisis," the Legislature enacted the predecessor to the TMLA, the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act (MLIIA). Scoresby v. Santillan , 346 S.W.3d 546, 552 (Tex. 2011) (citing MLIIA § 1.02(a)(5)–(6)). The legislation sought to "reduce [the] excessive frequency and severity of health care liability claims ... in a manner that [would] not unduly restrict a claimant's rights any more than necessary to deal with the crisis." MLIIA § 1.02(b)(1)–(3).

In 2003, the Legislature replaced the MLIIA with the TMLA, repeating its findings and statements of purpose. Scoresby , 346 S.W.3d at 552 (citing Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, §§ 10.01, 10.09, 10.11, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 847, 864–82, 884–85). The TMLA effectuates the Legislature's goal of "deter[ring] frivolous lawsuits by requiring a claimant early in litigation to produce the opinion of a suitable expert that his claim has merit." Id. ; see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.351(a).

In this case, Bagley argues that his claims are outside the scope of the TMLA—and he was thus not required to serve an expert report—because he pleaded them under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.³ He further argues that even if his claims are within the TMLA's scope, section 1983 preempts the TMLA because the two conflict and, under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,⁴ the state law gives way to the federal. RGSC and the individual defendants assert the TMLA applies, an expert report was required because Bagley's claims are HCLCs under the TMLA, and section 1983 does not preempt the TMLA's expert-report requirement. We agree with RGSC and the individual defendants.

A. Bagley's claims are health care liability claims.

Our threshold question is whether Bagley's claims are HCLCs subject to the TMLA, including the expert-report requirement in section 74.351. HCLCs have three elements: (1) the defendant is a health care provider⁵ or physician; (2) the claimant's cause of action is for treatment, lack of treatment, or other claimed departure from accepted standards of medical care, health care, or safety or professional or administrative services directly related to health care; and (3) the defendant's alleged departure from accepted standards proximately caused the claimant's injury or death. Loaisiga v. Cerda , 379 S.W.3d 248, 255 (Tex. 2012) (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.001(a)(13) ). Bagley does not dispute the first element: each defendant meets the definition of a health care provider or physician under the statute. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.001(a)(12). As to the third element, Bagley alleges that each defendant's conduct proximately caused Jeremiah's death.

Whether Bagley's claims are HCLCs therefore turns on the second element—whether Bagley's section 1983 claims allege a cause of action "for treatment, lack of treatment, or other claimed departure from accepted standards of medical care, or health care, or safety or professional or administrative services directly related to health care." See id. § 74.001(a)(13). The TMLA defines "health care" as "any act or treatment performed or furnished, or that should have been performed or furnished, by any health care provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient's medical care, treatment, or confinement." Id. § 74.001(a)(10)....