Church v. Franklin Cnty. Bd. of Revision
| Decision Date | 25 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | 22AP-372 |
| Citation | 2023 Ohio 1339 |
| Parties | Rock City Church, Appellant-Appellant, v. Franklin County Board of Revision, Appellee-Appellee. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Ohio Board of Tax Appeals (BTA No. 2021-1045)
On brief:
Mallory Law Office, LLC, and Thomas H. Mallory, Jr., for appellant.
Argued:
Thomas H. Mallory, Jr.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Rock City Church ("Rock City"), appeals from a decision of the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals ("BTA") affirming a decision of appellee the Franklin County Board of Revision ("BOR"), dismissing as untimely Rock City's complaint regarding a current agricultural-use valuation ("CAUV") recoupment charge imposed on its real property. Because we conclude the statutory requirement that Rock City's complaint be filed by March 31, 2020 was not tolled by emergency legislation enacted in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, we affirm.
{¶ 2} Rock City owns real property located at 4311 Anson Drive in Hilliard, Ohio. Rock City asserts it acquired the property in 2016 and that the property qualified for CAUV status at the time based on agricultural use.[1] Rock City further asserts it obtained a tax exemption, retroactive to January 1, 2017, based on use of the property for church purposes. Rock City did not seek CAUV status for the property for 2017. Rock City asserts a CAUV recoupment charge of $207,280.70 was imposed on the property effective January 1, 2017, and that it paid the charge.[2] {¶ 3} On July 31, 2020, Rock City filed a complaint with the BOR, asserting the property was tax exempt and requesting reimbursement of the CAUV recoupment charge. On June 15, 2021, the BOR notified Rock City the complaint had been dismissed "for filing outside of the filing season." (June 15, 2021 BOR Letter.) Rock City appealed to the BTA, arguing that Am.Sub.H.B. No. 197 ("H.B. 197"), enacted in March 2020, tolled the time for filing its complaint. Rock City claimed the BOR erred by dismissing its complaint without considering the effect of H.B. 197. The BTA affirmed the BOR's decision, concluding it was reasonable and lawful because H.B. 197 did not toll the statutory time for filing a complaint.
{¶ 4} Rock City appeals and assigns the following two assignments of error for our review:
{¶ 5} We review a BTA decision to determine if it is reasonable and lawful; if it is both, we must affirm. Columbus City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 10th Dist. No. 21AP-86, 2022-Ohio-355, ¶ 15. However, we review questions of law de novo. Id. at ¶ 17. Accordingly, we" 'will not hesitate to reverse a BTA decision that is based on an incorrect legal conclusion'" Westerville City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 146 Ohio St.3d 412, 2016-Ohio-1506, ¶ 26, quoting Bd. of Edn. of Gahanna-Jefferson Local School Dist. v. Zaino, Tax Commr., 93 Ohio St.3d 231, 232 (2001). Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. Thomas v. Logue, Admr. Ohio Bur. of Workers' Comp., 10th Dist. No. 21AP-385, 2022-Ohio-1603, ¶ 12.
{¶ 6} In its first assignment of error, Rock City argues the BOR and BTA erred by concluding its complaint was untimely. Rock City asserts that H.B. 197 tolled the statutory time for filing its complaint.
{¶ 7} R.C. 5715.19(A)(1) requires that a complaint against certain property-tax-related determinations "shall be filed with the county auditor on or before the thirty-first day of March of the ensuing tax year or the date of closing of the collection for the first half of real and public utility property taxes for the current tax year, whichever is later." A complaint against a recoupment charge levied under R.C. 5713.35 is subject to this filing requirement. R.C. 5715.19(A)(1)(c). Rock City does not appear to dispute that, under normal circumstances, its complaint would have been due by March 31, 2020.[3] In March 2020, however, the circumstances were not normal. That month, in response to the emerging COVID-19 pandemic, the General Assembly enacted H.B. 197. Among other measures, Section 22 of H.B. 197 tolled certain statutes of limitations and time requirements set to expire between March 9 and July 30, 2020.[4]
{¶ 8} As relevant to this appeal, Section 22(A)(10) of H.B. 197 contained a catch-all provision tolling "[a]ny other criminal, civil, or administrative time limitation or deadline under the Revised Code" set to expire between March 9 and July 30, 2020. After passage by the General Assembly, H.B. 197 was sent to Governor DeWine, who exercised a line-item veto deleting the words "or deadline" from Section 22(A)(10) before signing the bill. As modified by the line-item veto, Section 22(A)(10) states that "[a]ny other criminal, civil, or administrative time limitation under the Revised Code" set to expire between March 9 and July 30, 2020, was tolled. The General Assembly did not override the line-item veto and H.B. 197, as modified by the governor, went into effect on March 27, 2020.
{¶ 9} In the present case, on appeal from the BOR's dismissal, the BTA concluded that Section 22(A)(10) did not toll the March 31st filing requirement under R.C. 5715.19(A)(1) because that requirement was not a criminal, civil, or administrative time limitation. Reviewing the BTA's decision requires us to interpret and apply Section 22(A)(10).
{¶ 10} "When construing the language of a statute, a court must 'ascertain and give effect to the intention of the General Assembly.'" Meyers v. Hadsell Chem. Processing, L.L.C., 10th Dist. No. 18AP-387, 2019-Ohio-2982, ¶ 32, quoting Dodd v. Croskey, 143 Ohio St.3d 293, 2015-Ohio-2362, ¶ 24. When a statute is unambiguous and definite, it must be applied as written and no further interpretation is required. Thomas at ¶ 11. If a statute is ambiguous, then in determining legislative intent we may consider factors such as the circumstances under which the statute was enacted, the legislative history, and the consequences of a particular construction. R.C. 1.49.
{¶ 11} Rock City argues Section 22(A)(10) of H.B. 197 was ambiguous due to the General Assembly's use of the terms "time limitation" and "deadline," which are not defined within H.B. 197. Rock City further argues that, because of this ambiguity, we may consider the governor's veto message to interpret his intent in deleting the phrase "or deadline" from H.B. 197.
{¶ 12} With respect to ambiguity, we note that the version of Section 22(A)(10) that became law did not contain the term "deadline" because it had been removed through the line-item veto. Ultimately, the question before us is whether the March 31st filing requirement under R.C. 5715.19(A)(1) is a "time limitation" that would be tolled by Section 22(A)(10).[5] The Second District Court of Appeals also considered this issue in Northridge Local Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2d Dist. No. 29179, 2022-Ohio-495 ("Dayton Fun Hotels"), and we find that decision to be instructive.
{¶ 13} In Dayton Fun Hotels, the Second District found the distinction between a "statute of limitations," a "time limitation," and a "deadline" to be pivotal in resolving the question of whether Section 22 tolled the filing requirement under R.C. 5715.19(A). Dayton Fun Hotels at ¶ 16. Citing Black's Law Dictionary, the Second District concluded that a "statute of limitations" was a law barring civil claims or criminal prosecution after a specified period of time. Similarly, the court concluded that "time limitation" refers to a period of time within which action must be taken. Id. By contrast, the court concluded that a "deadline" is the time by which something must be completed and found that the use of "deadline" in other portions of H.B. 197 were consistent with that meaning. Id. at ¶ 17, 19. Considering these definitions, the Second District concluded that the March 31st filing requirement under R.C. 5715.19(A)(1) was a deadline because it was "a specific date by which an action needed to be taken." Id. at ¶ 23. Because the term "deadline" had been deleted from Section 22(A)(10) through the line-item veto, the Second District held that Section 22(A)(10) did not toll the filing deadline imposed by R.C. 5715.19(A)(1). Id. at ¶ 24.
{¶ 14} Rock City argues the Dayton Fun Hotels decision was incorrect because the Second District did not consider the governor's veto message explaining his line-item veto of the term "deadline." In that message, Governor DeWine provided the following explanation for his line-item veto:
This provision is intended to apply only to criminal statutes of limitations, civil statutes of limitations, administrative statutes of limitations and other statutorily created time limitations in court cases. Removing ["or deadline"] clarifies that this provision does not apply to statutory tax deadlines or due dates, including those tax deadlines or due dates adjusted elsewhere in this bill. The Tax Commissioner has the authority to individually extend tax deadlines and due dates based upon particularized situations. All other state agencies, boards and commissions will work with Ohio citizens in individual circumstances. This clarification, and maintaining revenue sources, such as the sales tax, which has already been collected by vendors but not yet remitted to the State and distributed to local governments, to fund essential government services, is imperative during the duration of the Governor's COVID-19 emergency...
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