Ciriack v. Merchants' Woolen Co.

• Decision Date: 26 February 1890
• Citation: 23 N.E. 829,151 Mass. 152
• Parties: CIRIACK v. MERCHANTS' WOOLEN CO.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

151 Mass. 152

23 N.E. 829

CIRIACK v. MERCHANTS' WOOLEN CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

February 26, 1890

COUNSEL

H.W. Bragg and E. Greenhood, for plaintiff.

R.M Morse, H.G. Nichols, and C.K. Cobb, for defendant.

OPINION

KNOWLTON J.

This case has once before been considered by this court, (see 146 Mass. 182, 15 N.E. 579;) and, on the testimony then presented, it was not easy to determine, as it is not now upon slightly different testimony, whether there was any evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant. The only negligence alleged is the failure to warn the plaintiff of the dangers to which he was subjected in doing his work. An employer is under no obligation to warn an employe of dangers which are obvious, nor to instruct him in matters which he may fairly be supposed thoroughly to understand. Nor is it the duty of the master to admonish his servant to be careful when the servant well knows his danger, and the importance of using care to avoid it. It is the duty of the servant to exercise care proportionate to the danger of his situation as he understands it, and, if he fails to do so, the fault is his, and not his master's. But where the work of a servant exposes him to danger of which he is ignorant, and which, from youth or inexperience, he is manifestly incapable of comprehending without assistance, it is the duty of his master, if he knows or ought to know of it, to give him such warning and instruction as is necessary for his safety. In determining the master's duty in such a case, the inquiry is, what instruction does the servant appear to need? Is there reason to believe him ignorant of anything which for his protection he ought to know, or incapable of appreciating the risks from what he sees around him? In the absence of anything to show the contrary, the master has a right to assume that he knows those facts of common experience, with which ordinary persons of his age and appearance are familiar. In hiring a boy 12 years of age, and apparently of average intelligence, an employer is not called upon to tell him that if he holds his hand in fire it will be burned, or strikes it with a sharp instrument it will be cut, or thrusts it between the teeth of a revolving cog-wheel in the gearing of a mill it will be crushed. From infancy and through childhood, as well as in later life, we are all making observations and experiments with material substances, and every person of ordinary faculties acquires knowledge, at an early age, of these familiar facts which force themselves on our attention through our senses.

There is nothing in this case to warrant a jury in finding the defendant negligent in omitting to tell the plaintiff that there were cog-wheels on the gig, or that the machinery would injure him if he allowed his hand or arm to get into the gearing, or in failing to repeat a warning which had once been given, or to inform him of risks which he understood himself. Russell v. Tillotson, 140 Mass. 201, 4 N.E 231; Crowley v. Pacific Mills, 148 Mass. 228, 19 N.E. 344; Williams v. Churchill, 137 Mass. 243; Buckley v. Manufacturing Co., (N.Y.) 21 N.E. 717. But the case presents itself in an aspect somewhat different from that which it wore at the former hearing. Besides some...