Chrysler Corp. v. Weinstein

• Decision Date: 23 February 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-1111,87-1111
• Citation: 522 So.2d 894,13 Fla. L. Weekly 513
• Parties: 13 Fla. L. Weekly 513 CHRYSLER CORPORATION, a foreign corporation, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Rochelle WEINSTEIN, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 894

522 So.2d 894

13 Fla. L. Weekly 513

CHRYSLER CORPORATION, a foreign corporation, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Rochelle WEINSTEIN, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

No. 87-1111.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

Third District.

Feb. 23, 1988.

Rehearing Denied April 20, 1988.

Walton, Lantaff, Schroeder & Carson and G. Bart Billbrough, Miami, for appellant/cross-appellee.

Michael Lechtman, North Miami Beach, for appellee/cross-appellant.

Before BARKDULL, NESBITT, and JORGENSON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Chrysler Corporation appeals an order awarding attorney's fees to Rochelle Weinstein following a jury verdict in her favor pursuant to the Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act (Lemon Law), § 681.10, et seq., Fla.Stat. (1985). We affirm the award.

Rochelle Weinstein sued Chrysler as a result of a defective car sold to her. The jury found in her favor on her Lemon Law and breach of contract claims. She did not prevail on breach of implied warranty, breach of merchantability, and punitive damage claims. Damages were assessed at $14,389.

A hearing was held to determine appropriate attorney's fees. The trial court awarded a fee of $18,055 based on findings that 80.25 hours of work on the case were reasonable and necessary; that Chrysler did not prove that opposing counsel had spent increased time preparing claims on which he did not prevail, thus obviating the need to reduce the number of hours for which fees should be awarded; that the attorney was entitled to $150 per hour; that the lodestar factor in this case was $12,037; and that Weinstein was represented on a contingency basis in a case where her chances of prevailing were more likely than not, thus entitling her attorney to an enhancement factor of 1.5.

In this appeal, Chrysler first alleges that Weinstein's attorney, while statutorily entitled to attorney's fees based on the Lemon Law, § 681.104(5)(b), Fla.Stat. (1985), failed to support his claim that the hours he expended on the case were reasonable. Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So.2d 1145, 1150 (Fla.1985). A review of the record shows that the trial judge found the number of hours to be reasonable in comparison to those spent by Chrysler's attorneys. We approve that finding. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank v. Canmont Int'l, Inc., 322 So.2d 565 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Vincent v. Lawson, 272 So.2d 162 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973).

Once the court determined the number of hours expended and the hourly rate of pay to be used (which is not disputed here), the lodestar factor was produced which became the objective basis for the fee award. Rowe, 472 So.2d at 1151. The trial court's next step was to add or subtract from the fee based on the "results obtained" and the "contingency risk" factor. Id. at 1151.

In that regard, Chrysler asserts that in calculating the fee award, the trial court should have reduced counsel's total hours by the amount of time spent on preparing non-statutory claims on which Weinstein did not prevail. See id. at 1151. We do not accept this argument. The trial court was entitled to believe Weinstein's expert who testified that the intertwining of the related causes of action for breaches of contract and express and implied warranties did not substantially increase the labor since all the claims involved a common core of facts and were based on related legal theories. An argument similar to Chrysler's was rejected in Drouin v. Fleetwood Enter., 163 Cal.App.3d 486, 209 Cal.Rptr. 623 (1985). There the court held that attorney's fees need not be apportioned because of a related legal theory where the various claims involve a common core of facts. Cf. Hendry Tractor Co. v. Fernandez, 432 So.2d 1315 (Fla.1983) (plaintiff in a multi-count personal injury action who prevailed on one theory of liability, but lost on another, was entitled to recover costs because injuries arose out of a single set of circumstances); but cf. Folta v. Bolton, 493 So.2d 440 (Fla.1986) (In a multi-count medical malpractice action, where each claim was separate and distinct and would support an independent action, as opposed to being an alternative theory of liability for the same wrong, the prevailing party on each distinct claim is entitled to attorney fees for those fees generated in connection with that claim).

We similarly reject Chrysler's claim that the fee arrangement between Weinstein and her attorney was not truly contingent. The agreement here required Weinstein to pay a flat $1,500 plus a $100 cost deposit. The balance of the fee was contingent on the successful outcome of...