Cislo v. City of Shelton
| Decision Date | 29 April 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 15451,15451 |
| Citation | 692 A.2d 1255,240 Conn. 590 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | Alexander CISLO v. CITY OF SHELTON |
Lee K. Tiernan, with whom were Steven J. Errante and, on the brief, Hugh F. Keefe, New Haven, for appellant (plaintiff).
Thomas J. Welch, with whom was John H. Welch, Jr., Shelton, for appellee (defendant).
Before CALLAHAN, C.J., and BORDEN, BERDON, PALMER and MENT, JJ.
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether a criminal charge has been "dismissed" within the meaning of General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 53-39a, 1 which provides for the indemnification of law enforcement officers under certain circumstances, when the charge against the officer has been nolled and the pertinent records have been erased pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 54-142a (c). 2 The plaintiff appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court following our grant of certification. 3 3 A divided panel of the Appellate Court concluded that the provisions of § 54-142a (c) did not effectuate a dismissal for purposes of § 53-39a, and affirmed the summary judgment of the trial court in favor of the defendant. Cislo v. Shelton, 40 Conn.App. 705, 712-14, 673 A.2d 134 (1996). We conclude, contrary to the Appellate Court, that an automatic erasure under § 54-142a (c) that occurs thirteen months following the entry of a nolle prosequi constitutes a dismissal within the meaning of § 53-39a. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the relevant facts and procedural history. "On October 12, 1989, the plaintiff, a Shelton police officer, was arrested and charged with the sexual assault of a police informant. Subsequent to the arrest of the plaintiff, the informant disappeared. On January 24, 1991, the assistant state's attorney entered a nolle prosequi in open court in the criminal action against the plaintiff. 4 The assistant state's attorney entered the nolle because of the disappearance of the informant. The plaintiff's counsel in the criminal action objected to the entry of the nolle and moved to dismiss the case. The trial court declined to dismiss the case and accepted the entry of the nolle pursuant to [General Statutes § 54-56b 5 and] Practice Book § 726. 6
"On March 4, 1992, the plaintiff brought [this] action against the defendant pursuant to General Statutes § 53-39a, 7 seeking indemnification for the economic losses he incurred in the defense of the criminal charges brought against him. Subsequent to the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff and the defendant filed cross motions for summary judgment. On January 11, 1994, the trial court, Rush, J., denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and granted the defendant's cross motion. In its memorandum of decision regarding the cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court determined that the plaintiff was not entitled to relief under § 53-39a. The trial court found as a matter of law that the plaintiff was not entitled to relief because § 53-39a "39a provides for indemnification only where the criminal charges against a police officer are dismissed or where the officer is found not guilty, and that here, the underlying criminal action against the plaintiff was terminated by the entry of a nolle prosequi. 8 On January 27, 1994, judgment was rendered in favor of the defendant and this appeal [to the Appellate Court] followed. In his initial appeal, the plaintiff claim[ed] that the trial court improperly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Cislo v. Shelton, supra, 40 Conn.App. at 706-709, 673 A.2d 134.
The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding that: (1) § 53-39a does not provide for indemnification when criminal charges against a police officer have been nolled; and (2) the subsequent "dismissal" of the charges was of no effect because, following the nolle, there were no criminal charges pending against the plaintiff that could have been dismissed. Id., at 715-16, 673 A.2d 134. This certified appeal followed.
The plaintiff renews in this court the two claims that the Appellate Court rejected, namely, that: (1) under § 54-142a (c), a nolle followed by thirteen months is tantamount to a dismissal, thereby qualifying the plaintiff for indemnification under § 53-39a; and (2) in the alternative, the dismissal entered by Judge Skolnick was sufficient to qualify the plaintiff for indemnification under § 53-39a. We conclude that the entry of a nolle followed by the elapse of the statutory period of thirteen months, which results in the mandatory erasure of the pertinent records pursuant to § 54-142a (c), constitutes a dismissal for purposes of § 53-39a. We therefore need not consider the plaintiff's second claim.
Section 54-142a (c) mandates the automatic erasure of records following the entry of a nolle and the passage of thirteen months. Whether this application constitutes a dismissal for purposes of § 53-39a is a question of statutory interpretation. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United Illuminating Co. v. New Haven, 240 Conn. 422, 431, 692 A.2d 742 (1997). Insofar as the language of the statute will permit, we interpret it in accordance with the purpose of the statute, because legislation is a purposive act. Id., at 450, 692 A.2d 742.
Section 53-39a, which was originally enacted in 1973; see Public Acts 1973, No. 73-627; authorizes indemnification for economic loss, including legal fees, incurred by officers of local police departments who are prosecuted for crimes allegedly committed by them in the course of their duties when the charges against them are dismissed or they are found not guilty. See, e.g., Link v. Shelton, 186 Conn. 623, 627, 443 A.2d 902 (1982). The general purpose of the statute is to permit police officers to recoup the necessary expenses that they have incurred in defending themselves against unwarranted criminal charges arising out of their conduct in the course of their employment. Id., at 628-29, 443 A.2d 902. Whether the charges are unwarranted, however, is determined objectively, namely, by whether an officer has been found not guilty or the charges have been dismissed. The plaintiff in the present case does not claim that he was found not guilty of the charges. The question, therefore, is whether the charges were "dismissed" within the meaning of § 53-39a.
We begin our inquiry by acknowledging the strength of the defendant's two principal contentions. The first is that § 53-39a, as a statute that abrogates or modifies governmental immunity, must be strictly construed. Rawling v. New Haven, 206 Conn. 100, 105, 537 A.2d 439 (1988). The second is that terms such as "dismissal" and "nolle" are ordinarily used as terms of art and, as such, are to be construed in accordance with their "peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law...." General Statutes § 1-1(a); Link v. Shelton, supra, 186 Conn. at 627, 443 A.2d 902. 9 These two contentions appear to lead to the conclusion that a nolle--even a nolle ultimately resulting in the erasure of records pursuant to § 54-142a (c)--cannot be considered to be a dismissal under § 53-39a. We nonetheless conclude that the entry of a nolle plus the passage of thirteen months, which results in the automatic erasure of relevant records under § 54-142a (c), constitutes a dismissal for the purposes of § 53-39a.
First, although the term "dismissed" as used in § 53-39a was undoubtedly used as a term of art, 10 the legislative history of § 54-142a (c) indicates that the legislature did not intend the term "nolle" as used in § 54-142a (c) necessarily to be restricted to its ordinary specialized meaning. Instead, the indication is that the legislature specifically designed § 54-142a (c) in order to avoid the speedy trial violations that the legislature feared otherwise might occur. That fear was based on its interpretation of the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967).
The erasure provisions of § 54-142a (c) have their origins in legislation enacted in 1963. Prior...
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