Chromy v. Lawrance, B050102
Decision Date | 11 September 1991 |
Docket Number | No. B050102,B050102 |
Citation | 285 Cal.Rptr. 400,233 Cal.App.3d 1521 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | , 1992 A.M.C. 1252 Anthony J. CHROMY, as Administrator of the Estate of Ronald Allan Chromy, Deceased, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Charles LAWRANCE, Mary Jane Lawrance, Defendants and Respondents. Civ. |
Duke L. Peters, Sherman Oaks, for plaintiff and appellant.
Richard G. Flanagan and L.E. Schweiner, Van Nuys, for defendants and respondents.
Anthony Chromy, administrator of the Estate of Ronald Allan Chromy, appeals from a defense judgment after a jury rejected his maritime wrongful death and survivor claims based on the Death on the High Seas Act (46 U.S.C.App. § 761, et seq., DOHSA). We vacate the judgment and order the action dismissed because the trial court had no subject matter jurisdiction to try either claim. We reject appellant's argument that Moragne v. States Marine Lines (1970) 398 U.S. 375, 90 S.Ct. 1772, 26 L.Ed.2d 339 (Moragne ), and Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire (1986) 477 U.S. 207, 106 S.Ct. 2485, 91 L.Ed.2d 174 (Tallentire ), here permits the trial court to exercise concurrent subject matter jurisdiction.
Decedent, Ronald Chromy, fell from respondents' Charles and Mary Jane Lawrance, 27-foot sailboat, the "Scherzo," during an overnight yacht race from Santa Barbara to Redondo Beach. The accident occurred twelve nautical miles southeast of Anacapa Island, more than three nautical miles from any state shoreline, i.e., on the high seas. Respondents radioed a "May Day" signal but were unable to give the United States Coast Guard accurate ship coordinates because of a defect in their Loran navigation system. The Coast Guard search and rescue team never found decedent.
Decedent's heirs and estate filed a DOHSA wrongful death claim and a survivor claim under general maritime law. Liability was predicated on theories of unseaworthiness and negligence. Appellant claimed that respondents' failure to deploy a rescue buoy, competently crew the ship, or give the Coast Guard accurate coordinates breached the maritime duty to rescue decedent.
Respondents filed a general demurrer challenging the court's subject matter jurisdiction. The demurrer was overruled. Respondents did not seek relief by way of a writ. Following a 9-day trial, the jury returned a defense verdict on negligence (9-3) and unseaworthiness (12-0).
In his opening brief, appellant attacked the judgment on several substantial grounds. Respondent, content with the jury verdict, did not raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. We raised the issue sua sponte and asked the parties for briefing. (Bachis v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 722, 724, 71 Cal.Rptr. 486; Gov.Code, § 68081.)
(Abelleira v. District Court of Appeals (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 288, 109 P.2d 942; see also Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) vol. 2, Jurisdiction, § 9, p. 374.) (Schlyen v. Schlyen (1954) 43 Cal.2d 361, 375, 273 P.2d 897.)
The Death on the High Seas Act is codified as 46 United States Code Appendix section 761, et seq. Section 761 states: "Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore of any State, or the District of Columbia, or the Territories or dependencies of the United States, the personal representative of the decedent may maintain a suit for damages in the district courts of the United States, in admiralty, for the exclusive benefit of the decedent's wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent relative against the vessel, person, or corporation which would have been liable if death had not ensued."
Section 7 of the Act (46 U.S.C.App. § 767) contains a "jurisdictional savings" clause which states in part that, "[t]he provisions of any State statute giving or regulating rights of action or remedies for death shall not be affected by this chapter...."
DOHSA provides a uniform federal remedy for wrongful deaths occurring more than a marine league (three miles) from shore. (Moragne, supra, 398 U.S. at p. 398, 90 S.Ct. at p. 1786, 26 L.Ed.2d at p. 355; see also 1 Norris, The Law of Maritime Personal Injuries (4th ed. 1990) § 6.5, p. 317; 6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) Torts, § 1200, p. 636.) "DOSHA does not include a survivial provision authorizing recovery for pain and suffering before death." (Tallentire, supra, 477 U.S. at p. 215, fn. 1, 106 S.Ct. at p. 2490, fn. 1, 91 L.Ed.2d at p. 184, fn. 1).
DOSHA jurisdiction attaches to (Bergen v. F/V St. Patrick (9th Cir.1987) 816 F.2d 1345, 1348.) (People v. Weeren (1980) 26 Cal.3d 654, 665, 163 Cal.Rptr. 255, 607 P.2d 1279; Hooker v. Raytheon Co. (S.D.Cal.1962) 212 F.Supp. 687, 693-694.)
DOHSA provides that wrongful death claims arising from maritime accidents on the high seas "may" be maintained in federal court. The use of the word "may" has generated confusion and debate in the decisional law since DOHSA's enactment in 1920. The issue is whether DOHSA preempts, i.e., supersedes, state remedies and subject matter jurisdiction. The United States Supreme Court resolved part of the debate by holding that DOHSA establishes a uniform federal remedy for deaths occurring on the high seas. In dicta, the Supreme Court noted that DOHSA was intended to preserve a state's existing subject matter jurisdiction over maritime deaths. (Moragne, supra, 398 U.S. at pp. 400-402, 90 S.Ct. at pp. 1787-1788, 26 L.Ed.2d at pp. 355-357; Tallentire, supra, 477 U.S. at p. 230, 106 S.Ct. at p. 2498, 91 L.Ed.2d at pp. 194-195.)
In Moragne a longshoreman died in Florida territorial waters. The court discussed the problem of state concurrent jurisdiction by noting that (Id., 398 U.S. at p. 393, fn. 10, 90 S.Ct. at p. 1784, fn. 10, 26 L.Ed.2d at pp. 352-353, fn. 10 emphasis added.)
In Tallentire two drilling platform workers were killed in a helicopter crash 35 miles off the Louisiana coast on the high seas. Invoking a "Reverse-Erie" doctrine, the court required that state (Id., 477 U.S. at p. 223, 106 S.Ct. at p. 2494, 91 L.Ed.2d at p. 190.) Tallentire held that DOHSA remedies preempted a state's wrongful death remedies where DOHSA applied. (Id., 477 U.S. at p. 232, 106 S.Ct. at p. 2499, 91 L.Ed.2d at p. 190.) Thus, Louisiana state law which allowed recovery for nonpecuinary loss was preempted by DOHSA. Decedent's heirs could not recover damages for nonpecuniary loss. (Id., 477 U.S. at p. 220, 106 S.Ct. at p. 2493, 91 L.Ed.2d at p. 188; see also 14 Wright & Miller,Federal Practice and Procedure (1991, supp.) § 3672, pp. 154-155.) Tallentire concluded that the jurisdictional savings clause found in section 7 of DOHSA "bears a marked similarity to the 'saving to suitors' clause that allows litigants to bring in personam maritime actions in state courts." (Id., 477 U.S. at p. 222, 106 S.Ct. at p. 2494, 91 L.Ed.2d at p. 189.)
The "savings to suitors" clause is found in The Judiciary Act of 1789 and states the district courts of the United States "... shall also have exclusive original cognizance of all civil cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction ... saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy where the common law is competent to give it...." (28 U.S.C. § 1333.)
(1 Norris, The Law of Maritime Personal Injuries (4th ed. 1990) § 5.16, p. 290, emphasis added.)
DOHSA actions may only be tried in state courts if the state's wrongful death statute applies to deaths on the high seas. "Tallentire has now clearly established that section 7 of DOHSA expressly provides that claims governed by the substantive provisions of DOHSA may be brought in state court, with state wrongful death statutes providing the jurisdictional basis for exercise of saving clause jurisdiction by the state courts...." (B. Clark, "Removability of High Seas Death Claims Filed In State Court After Tallentire," 12 Tulane Maritime Law Journal (1988) 317, 333-334.) "[S]tate wrongful death statutes...
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