Vincent v. Lawson, 72-137
| Decision Date | 15 January 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 72-137,72-137 |
| Citation | 272 So.2d 162 |
| Parties | Kate W. VINCENT, a free dealer, Appellant, v. Helen W. LAWSON and W. A. Lawson, her husband, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Richard A. Lawrence, Sr., Melbourne, for appellant.
William J. Neale, of Neale & Sigman, Melbourne, for appellees.
WHITE, JOS. S., Associate Judge.
This is an appeal by the plaintiff who had obtained a foreclosure decree in the trial court, but which decree was vacated by the trial court upon defendant's motion made several months subsequent to the entry of the decree, foreclosure sale of the property and the issuance of certificate of title to the plaintiff. With the motion to vacate the decree defendant tendered into court the full amount due on account of principal, interest, costs and attorney fees. The appeal is from the trial court's order vacating the final decree, the foreclosure sale, and the certificate of title held by plaintiff.
Defendant's motion to vacate was based upon the fact that shortly after institution of suit plaintiff and defendant agreed upon suspension of the proceedings if defendant would make certain periodical payments toward discharging a delinquency existing at the time of suit. Defendant argued that thereafter plaintiff could not lawfully resume action without first giving defendant notice of such an intention.
No responsive pleading was filed to the motion to vacate, but, nevertheless, a hearing was held at which time testimony on the motion was heard by the trial judge.
In reviewing this testimony we find a conflict existing regarding the exact terms of the agreement according to which defendant was to make payments and plaintiff was to suspend prosecution of the foreclosure proceedings. According to plaintiff's version of the agreements, time of performance by defendant was the essence of the contract, whereas defendant said that the payment made on the occasion of the agreement would 'stop the foreclosure' and that there was no 'set time', 'not any specific time' for paying the balance; that defendant 'would make payments as often as I could'.
Conflicts in testimony are to be reconciled by the trier of the facts; in this case, the trial judge. We are not authorized to reverse if there is substantial evidence in the record to support the conclusion of the trier of the facts.
The trial judge ruled that plaintiff should have notified defendant of a resumption of the foreclosure proceedings. If defendant...
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...a question of fact bearing on the issue of the customer's negligence that should be resolved by the trier of fact. See Vincent v. Lawson, 272 So.2d 162 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973); see also, Flagship Bank. Furthermore, although, as the customer argues, its checks and its office were not generally a......
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...attorneys. We approve that finding. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank v. Canmont Int'l, Inc., 322 So.2d 565 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Vincent v. Lawson, 272 So.2d 162 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973). Once the court determined the number of hours expended and the hourly rate of pay to be used (which is not disputed he......
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Manufacturers Nat. Bank of Hialeah v. Canmont Intern., Inc., 75--107
...its duty in this regard ceases when it has determined that there is some substantial evidence to support the judgment. Vincent v. Lawson, Fla.App.1973, 272 So.2d 162; and 2 Fla.Jur., Appeals, §§ 340--344, and § 347 with the cases cited therein. Since the record in this appeal discloses subs......
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Apeco Marina, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 74-144
...City of Miami Beach v. Fein, Fla.App.1972, 263 So.2d 258; City of Jacksonville v. Mack, Fla.App.1972, 260 So.2d 542; Vincent v. Lawson, Fla.App.1973, 272 So.2d 162. Careful review of the facts in the case sub judice discloses that there was substantial competent evidence to support the Affi......