Chrobuck v. Snohomish County, 41145
| Decision Date | 04 February 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 41145,41145 |
| Citation | 78 Wn.2d 858,480 P.2d 489 |
| Parties | J. T. CHROBUCK, Charles F. Shigley, Sr., Arthur Kilian Clifford Rudeen, Glen Neuman, E. Richard Peasley, Ronald Mathies, Harry Watts, George Sherry, M. C. Michner, William C. Kubick, E. R. Heggen, Dr. W. BE. Berard, J. W. Tupper, F. C. Whaley, Gene Hickok, H. C. Humphrey, R. E. Lervoid, and R. C. Kirsten, Respondents, v. SNOHOMISH COUNTY, Snohomish County Planning Commission, and Snohomish County Board of Commissioners, and Atlantic Richfield Company, Appellants. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Robert E. Schillberg, Pros. Atty., Eugene Butler, Deputy Pros. Atty., Joseph Meagher, Westmoreland, French & Meagher, Everett, for appellants.
Hodge, Dahlgren & Hillis, Jerome L. Hillis, Seattle, for respondents.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the superior court voiding the action of the Planning Commission and the Board of County Commissioners of Snohomish County, Washington, in amending a comprehensive plan and rezoning a given area from a rural and residential type classification to a heavy industrial classification.
The facts essential to a resolution of the appeal may be summarized in the following manner:
Commencing in 1956, defendant Atlantic Richfield Company, hereafter referred to as Atlantic Richfield, acquired approximately 2,100 acres of land embracing some 2,000 lineal feet of beach frontage in the immediate vicinity of Kayak Point on Port Susan Bay of Puget Sound. The acreage is situated in Snohomish County, approximately 7 miles south of the town of Stanwood, some 15 miles north and west of the city of Everett, and easterly--across Port Susan Bay--Of Camano Island.
The property is located within the Stanwood Planning Area of Snohomish County's Comprehensive Plan for zoning. The comprehensive plan text for the Stanwood Planning Area, promulgated in 1964, designated the Atlantic Richfield property and the surrounding area as rural and residential, and the implementing zoning ordinance classified it as Rural Use, a residential and agricultural type of zone as established in the Snohomish County Zoning Ordinance.
Since the zoning in 1964, the waterfront areas bordering on Port Susan Bay to the north and immediate south of the Atlantic Richfield property have, as access became available, developed as prime residential and recreational sites, as has the east shore of Camano Island. Likewise, Lakes Howard, Goodwin, Shoecraft, and Ki lying, respectively, to the north and east of the inland perimeter of Atlantic Richfield's property have experienced waterfront residential growth, with an increasing transition from summer cottages to permanent residences. The remainder of this portion of the Stanwood Planning Area is rather sparsely settled, although with the increased population and industrial expansion in the vicinity of the city of Everett greater residential utilization is foreseeable. Access to the Atlantic Richfield property at all times concerned consisted of one secondary paved county road running generally north and south, known as the Warm Beach Road, and a graveled road, Fire Trail Road, running east and west along the southern boundary of the property.
In mid-1967, Atlantic Richfield publicly announced it proposed to construct and operate an oil refinery on its property in the immediate vicinity of Kayak Point. Thereafter, in September, Atlantic Richfield requested Snohomish County to amend the comprehensive plan to permit a rezoning of the pertinent portion of its property from its rural residential classification to a heavy industrial designation to enable the proposed installation. The application was duly referred to the Snohomish County Planning Department for review and recommendation and a public hearing before the Snohomish County Planning Commission was scheduled to commence November 30, 1967.
At the public hearing, which commenced as scheduled on November 30 and extended through December 1, 1967, plaintiffs, property owners situated in varying proximity to the area proposed to be utilized for an oil refinery, were represented by counsel and appeared in opposition to the requested amendment of the comprehensive plan. Atlantic Richfield, as a proponent of the amendment, was likewise represented by counsel. At the outset of the hearing all counsel for the respective interested parties were advised by the chairman of the planning commission that cross-examination of any witnesses testifying during the hearing would not be permitted.
The hearing opened with the introduction of the study of the proposal conducted by the Snohomish County Planning Department and the recommendation of that department that Atlantic Richfield's application be denied. This recommendation was predicated upon the department's belief that the area involved was topographically unsuited for heavy industry and that the proposed location of an oil refinery on the site, with the portent of future expansion, was incompatible with the existing and future residential and recreational attributes of the surrounding area.
Atlantic Richfield then introduced evidence, including the testimony of Mr. L. F. Strador, vice-president of Atlantic Richfield, describing the nature and characteristics of the oil refinery and dockage installation proposed as well as the controls which would be utilized to minimize visual impact, noise, odor, water pollution and oil spillage. In this vein, Atlantic Richfield indicated an immediate need for only 660 acres for the main refinery facilities, including a narrow strip of beach frontage off Kayak Point to afford dockage for incoming and outgoing oil tankers. Further evidence bore upon the sources of water supply and electrical energy which would be looked to, and the additional local fire control services, employment opportunities, improved access, and tax advantages which could be derived as a result of the proposed installation. Counsel for Atlantic Richfield stated that if the company could not utilize the proposed Kayak Point site it would have to go elsewhere than Snohomish County in placing its refinery.
Plaintiffs were then allowed to present their contentions and evidence, by which they reechoed the concerns of the Snohomish County Planning Department survey, and emphasized the existing and expanding residential and recreational usage of Port Susan Bay beach frontage, the tidal and fishery characteristics of Port Susan Bay and the possible adverse effects of oil spillage and the dumpage of effluent into the Bay.
Following the hearing and on January 9, 1968, the planning commission announced its decision to grant Atlantic Richfield's application to amend the comprehensive plan, and on January 15, 1968, forwarded its findings of fact and recommendation to the Board of County Commissioners of Snohomish County. The board in turn, on February 5, 1968, by resolution adopted the findings and recommendation of the planning commission and amended the comprehensive plan accordingly.
Thereafter and on February 29th and March 1, 1968 pursuant to a petition to rezone the proposed refinery site filed by Atlantic Richfield on the first day of the planning commission hearings on the comprehensive plan amendment, November 30, 1967, the planning commission conducted a public hearing on the petition to rezone. Again, plaintiffs, as opponents, and Atlantic Richfield, as proponent, were represented by counsel and presented, with some additions and refinements, essentially the same testimony and evidence as at the previous hearing, subject to the same limitation as to cross-examination. And, again, the Snohomish County Planning Department recommended against the granting of the petition.
On May 16, 1968, the planning commission rendered its decision granting Atlantic Richfield's petition, as amended at the hearing, to rezone 635 acres of its property from the Rural Use designation to a heavy industrial classification, contingent upon the acceptance and continued validity of a concomitant agreement between the county and Atlantic Richfield concerning the exclusive use and the environmental control of the site for refinery purposes, and upon the rezoning of 245 acres around the perimeter of the site to a forest and recreational use as a buffer zone. The planning commission's findings of fact and recommendations were forwarded to the board of county commissioners on May 27, 1968, and on June 10, 1968, based upon the execution and 'specific enforceability' of the concomitant agreement, the board adopted the recommendation of the planning commission and rezoned the property as indicated.
On June 24, 1968, plaintiffs initiated this action seeking judicial review, by way of certiorari, of the comprehensive plan amendment and rezone proceedings. In essence plaintiffs contended that a change of conditions in the area involved which would warrant the action taken had not been established, that the plan amendment and rezoning determinations amounted to spot zoning and were arbitrary and unreasonable, and that they had been denied due process of law before the planning commission and the board of county commissioners.
The superior court, in voiding the comprehensive plan amendment and rezoning, determined that plaintiffs had not been accorded due process of law in the proceedings before the planning commission and the board of county commissioners and, further, that the rezoning constituted spot zoning. These determinations were predicated upon this court's decision in Smith v. Skagit County, 75 Wash.2d 715, 453 P.2d 832 (1969). On appeal, defendants challenge the applicability of Smith to the facts of this case.
However, before reaching the substantive issues concerning the zoning process, it is necessary to dispose of a procedural matter interjected by defendants. At the hearing before the superior court, defendants moved to dismiss the writ of certiorari issued upon plaintiffs' petition for review insof...
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