Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Davis

• Citation: 226 Ga. 221,173 S.E.2d 691
• Decision Date: 10 March 1970
• Docket Number: Nos. 25538,25574,s. 25538
• Parties: CHRYSLER MOTORS CORPORATION v. Jean DAVIS et al. GLYNN PLYMOUTH, INC. v. Jean DAVIS et al.
• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Page 691

173 S.E.2d 691

226 Ga. 221

CHRYSLER MOTORS CORPORATION v. Jean DAVIS et al.

GLYNN PLYMOUTH, INC. v. Jean DAVIS et al.

Nos. 25538, 25574.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

March 10, 1970.

Rehearing Denied March 25, 1970.

Syllabus by the Court

Where the Court of Appeals holds that certain specified evidence in negligence cases is insufficient to show that the alleged negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries, the further holding by that court that the self-servingdeclaration of one since deceased, introduced without objection, has probative value and that together with the other evidence is sufficient to prove proximate cause, is erroneous insofar as the self-serving declarations are concerned. However, the Court of Appeals was correct in affirming the trial court's judgment overruling the defendants' motions for judgments notwithstanding the mistrial for the reason that there was prima facie res gestae evidence for the consideration of a jury.

Neely, Freeman & Hawkins, Joe C. Freeman, Jr., Thomas J. Harper, Jr., Atlanta, Conyers, Fending, Dickey, Fending & Whelchel, J. Thomas Whelchel, Brunswick, for Chrysler Motors Corp.

Bennet, Bennet, Gilbert & Whittle, Wallace E. Harrell, Brunswick, Bouhan, Williams & Levy, Walter C. Hartridge, II, Savannah, for Glynn Plymouth, Inc.

Alaimo, Taylor & Bishop, Anthony A. Alaimo, James A. Bishop, Brunswick, for appellees.

FELTON, Justice.

We granted certiorari to review the rulings and judgments of the Court of Appeals in these cases: Glynn Plymouth, Inc. v. Davis, Chrysler Motors Corporation v. Davis, 120 Ga.App. 475, 170 S.E.2d 848. We repeat the statement of facts preceding the opinions of the Court of Appeals and the rulings of the court on the specific issues ruled on. The issues defined by the Court of Appeals are clear and pinpointed to such an extent that there and be no doubt what it meant as to the sole issue determining whether its ruling is right or wrong:

'James M. Davis had served as manager-president of Glynn Plymouth, Inc., until February 15, 1966, at which time he severed this connection to go into another business. On February 19, 1966, he purchased from Glynn Plymouth a 1966 Plymouth Belvedere station wagon which he had previously used as a demonstrator and which his wife had also driven. On March 3, 1966, Mr. Davis was returning to Brunswick from Savannah traveling east on U.S. Highway No. 84 towards a railroad crossing at approximately 60 m.p.h. when the red blinker lights at the crossing began to flash indicating the approach of a train. Mr. Davis applied the brakes to the automobile, whereupon it verred off slightly to the right where the right front wheel came onto the shoulder, and the automobile then came back onto the highway, veered sharply to the left, and came to rest in a ditch against the railroad embankment on the left side of the highway approximately four or five feet from the tracks. There were no witnesses to the collision other than Mr. Davis, who was hospitalized for injuries to his ankle and subsequently released. On April 21, however, he died from a blood clot which broke loose from the injured area and lodged in his lung.

'Mrs. Davis, plaintiff here, brought suit on April 27, 1967, for his wrongful death, alleging that Chrysler Motors Corporation had sold through Glynn Plymouth an automobile which was defective by virtue of improperly tightened suspension bolts and brake drums which were 'out of round.' It was contended that these defects caused Mr. Davis to lose control of the automobile; and liability was sought to be imposed upon Chrysler for negligence in selling the car with its manufacturing defects through Glynn Plymouth, and upon Glynn Plymouth for its negligence in failing to inspect, discover, and repair the defects.

'Upon trial both defendants made motions for directed verdict at the close of all the evidence, which were denied. The jurors were then unable to reach a verdict, and a mistrial was declared. Defendants now appeal from the orders overruling their respective motions for judgment notwithstanding mistrial, the statutory certificate having been obtained from the trial judge. Code Ann. § 6-701(a)2.'

The Court of Appeals ruled as to both defendants, now petitioners in certiorari, that there was no evidence to authorize a finding that the suspension system of the automobile in which the plaintiff's husband was riding when he was injured was defective. That left the questions (1) whether there was evidence to authorize a finding that both defendants were negligent as charged as related to the defective brakes and (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to show that the defective brakes were the proximate cause of the death of the plaintiff's husband. The Court of Appeals ruled that as to the first question just stated the evidence was sufficient to authorize a finding that the defendants were negligent as to the specifications of negligence as to defective brakes. The court went on to hold that without the evidence introduced without objection as to what Mr. Davis, the deceased husband, told others in regard to the occurrence, there was not sufficient evidence of a causal connection between the defective brakes and the collision. There is no petition to this court for writ of certiorari to review this ruling and this leaves us with one question to decide in this case and that is, whether the declarations of Mr. Davis have any probative value, even if admitted without objection.

1. We hold that the declarations of the deceased husband of the plaintiff were hearsay, inadmissible under any exception to the hearsay rule, since they were self-serving and not a part of the res gestate and that, therefore, they were entirely without probative value which could be added to the evidence as to the proximate cause of the death to authorize a verdict for the plaintiff. The court, therefore, erred in overruling the defendants' motions for judgments in their favor notwithstanding the mistrial insofar as the self-serving purely hearsay evidence is involved.

'The two underlying reasons for any exception to the hearsay rule are a necessity for the exception and a circumstantial guaranty of the trustworthiness of the offered evidence-that is, there must be something present which the law considers a substitute for the oath of the declarant and his cross-examination by the party against whom the hearsay is offered. * * * However, the mere fact that a witness is dead does not render his declarations admissible, although, if in addition to the death of a witness there are circumstances which attribute verity to his declarations, the hearsay rule may be relaxed to permit the admission of such declaration.' 29 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 496, p. 554, citing Matthews v. United States (CA5 Ga) 217 F.2d 409, 50 A.L.R.2d 1187; Ferguson v. Smazer, 151 Conn. 226, 196 A.2d 432; Baugh v. Grigsby (Mo.) 286 S.W.2d 798, 58 A.L.R.2d 607; Potter v. Baker, 162 Ohio St. 488, 55 Ohio Ops. 389, 124 N.E.2d 140, 53 A.L.R.2d 1234. (Emphasis supplied.) 'It is a general rule that self-serving declarations-that is, statements favorable to the interest of the declarant-are not admissible in evidence as proof of the facts asserted, regardless of whether they were implied by acts or conduct, were made orally, or where reduced to writing. The rule which renders self-serving statements inadmissible is the same in criminal prosecutions as in civil actions. The vital objection to the admission of this kind of evidence is its hearsay character; the phrase 'self-serving' does not describe an independent ground of objection. Such declarations are untrustworthy; their introduction in evidence would open the door to frauds and perjuries, and the manufacturing of evidence. The fact that the declarant has since died does not alter the general exclusionary rule.' 29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 621, pp. 674, 675, citing Toney v. Raines, 224 Ark. 692, 275 S.W.2d 771; Truitt v. Truitt, 290 Ky. 632, 162 S.W.2d 31, 140 A.L.R. 1127; Winter v. Gani (La.App.) 199 So. 600; Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Wilder, 255 N.C. 114, 120 S.E.2d 404. (Emphasis supplied.) 'Declarations of a deceased person as to his own age are admissible in evidence after his death, provided such declarations did not affect favorably his own interest, or that of his estate, in a controversy then existing. If the...