Circle K Store No. 1131 v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona

• Decision Date: 21 August 1990
• Docket Number: No. CV-89-0415-PR,CV-89-0415-PR
• Citation: 796 P.2d 893,165 Ariz. 91
• Parties: CIRCLE K STORE # 1131, Petitioner Employer, Gab Business Services, Inc., Petitioner Carrier, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA, Respondent, Pauline L. Shoemaker, Respondent Employee.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Page 893

796 P.2d 893

165 Ariz. 91

CIRCLE K STORE # 1131, Petitioner Employer Gab Business Services, Inc., Petitioner Carrier, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA, Respondent Pauline L. Shoemaker, Respondent Employee.

No. CV-89-0415-PR.

Supreme Court of Arizona In Banc.

Aug. 21, 1990.

[165 Ariz. 92] Long, Lester & Lundmark, P.A. by Steven C. Lester, Phoenix, for petitioner employer, carrier.

Anita R. Valainis, Chief Counsel, Indus. Com'n of Ariz., Phoenix, for respondent.

Sherman R. Bendalin, Phoenix., for respondent employee.

OPINION

CAMERON, Justice.

I. JURISDICTION

Claimant employee, Pauline L. Shoemaker, petitioned this court to review a decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals that set aside her award for worker's compensation benefits. 162 Ariz. 560, 785 P.2d 80. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 5(3), A.R.S. §§ 12-120.24, 23-948 and Rule 23, Ariz.R.Civ.App.P., 17B A.R.S.

II. ISSUE

Did claimant's injuries arise out of her employment within the meaning of A.R.S. § 23-1021(A)?

III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On 14 January 1988, Pauline L. Shoemaker (claimant), an employee of Circle K Store # 1131 (Circle K), sustained injuries as the result of a fall that occurred next to a dumpster in the Circle K parking lot. She filed a worker's compensation claim and was denied benefits. Claimant timely requested a hearing to determine whether her injuries were compensable under A.R.S. § 23-1021(A), which requires that an employee's injuries or death result from an "accident arising out of and in the course of his employment." The parties stipulated that no medical testimony was necessary to establish that the fall caused claimant's injuries.

Claimant and Circle K's investigator testified at the hearing. The testimony showed that on 14 January 1988, claimant worked from 3 p.m.--11 p.m. One of claimant's work duties was to carry out the trash from her shift. Claimant testified that on the night in question she left work at approximately 11:30 when the midnight shift employee came on duty.

Before starting home, claimant picked up her belongings, some groceries, and the trash. She testified she fell after depositing the trash in a dumpster and turning around to pick up her things:

Q. Tell the Judge what happened at the dumpster?

A. Well, I lifted the lid, because they are closed most of the time, and I lifted the lid to put my trash in, set my things down that I had to go home, and put the trash in, turned around to and picked up my things to go home and that's when I fell. I don't know, I turned my ankle.

Q. When you say "things to go home" what do you mean by that?

A. Well, I had two small bags with a half gallon of milk and four rolls of tissue.

Q. So you had some personal--or you had purchased those?

A. Right. I purchased those at the store.

Q. When you walked out of the store and went to the dumpster you had in your arms what, please, or your hands?

* * * * * *

A. I had my purse and those two bags, half gallon of milk and four rolls of tissue, and a bag of trash.

Q. Your testimony is that you slipped and fell?

A. Right.

As to where her injuries occurred, claimant testified Q. When you had the accident where were you in relation to the dumpster?

A. Right next to the dumpster. As I turned around my ankle turned and it twisted my ankle.

Q. When you say you were right next to the dumpster, how close, can you give me feet or arms length or whatever?

A. Probably three or four feet.

Q. Could you have touched it if you would have reached back with one of your arms?

A. Possibly.

On cross-examination, claimant testified she had no trouble with her feet, and wore the type of shoes that Circle K preferred. She also answered questions regarding the origin or cause of her injuries:

Q. Is there anything, was there any obstacle, anything around there that would have caused you to trip, slip or, you know, anything that you're aware of in the immediate area that caused--

A. I wasn't aware of anything that I could have tripped on. All I know is my ankle turned.

* * * * * *

Q. Is there anything about where you were standing, or anything in the vicinity that you, in your own mind, associate with your twisting your ankle?

A. Not to my knowledge. I just--it happened so fast.

Q. You picked up your grocery bags and turned?

A. And I was down--

Q. The dumpster looks like it's right on--there is a curb there, a gutter that runs along there?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you step into that and twist your ankle?

A. No, I didn't go that far when I was walking, because it's even with the walk, you see. Right there is the walk, and I was over here instead of right here is where it was. I wasn't going to the street at all.

After the hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) entered an award for a compensable claim. He found that claimant established, by a reasonable preponderance, that her injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment. Specifically, he found that her fall occurred in an area where she might reasonably be expected to be in connection with her employer's work, using a customary or permissible route from her workplace. Thus, he held that she sustained an injury "in the course of" her employment. ¹ He also found that her injury "arose out of" her employment because: 1) no showing was made that claimant's fall was idiopathic in origin (resulting from a pre-existing infirmity); 2) the origin of the fall was unexplained; and 3) Arizona law does not require a claimant to offer a precise explanation as to why a fall occurred. The award was affirmed upon administrative review, and the respondents sought special action relief in the court of appeals.

The court of appeals set aside the award finding that although the injuries occurred in the course of claimant's employment, she failed to prove her injuries arose out of her employment. The court reasoned that because a claimant in an unexplained fall case is physically able to tell her story, he or she must provide affirmative proof that the fall was caused by a risk associated with or incidental to the employment. Because claimant presented no such explanation, the court of appeals held that her claim for compensation should have been denied and set aside the award.

IV. DISCUSSION

In order for an industrial injury to be compensable, it must result from an "accident arising out of and in the course of" the claimant's employment. A.R.S. § 23-1021(A). The phrase "arising out of" refers to the origin or cause of the injury, whereas the phrase "in the course of" refers to the time, place, and circumstances of the accident in relation to the employment. Goodyear Aircraft Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 62 Ariz. 398, 158 P.2d 511 (1945). In Goodyear, we stated that in order to prove the "arising out of" element of a claim, the injury must be "caused in whole or in part, or contributed by a necessary risk or danger of the employment, or inherent in its nature." 62 Ariz. at 409, 158 P.2d at 522 (emphasis in original). ²

We recently reaffirmed that an injury "arising out of" employment refers to the origin or cause of claimant's injury. Murphy v. Industrial Comm'n, 160 Ariz. 482, 485, 774 P.2d 221, 224 (1989). In Murphy, an employee fell and was injured shortly after being told by his employer that he was being transferred to a different department with a pay cut. We found that the injury arose out of the employment because it resulted from work-related stress that caused the employee to fall. We stated:

In the instant case, Murphy's physical injury resulted from work-related stress and, we believe, arose out of his employment. It is ironic that had Murphy tripped and fallen on the hard floor during work or had hit some machinery on the way down there would be little question that the accident arose out of and in the course of his employment. We do not believe, however, that falling to a floor as opposed to falling on a piece of machinery should make any difference.

Id. at 486, 774 P.2d at 225. The requisite causal connection was met in Murphy because uncontroverted medical testimony indicated that Murphy had fallen due to the news that he was being displaced.

The "arising out of" and "in the course of" employment tests are separate tests and both must be satisfied. Peetz v. Industrial Comm'n, 124 Ariz. 324, 325, 604 P.2d 255, 256 (1979); Royall v. Industrial Comm'n, 106 Ariz. 346, 349, 476 P.2d 156, 159 (1970). However, these two tests have been confused. For example, in Goodyear, we said the injury "arose out of" claimant's employment because "his employer's business required him to be at the place of the accident at the time it occurred." Goodyear, 62 Ariz. at 415, 158 P.2d at 528. This analysis focused on the time and place of the accident which is part of the "in the course of" employment analysis.

A recent court of appeals case used similar reasoning to conclude that an injury arose out of and in the course of employment. Hansen v. Industrial Comm'n, 141 Ariz. 190, 685 P.2d 1342 (App.1984). In Hansen, the claimant fell and injured herself at a Ramada Inn where she was performing in a play for her employer. The court held that, although claimant was not on the physical premises controlled by her employer at the time of the injury, the injury arose in the course of her employment because she was in the range of risk causally related to her employment. Id. at 195, 685 P.2d at 1347. The court also found that Hansen's injuries arose out of her employment because it was her employment that caused her to be at the Ramada Inn at the time of the injury. Id.

Claimant asserts that Hansen adopts the positional-risk doctrine, which provides that an injury "arises out of" the employment if it would not have occurred but for the fact the employment placed plaintiff at that location at that particular time. See 1 A. Larson, § 6.50, at 3-6 through 3-7. The doctrine creates a presumption in favor of the claimant, providing that compensation will be...