Chrysler Grp., LLC v. Walden

• Citation: 792 S.E.2d 754,339 Ga.App. 733
• Decision Date: 15 November 2016
• Docket Number: A16A1285
• Parties: CHRYSLER GROUP, LLC v. WALDEN et al.
• Court: United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)

339 Ga.App. 733

792 S.E.2d 754

CHRYSLER GROUP, LLC

v.WALDEN et al.

A16A1285

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

November 15, 2016

Reconsideration Denied December 5, 2016

Bruce W. Kirbo, Jr. ; Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, M. Diane Owens, Bradley S. Wolff, Terry O. Brantley, Alicia A. Timm, for appellant.

Butler, Wooten, Cheeley & Peak, James E. Butler, Jr., David T. Rohwedder, Leigh M. May ; Butler Tobin, James E. Butler III ; Floyd & Kendrick, George C. Floyd, L. Catherine Cox; Seacrest, Karesh, Tate & Bicknese, Karsten Bicknese, Robert H. Betts, for appellees.

King & Spalding, Chilton D. Varner, Madison H. Kitchens, amici curiae.

McFadden, Judge.

This case involves a tragic vehicle collision that resulted in the death of four-year-old Remington Walden. The collision occurred when the child was a passenger in the back seat of a 1999 Chrysler Jeep Grand Cherokee. Bryan Harrell, a co-defendant who has not appealed, was driving a pickup truck and struck the back of the Grand Cherokee. The gas tank of the Grand Cherokee was punctured in the wreck and the vehicle caught fire. Remington Walden died in the fire.

In 2012, Remington Walden's parents filed this action against Chrysler Group, LLC n/k/a "FCA US LLC" and Harrell. They alleged that Chrysler acted with a reckless or wanton disregard for human life in the design or sale of the Grand Cherokee, and that Chrysler breached a duty to warn of the hazard associated with the use of the vehicle. After a nine-day trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding $120 million in damages for wrongful death and $30 million in damages for pain and suffering. The jury found Harrell to be one percent at fault and Chrysler to be ninety-nine percent at fault. Chrysler filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied, conditioned on the plaintiffs' acceptance of a remittitur of the wrongful death verdict to $30 million and of the pain and suffering verdict to $10 million. The plaintiffs accepted the remittitur, and the trial court entered judgment accordingly.

Chrysler now appeals. It argues that the trial court erred by denying its directed verdict motions, but we find that the trial court properly submitted the plaintiffs' claims to the jury for resolution. Chrysler argues that the trial court erred by allowing the plaintiffs to introduce evidence of 17 other rear-end collisions involving Jeep vehicles because the plaintiffs failed to show that the collisions were substantially similar to the collision at issue, but Chrysler has not shown that the trial court abused his discretion in admitting that evidence. Chrysler argues that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of incidents involving the Ford Pinto without determining that the incidents were substantially similar to the incident here, but the references to Pintos were general references, not evidence of particular incidents.

Chrysler argues that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence and allowing certain argument. Specifically, Chrysler asserts that the trial court erred by allowing the plaintiffs to question a witness about the compensation paid to its chief executive officer, also a witness, but evidence of a witness's relationship to a party is always admissible. Chrysler argues that the trial court erred by allowing plaintiffs' counsel to argue in closing that Chrysler should be imprisoned, but Chrysler has not shown an abuse of discretion.

Chrysler argues that the trial court erred by allowing the plaintiffs to question witnesses about a recall request letter issued by a division of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") during an investigation of the fuel tanks in Jeep SUVs. It argues that the recall request letter was inadmissible hearsay because it included only tentative findings, but the trial court did not abuse his discretion in admitting the recall request letter.

Conversely, Chrysler argues that the trial court erred by excluding the testimony of two of its experts, but Chrysler challenges only one of the several grounds upon which the trial court excluded the testimony and we will affirm a trial court's ruling that is right for any reason.

Finally, Chrysler raises challenges based on the size of the verdict and the judgment entered on the remitted verdict. It argues that the size of the jury's verdict demonstrates that the verdict was motivated by passion and prejudice and a desire to punish and deter, although the plaintiffs did not seek punitive damages, but we find that Chrysler has failed to show the verdict resulted from prejudice. Chrysler also argues that the trial court failed to sufficiently remit the damages awards, but we find that the trial court did not err. We therefore affirm.

1. Denial of directed verdict motions .

Chrysler argues that the trial court erred by denying its directed verdict motions on the plaintiffs' claims that Chrysler acted with a reckless or wanton disregard for human life in the design or sale of the Grand Cherokee, and that Chrysler breached a duty to warn of the hazard associated with the use of the vehicle. We disagree.

The plaintiffs filed their action beyond the applicable ten-year statute of repose set forth in OCGA § 51-1-11 (b) (2), which therefore controls the claims available to them. The statute of repose excepts certain claims of wanton and reckless conduct from its application and does not apply to failure to warn claims. OCGA § 51-1-11 (c). As noted, the plaintiffs asserted a claim of reckless or wanton conduct and a claim of failure to warn. Both claims were founded on the assertion that Chrysler knew that the location of the fuel tank in the 1999 Grand Cherokee was dangerous, yet it consciously and deliberately continued to manufacture and sell the vehicle with the gas tank in that location and it failed to warn the public of the danger. Chrysler moved for directed verdict at the close of the plaintiffs' case and at the close of the evidence. The court denied the motions, and Chrysler enumerates as error the denial of the motions.

A motion for directed verdict should not be granted where there exists even slight material issues of fact, because the trial court is substituting its judgment for the jury's; only when there is an absence of evidence or when no evidence supports an essential element of the case should a directed verdict be granted, because the trial judge takes the determination of the facts from the jury.

Teklewold v. Taylor , 271 Ga.App. 664, 665, 610 S.E.2d 617 (2005) (citation omitted). "The appellate review standard of a trial court's denial of a directed verdict motion is the any evidence standard. In considering a ruling on a motion for directed verdict, the evidence must be construed most favorably to the party opposing the motion." Key Safety Systems v. Bruner , 334 Ga.App. 717, 717–718, 780 S.E.2d 389 (2015) (citation omitted). See also OCGA § 9-11-50 (a).

Viewed in this light, the record shows that on the afternoon of March 6, 2012, Emily Newsome was driving her four-year-old nephew, Remington Walden, to a tennis lesson in her father's 1999 Jeep Grand Cherokee, which was manufactured February 2, 1999. The child was seated in the back of the vehicle. As Newsome was waiting to make a left-hand turn, defendant Bryan Harrell, who was driving a Dodge Dakota pickup truck, collided with the back of the Grand Cherokee. The fuel tank of the Grand Cherokee, which was located behind the rear axle, was ruptured in the collision. Gasoline poured from the tank and ignited. The Grand Cherokee was engulfed in flames. Newsome was able to climb out of the driver's side window of the Grand Cherokee, but Remington Walden could not escape and Newsome could not get him out. The child was alive and conscious while the Grand Cherokee was on fire and may have lived up to a minute with flames in contact with his body. He died from injuries caused by the fire. The plaintiffs presented evidence that there is no more painful way to die.

The plaintiffs presented the testimony of Judson Estes, the Chrysler employee who managed the crash test program for Grand Cherokees starting with the 1996-1997 model year. Estes testified that in 1998, Chrysler knew that the gas tank in the 1999 Grand Cherokee was vulnerable and would be crushed in rear impacts.

Michael Teets, a senior engineer and specialist in fuel systems for Chrysler, testified that, as a rule, there should be no "crush" in the tank area. He acknowledged that design guidelines for fuel supply, written before he was hired at Chrysler in 1981, provided that the fuel tank "should be located in a manner that avoids known impact areas," where the potential of the tank being crushed in a collision is far greater. At some point, Chrysler convened a group of employees, called the "Rear Impact Tech Club," to review old fuel system guidelines and methodologies. Teets was a member of the group and, in December 2001, informed the group that there "should be no crush in tank area."

The plaintiffs presented other evidence that Chrysler knew the benefits of locating the gas tank "midship," or between the front and rear axles. They introduced marketing brochures for other Chrysler vehicles, which, the plaintiffs' expert testified, demonstrated an extensive history of Chrysler's knowledge of protection from rear impact that comes from placing gas tanks midship. These included a brochure for a 1996 Dodge Caravan, a 1998 Dodge Durango SUV, and a 1999 Ram Cargo Van.

The plaintiffs also presented evidence of 17 other collisions involving Jeep vehicles with fuel tanks located behind the rear axle, in which the Jeep vehicle was rear-ended and fuel escaped from the tank. They showed that Chrysler had notice of these other incidents before the collision at issue and had notice of one of them prior to the sale of the Grand Cherokee involved in this case. (Although Chrysler challenges the admission of this evidence, it has failed to show that the trial court abused his discretion in...