CIBC Nat'l Trust Co. v. Dominick

• Decision Date: 04 May 2020
• Docket Number: S-19-0157
• Citation: 462 P.3d 452
• Parties: CIBC NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, Executor of the Estate of Julie Anne Bell, and Trustee of the Julie Anne Bell Revocable Living Trust dated December 16, 2014, as amended and restated, Appellant (Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant), v. Patrick Lawler DOMINICK, Appellee (Defendant/Counterclaimant).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

462 P.3d 452

CIBC NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, Executor of the Estate of Julie Anne Bell, and Trustee of the Julie Anne Bell Revocable Living Trust dated December 16, 2014, as amended and restated, Appellant (Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant),

v.Patrick Lawler DOMINICK, Appellee (Defendant/Counterclaimant).

S-19-0157

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

May 4, 2020

Representing Appellant: Paula A. Fleck, Holland & Hart, LLP, Jackson, Wyoming; Thomas C. Junker, Fiske Law Group, PLLC, Alexandria, Virginia.

Representing Appellee: Erika M. Nash and Aaron J. Lyttle, Long Reimer Winegar, LLP, Jackson, Wyoming.

Before DAVIS, C.J., and FOX, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.

FOX, Justice.

[¶1] Julie Anne Bell’s death ignited a dispute between her long-term romantic partner, Patrick Dominick, and her estate over the ownership of real property in Teton County, Wyoming. We conclude the district court abused its discretion by certifying its partial summary judgment order as a final judgment under Rule 54(b) and dismiss the appeal.

ISSUES

[¶2] We decide the following dispositive issues:

1. Did the district court err when it certified its partial summary judgment order as a final judgment under Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) ?

2. Should this Court convert the pending appeal to a writ of review under Wyoming Rule of Appellate Procedure 13.02 ?

FACTS

[¶3] In 2013, Julie Anne Bell and Patrick Dominick purchased a home in Teton County, Wyoming. Prior to purchasing the property, they signed a tenants-in-common agreement (TIC Agreement), which provided they each had a 50% interest in the property, and included a buy-sell provision and method of transfer upon the death of one party. Later the same day, they accepted the deed for the property, which described their ownership interest as "joint tenants with rights of survivorship." Ms. Bell died in August 2015 and, in October, Mr. Dominick provided notice to Teton County Records that he was the surviving joint tenant with survivorship rights.

[¶4] CIBC National Trust Company, the executor of Ms. Bell’s estate, filed for declaratory judgment that the TIC Agreement governed, and asserted claims for breach of contract or partition. Mr. Dominick answered and counterclaimed for quiet title and slander of title. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The district court concluded that the merger doctrine applied, that the deed controlled, and that Mr. Dominick owned the property as the surviving joint tenant. The district court then, over Mr. Dominick’s objection, granted CIBC’s motion to certify the partial summary judgment order as a final judgment under Rule 54(b) and stayed the remaining claim for slander of title. On appeal, the parties submitted briefing on the merits of the partial summary judgment order, and we requested supplemental briefing on whether the district court properly certified its partial summary judgment ruling under W.R.C.P. 54(b) when the slander of title claim was still pending below and, if it was an improper certification, whether we should convert the appeal to a writ of review.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶5] We follow a two-step analysis to determine whether a claim is properly certified under Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). First, we determine whether the judgment the district court certified as final falls within the scope of Rule 54(b). This threshold issue is a question of law that we consider de novo, giving no deference to the district court’s determination. Meiners v. Meiners , 2016 WY 74, ¶ 14, 376 P.3d 493, 496-97 (Wyo. 2016) (citing Baker v. Speaks , 2014 WY 117, ¶ 12, 334 P.3d 1215, 1220 (Wyo. 2014) ). Second, we evaluate whether the district court determined there was "no just reason for delay" under an abuse of discretion standard. Baker , 2014 WY 117, ¶ 12, 334 P.3d at 1220.

I. The district court’s order falls within the scope of W.R.C.P. 54(b), but the district court erred when it found no just reason for delay and certified its partial summary judgment order as a final judgment

[¶6] The purpose of Rule 54(b) is to strike a balance between the strong preference against piecemeal appeals, and the possible injustice that results by delaying entry of a final judgment in a multi-party action, or on distinctly separate claims, until the resolution of the entire case. Baker , 2014 WY 117, ¶ 15, 334 P.3d at 1221 ("A Rule 54(b) certification ‘cannot be employed to permit the appeal of a partial adjudication of the rights of one or more of the parties.’ ... The rationale for such holding is to protect the policy against piecemeal appeals.") (quoting Mott v. England , 604 P.2d 560, 563 (Wyo. 1979) ) (internal citation and alterations omitted); Olmstead v. Cattle, Inc. , 541 P.2d 49, 51 (Wyo. 1975) ; 10 Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2654 (4th ed., database updated April 2020). Rule 54(b) certifications are neither routine nor for the convenience of the court or the parties. Huggins v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc ., 566 F.3d 771, 774 (8th Cir. 2009) ("[W]e have repeatedly stated that Rule 54(b) certifications ‘should neither be granted routinely nor as an accommodation to counsel.’ ") (citation omitted).

A. The district court’s partial summary judgment order falls within the scope of Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)

[¶7] Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) provides:

When an action presents more than one claim for relief—whether as a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim—or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay. Otherwise, any order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.

The parties agree this case falls under the scope of Rule 54(b) because it presents more than one claim for relief. In analyzing whether there are multiple claims, courts should determine whether "the possible recoveries are more than one in number and not mutually exclusive." 10 Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2657.¹

[¶8] Ownership of the property is a necessary element of every claim and counterclaim in this case. The district court concluded that Mr. Dominick owned the entire property as the surviving joint tenant. Thus, the partial summary judgment order resolved all of CIBC’s claims because they all depended upon ownership, and it decided Mr. Dominick’s counterclaim for quiet title. The question is whether Mr. Dominick’s remaining claim for slander of title is separate from the decided claims. See Baker , 2014 WY 117, ¶ 14, 334 P.3d at 1221. Wyoming defines slander of title as "a false and malicious statement made in disparagement of a person’s title to real or personal property, or of some right of his causing him special damage." Sannerud v. Brantz , 879 P.2d 341, 344 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting Bennett v. Pace , 731 P.2d 33, 34 (Wyo. 1987) ). Mr. Dominick must succeed on his ownership claim to succeed on his slander of title claim. However, the reverse is not true; Mr. Dominick can succeed on ownership without succeeding on slander of title. Thus, there are multiple possible recoveries, and they are not mutually exclusive. 10 Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2657. Because there are multiple claims and the district court’s partial summary judgment order finally disposed of some, but not all of them, the district court did not err in concluding that Rule 54(b) applies. However, "[n]ot all final judgments on individual claims should be immediately appealable, even if they are in some sense separable from the remaining unresolved claims." Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co. , 446 U.S. 1, 8, 100 S.Ct. 1460, 1465, 64 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980).

B. The district court’s conclusion that the factors weighed in favor of finding "no just reason for delay" was in error

[¶9] The second step of the Rule 54(b) analysis requires courts to conduct a multi-factor balancing test to determine whether there is "no just reason for delay." Baker , 2014 WY 117, ¶ 16, 334 P.3d at 1221 (citing Mott , 604 P.2d. at 563 ); W.R.C.P. 54(b). "Given the wide range of discretion conferred on the trial judge in deciding whether there is no just reason for delay, the district court should feel free to consider any factor that seems relevant to a particular action, keeping in mind the policies the rule attempts to promote." 10 Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2659.² The most commonly considered factors include: 1) "the relationship between the adjudicated and the unadjudicated claims," 2) "the possibility that the need for review might be mooted by future developments in the" lower court, 3) "the possible impact of an immediate appeal on the remaining trial proceedings," and 4) the "practical effects of allowing an immediate appeal," including the potential injustice or hardship to the parties if the appeal is delayed. Id . The United States Supreme Court approved of the federal district court’s consideration of similar factors in Curtiss-Wright , while at the same time declining to limit the district courts’ discretion by "fix[ing] or sanction[ing] narrow guidelines." Curtiss-Wright , 446 U.S. at 11, 100 S.Ct. at 1466.

[¶10] District courts are to act as dispatchers under the Rule, exercising their discretion "in the interest of sound judicial administration" to determine the correct time for appeal. Id. , 446 U.S. at 8, 100 S.Ct. at 1465. The role of appellate courts in this analysis is "not to reweigh the equities or reassess the facts but to make sure that the conclusions derived from those weighings and assessments are juridically sound and...