Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Davis, Nos. 25538
| Court | Supreme Court of Georgia |
| Writing for the Court | FELTON; ALMAND |
| Citation | 226 Ga. 221,173 S.E.2d 691 |
| Parties | CHRYSLER MOTORS CORPORATION v. Jean DAVIS et al. GLYNN PLYMOUTH, INC. v. Jean DAVIS et al. |
| Docket Number | Nos. 25538,25574 |
| Decision Date | 10 March 1970 |
Page 691
v.
Jean DAVIS et al.
GLYNN PLYMOUTH, INC.
v.
Jean DAVIS et al.
Rehearing Denied March 25, 1970.
Syllabus by the Court
Where the Court of Appeals holds that certain specified evidence in negligence cases is insufficient to show that the alleged negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries, the further holding by that court that the self-servingdeclaration of one since deceased, introduced without objection, has probative value and that together with the other evidence is sufficient to prove proximate cause, is erroneous insofar as the self-serving declarations
Page 692
are concerned. However, the Court of Appeals was correct in affirming the trial court's judgment overruling the defendants' motions for judgments notwithstanding the mistrial for the reason that there [226 Ga. 222] was prima facie res gestae evidence for the consideration of a jury.Neely, Freeman & Hawkins, Joe C. Freeman, Jr., Thomas J. Harper, Jr., Atlanta, Conyers, Fending, Dickey, Fending & Whelchel, J. Thomas Whelchel, Brunswick, for Chrysler Motors Corp.
Bennet, Bennet, Gilbert & Whittle, Wallace E. Harrell, Brunswick, Bouhan, Williams & Levy, Walter C. Hartridge, II, Savannah, for Glynn Plymouth, Inc.
Alaimo, Taylor & Bishop, Anthony A. Alaimo, James A. Bishop, Brunswick, for appellees.
FELTON, Justice.
We granted certiorari to review the rulings and judgments of the Court of Appeals in these cases: Glynn Plymouth, Inc. v. Davis, Chrysler Motors Corporation v. Davis, 120 Ga.App. 475, 170 S.E.2d 848. We repeat the statement of facts preceding the opinions of the Court of Appeals and the rulings of the court on the specific issues ruled on. The issues defined by the Court of Appeals are clear and pinpointed to such an extent that there and be no doubt what it meant as to the sole issue determining whether its ruling is right or wrong:
'James M. Davis had served as manager-president of Glynn Plymouth, Inc., until February 15, 1966, at which time he severed this connection to go into another business. On February 19, 1966, he purchased from Glynn Plymouth a 1966 Plymouth Belvedere station wagon which he had previously used as a demonstrator and which his wife had also driven. On March 3, 1966, Mr. Davis was returning to Brunswick from Savannah traveling east on U.S. Highway No. 84 towards a railroad crossing at approximately 60 m.p.h. when the red blinker lights at the crossing began to flash indicating the approach of a train. Mr. Davis applied the brakes to the automobile, whereupon it verred off slightly to the right where the right front wheel came onto the shoulder, and the automobile then came back onto the highway, veered sharply to the left, [226 Ga. 223] and came to rest in a ditch against the railroad embankment on the left side of the highway approximately four or five feet from the tracks. There were no witnesses to the collision other than Mr. Davis, who was hospitalized for injuries to his ankle and subsequently released. On April 21, however, he died from a blood clot which broke loose from the injured area and lodged in his lung.
'Mrs. Davis, plaintiff here, brought suit on April 27, 1967, for his wrongful death, alleging that Chrysler Motors Corporation had sold through Glynn Plymouth an automobile which was defective by virtue of improperly tightened suspension bolts and brake drums which were 'out of round.' It was contended that these defects caused Mr. Davis to lose control of the automobile; and liability was sought to be imposed upon Chrysler for negligence in selling the car with its manufacturing defects through Glynn Plymouth, and upon Glynn Plymouth for its negligence in failing to inspect, discover, and repair the defects.
'Upon trial both defendants made motions for directed verdict at the close of all the evidence, which were denied. The jurors were then unable to reach a verdict, and a mistrial was declared. Defendants now appeal from the orders overruling their respective motions for judgment notwithstanding mistrial, the statutory certificate having been obtained from the trial judge. Code Ann. § 6-701(a)2.'
The Court of Appeals ruled as to both defendants, now petitioners in certiorari, that there was no evidence to authorize a finding that the suspension system of the
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automobile in which the plaintiff's husband was riding when he was injured was defective. That left the questions (1) whether there was evidence to authorize a finding that both defendants were negligent as charged as related to the defective brakes and (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to show that the defective brakes were the proximate cause of the death of the plaintiff's husband. The Court of Appeals ruled that as to the first question just stated the evidence was sufficient to authorize...To continue reading
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Jones v. Krystal Co., No. A98A0078.
...arising from suppression of evidence is one of fact, not of law. Glynn Plymouth, Inc. v. Davis, 120 Ga.App. 475, 170 S.E.2d 848, aff'd, 226 Ga. 221, 173 S.E.2d 691 (1970). The presumption arises, as in this case, only when the party has evidence within its control, i.e., employees on duty a......
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Lane v. Tift County Hosp. Authority, No. A97A1743
...of evidence. The fact that the declarant has since died does not alter the general exclusionary rule.' Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Davis, [226 Ga. 221, 224-225, 173 S.E.2d 691 (1970) ]. As can be seen from the preceding passage, in Chrysler Motors this court focused on whether the declaration ......
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Gissendaner v. State, No. S00P0289.
...cross examination by the party against whom the hearsay is offered." (Citations and emphasis omitted.) Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Davis, 226 Ga. 221, 224(1), 173 S.E.2d 691 (1970); see also Abraha v. State, 271 Ga. 309, 313(2), 518 S.E.2d 894 (1999). The trial court did not abuse its discreti......
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Rose v. Figgie Intern., Inc., Nos. A97A1495
...481(1), 170 S.E.2d 848 (1969) (though car unavailable, "wholly circumstantial" evidence admissible to show defective brake drums), aff'd. 226 Ga. 221, 173 S.E.2d 691 (1970); Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Keating, 45 Ga.App. 811, 814(3), 165 S.E. 873 (1932) (bridge portion destroyed in accident; ......
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Jones v. Krystal Co., No. A98A0078.
...arising from suppression of evidence is one of fact, not of law. Glynn Plymouth, Inc. v. Davis, 120 Ga.App. 475, 170 S.E.2d 848, aff'd, 226 Ga. 221, 173 S.E.2d 691 (1970). The presumption arises, as in this case, only when the party has evidence within its control, i.e., employees on duty a......
-
Lane v. Tift County Hosp. Authority, No. A97A1743
...of evidence. The fact that the declarant has since died does not alter the general exclusionary rule.' Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Davis, [226 Ga. 221, 224-225, 173 S.E.2d 691 (1970) ]. As can be seen from the preceding passage, in Chrysler Motors this court focused on whether the declaration ......
-
Gissendaner v. State, No. S00P0289.
...cross examination by the party against whom the hearsay is offered." (Citations and emphasis omitted.) Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Davis, 226 Ga. 221, 224(1), 173 S.E.2d 691 (1970); see also Abraha v. State, 271 Ga. 309, 313(2), 518 S.E.2d 894 (1999). The trial court did not abuse its discreti......
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Rose v. Figgie Intern., Inc., Nos. A97A1495
...481(1), 170 S.E.2d 848 (1969) (though car unavailable, "wholly circumstantial" evidence admissible to show defective brake drums), aff'd. 226 Ga. 221, 173 S.E.2d 691 (1970); Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Keating, 45 Ga.App. 811, 814(3), 165 S.E. 873 (1932) (bridge portion destroyed in accident; ......