Cisco Independent School Dist. v. Dudley, 1150.

• Decision Date: 27 October 1932
• Docket Number: No. 1150.,1150.
• Citation: 53 S.W.2d 639
• Parties: CISCO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST. v. DUDLEY et al.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

53 S.W.2d 639

CISCO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST. v. DUDLEY et al.

No. 1150.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Eastland.

October 27, 1932.

Rehearing Denied November 4, 1932.

Appeal from District Court, Eastland County; Geo. L. Davenport, Judge.

Application for mandatory injunction by the Cisco Independent School District against L. E. Dudley and others.

Application denied.

Butts & Wright, of Cisco, and Conner & McRae and Frank Judkins, all of Eastland, for relator.

Hart, Patterson & Hart, of Austin, Turner, Seaberry & Springer, of Eastland, Woodruff & Holloway, of Brownwood, L. D. Hawkins, of Breckenridge, Loftin V. Witcher, of Ft. Worth, and Cox & Hayden, of Abilene, for respondents.

LESLIE, J.

This is an original proceeding in this court. It was instituted by the Cisco independent school district to procure the issuance by this court of a mandatory injunction to compel L. E. Dudley, N. S. Holland, R. F. Holloway, P. B. Bittle, and E. J. Woodward, individually and as members of the executive committee of district No. 3 of the Interscholastic League of Texas, (1) "to immediately proceed to carry out the commands of the judgment of September 28th, 1932, by the 91st District Court of Eastland County" in cause No. 15329; (2) to refrain from doing each and everything which they (defendants) were directed not to do by said judgment, and (3) to compel said district committee to arrange a schedule of football games between the Cisco High School and the other towns of district No. 3. Such relief is sought "so that the jurisdiction of this court may be preserved and the subject matter of this suit not destroyed," and thus "prevent final rendition of judgment in this cause from being a vain and useless thing." This cause referred to above, and to which this proceeding relates, is that of the Cisco Independent School District v. L. E. Dudley, No. 15329. The defendants in that cause were L. E. Dudley et al., composing the membership of the executive committee of district No. 3, and the state executive committee of the Interscholastic League, individually and as such, respectively.

In the original suit it was alleged that the University Interscholastic League is a voluntary association, composed of the various public schools of the state under articles of association, that the state is divided into sixteen districts, and that district No. 3 is composed of the towns of Ranger, Abilene, Breckenridge, Brownwood, Eastland, and Cisco. The pleadings further set forth that the association is governed by self-enacted rules and regulations, and that it has certain eligibility rules, with penalties for the violation of the same. Suffice it to say that, in the operation of the league in district No. 3, certain infractions of the eligibility rules were charged against the Cisco High School, and, as a result of an investigation pursuant to the rules of the association, the said Cisco district was suspended for one year from the state league. It was the position of the plaintiff in said suit that it had been wrongfully suspended, and upon a trial of the case judgment was rendered setting aside the order of suspension as made by the state committee of the Interscholastic League. The judgment went further and enjoined the district committee from proceeding further with the making of any schedules that would not provide for games with the Cisco High School, and ordering the district committee to immediately proceed to arrange a schedule for games to be played between the Cisco High School and the other high schools of district No. 3. The judgment ran against the state executive committee, the district executive committee, and against the defendants jointly and severally.

That judgment was entered September 28, 1932. Motion for new trial was overruled October 1st, the last day of the August term of court, and on October 4th following, and on motion of the district committee, the trial court heard testimony and fixed the sum of $5,000 as the proper amount of the supersedeas bond. A bond in that amount was promptly executed by the executive committee of district No. 3, and filed and approved October 13, 1932. The state executive committee appeals with cost bond. The jurisdiction over said cause and its subject-matter thus passed into this court. The Cisco district will be referred to as relator and the committee as respondents. The proceeding instituted in this court October 15, 1932, has been given prompt hearing and careful consideration.

In the first part of this opinion we stated the object and purposes of this application for the mandatory injunction. The relator's right to such relief will now be considered in the light of certain statutes and well-established rules of law and equity by which this court must be governed. There are at least two controlling reasons why the relief sought cannot be granted:

In the first place, the original cause of action tried in said Ninety-First district court is a civil case within the meaning of article 2249 of the Revised Statute (1925), which provides that: "An appeal may be taken to the Court of Civil Appeals from every final judgment of the district court in civil cases. * * *" In fact, we do not understand that any party to this suit contends that it is not such case, or that the judgment in the district court is not a "final judgment." Certainly there would be no ground for such contention. That being true, the defendants (respondents here) had the undoubted right to appeal from said judgment. They excepted to the same, gave notice of appeal, and executed and filed the aforesaid bond, fixed by the trial judge as proper and sufficient protection to the relator, the Cisco independent school district. In doing so, the respondents have simply availed themselves of the right of appeal under the plain provision of article 2270 of our Revised Statute, the pertinent part of which reads as follows: "An appellant * * * desiring to suspend the execution of the judgment, may do so by giving a good and sufficient bond to be approved by the clerk, payable to appellee * * * in a sum at least double the amount of the judgment, interest and costs, conditioned that such appellant * * * shall prosecute his appeal * * * with effect; and in case the judgment of the Supreme Court or the Court of Civil Appeals shall be against him, he shall perform its judgment, sentence or decree, and pay all such damages as said court may award against him."

In other words, the lawmaking power of this state has provided definite ways of appeal "from every final judgment of the district court in civil cases," and, where the appellant or appellants, as in this case, comply with the statutes, the trial court has no say, discretionary or otherwise, and neither does this court; that is, the effect of...