Christus Spohn Health System Corp. D/b/a Christus Spohn v. Huizen
| Decision Date | 19 May 2011 |
| Docket Number | NUMBER 13-10-400-CV |
| Parties | CHRISTUS SPOHN HEALTH SYSTEM CORPORATION D/B/A CHRISTUS SPOHN HOSPITAL CORPUS CHRISTI-MEMORIAL, Appellant, v. JOHN VEN HUIZEN AND VANESSA VEN HUIZEN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIENDS OF GIULIANA SOPHIA VEN HUIZEN, MINOR CHILD, Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On appeal from County Court at Law No. 1
of Nueces County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINIONBefore Justices Garza, Benavides, and Vela
This is an appeal from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss filed by appellant, CHRISTUS Spohn Health System Corporation d/b/a CHRISTUS Spohn Hospital Corpus Christi-Memorial ("Spohn"). The trial court denied Spohn's motion, which sought dismissal of the health care liability claims of appellees, John Ven Huizen and Vanessa Ven Huizen, individually, and as next friends of Giuliana Ven Huizen, their minor daughter ("Ven Huizens"). The Ven Huizens also sued Angelica Dulak, a nurse and Spohn employee. Spohn filed a motion to dismiss on behalf of Dulak, urging that section 101.106(e) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code mandates dismissal of claims against an employee of a governmental unit when suit is filed against both the governmental unit and an employee of the governmental unit. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.106(e) (West 2011). Spohn claims it was entitled to governmental immunity as a "governmental unit" pursuant to sections 285.071 and 285.072 of the Texas Health and Safety Code because the statute rendered Spohn "a hospital district management contractor." See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 285.071, 285.072 (West 2010).
Spohn argues that, because it was a hospital district management contractor, it was a "governmental unit" with respect to the claims made by the Ven Huizens in this lawsuit. Spohn also contends on appeal that the trial court should have dismissed Dulak from the lawsuit because she was an employee of a governmental unit. In addition to denying Spohn's pleas, the trial court granted the Ven Huizens' motion for partial summary judgment, also based on the question of whether Spohn and Dulak were entitled to immunity. We reverse and render judgment dismissing the case.
On August 10, 2009, the Ven Huizens filed suit against Spohn, Dulak, and Barbara Estment, M.D., alleging a healthcare liability claim with respect to injuries that occurred to their daughter at the time of her birth. The Ven Huizens alleged that the health care professionals failed to recognize that their daughter was exhibiting signs of fetal distress prior to her delivery, which caused her to be born with severe injuries. At the time of Giuliana Ven Huizen's birth, Spohn was managing Memorial Hospital pursuant to contracts Spohn had entered in 1996 with the Nueces County Hospital District.
Spohn filed a plea to the jurisdiction and a motion to dismiss with respect to the Ven Huizens' claims against Spohn and Dulak, asserting that Spohn was a "hospital district management contractor" and was entitled to immunity as a "governmental unit." Spohn also sought dismissal of the Ven Huizens claims against Dulak pursuant to section 101.106(e) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Id. § 101.106(e) Spohn also urged that the Ven Huizens failed to prove that their claims fell within the waiver of immunity under the Tort Claims Act and that the Ven Huizens failed to provide statutory notice under the Texas Tort Claims Act. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 101.021, 101.101 (West 2011).
On May 28, 2010, the Ven Huizens filed a motion for partial summary judgment pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c) and 166a(i). They also amended their petition to request a declaratory judgment that Spohn was an independent contractor and not a governmental unit, pleaded that Dulak was an employee of an independent contractor, and alleged that Spohn's characterization of sections 285.071 and 285.072 ofthe Texas Health and Safety Code violated the United States and Texas Constitutions.
The trial court ultimately denied Spohn's claims, granted the Ven Huizens' motion for partial summary judgment, and denied the Ven Huizens' request for declaratory relief and attorney's fees. This interlocutory appeal ensued.
The question of whether a party is entitled to governmental immunity implicates the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. See Harris County Hosp. Dist., v. Tomball Reg'l Hosp., 283 S.W.3d 838, 842 (Tex. 2009); Tex. Dep't of Parks and Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction over a claim is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. Tomball, 283 S.W.3d at 842.
Spohn claims that because of the contractual relationship it entered into with the Nueces County Hospital District beginning in 1996 and that continued to be in force throughout the time frame that involves this lawsuit, it is entitled to immunity pursuant to sections 285.071 and 285.072 of the health and safety code. Id. §§ 285.071, 285.072. It is undisputed that hospital districts are governmental units entitled to immunity, and individuals filing suit against a hospital district must comply with the notice requirements when filing suit against a governmental unit under the tort claims act. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.001 (3) (West 2011); Martinez v. Val Verde County Hosp. Dist., 140 S.W.3d 370, 371 (Tex. 2004). It is also clear from the statute that an entity that is a "hospital district management contractor" is a governmental unit with respect to its management or operation of a hospital under a contract with a hospital district. Section285.071 of the health and safety code defines a "hospital district management contractor" as a "nonprofit corporation, partnership, or sole proprietorship that manages or operates a hospital or provides services under contract with a hospital district that was created by general or special law." Id. § 285.071. The statute also states that:
A hospital district management contractor in its management or operation of a hospital under a contract with a hospital district is considered a governmental unit for purposes of Chapters 101, 102, and 108, Civil Practice and Remedies Code, and any employee of the contractor is, while performing services under the contract for the benefit of the hospital, an employee of the hospital district for the purpose of Chapters 101, 102, and 108, Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
Little case law or analysis exists with respect to this statute. The Austin Court of Appeals, in an unpublished memorandum opinion, stated:
At relevant times, Brackenridge Hospital has been managed by Seton Healthcare Network (f/k/a Daughters of Charity Health Services of Austin) under a contract with the Travis County Hospital District. There is no dispute that Seton in this regard is a 'hospital district management contractor' that is deemed a 'governmental unit' entitled to the protections of the tort claims act and those employees are considered 'employees' of the hospital district under the act.
See Carroll v. Donau, No. 03-09-00293-CV, 2010 WL 2977462 at *1 (Tex. App.-Austin July 29, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.). In Carroll, the plaintiff filed a health care liability claim against Seton. The parties agreed, in that case, that the hospital was a governmental unit because Brackenridge was managed by Seton under a contract with the hospital district.
In Rodriguez v. Christus Spohn Health System Corp., the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the parties did not contest the district court's determination that Spohn was a "hospital district management contractor" as defined by section 285.071. Rodriguez, 628 F. 3d 731, 734 (5th Cir. 2010). The Court, in Rodriguez, stated "since Christus is a hospital district management contractor, it is entitled to governmental immunity for purposes of Chapters 101, 102, and 108 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code." Id. The Fifth Circuit opined that Spohn was entitled to governmental immunity from state law claims unless the plaintiff pleaded a claim that comes within the purview of the categories of claims for which the Texas Tort Claims Act waives immunity. Id. The court noted that Rodriguez's claim, brought under Chapter 74 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, had to be dismissed because it was a tort based on a statute that contained no waiver of immunity. Id. at 736. This case is notable for our analysis because Christus Spohn, the precise entity that was determined by the district court in Rodriguez to be a hospital district management contractor, is the same entity that is before this Court in this appeal.
Recently, the Texas Supreme Court ruled that another section of the health and safety code, section 312.007, rendered Baylor College of Medicine a state agency. Klein v. Hernandez, 315 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2010). In Klein, there was an agreement between Baylor College of Medicine and the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board to train resident physicians at public hospitals in Texas. Id. at 2. Klein, a Baylor resident physician, delivered Hernandez's baby pursuant to the contract. Id. The Hernandezes filed suit against Baylor and Klein for medical malpractice, alleging that thephysician was negligent in delivering their child. Both Baylor and Klein filed motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, stating that they were entitled to immunity under sections 312.006 and 312.007 of the Texas Health and Safety Code. Id.; see Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 312.006, 312.007 (West 2010). The supreme court held that under section 312.007, Baylor was a state agency and Klein was considered an employee of a state agency. Id. at 8.
While the statute at issue in this case is different, Klein is instructive because the case makes clear that the Legislature has...
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