Citizens for Legislative Choice v. Miller

• Decision Date: 05 February 1998
• Docket Number: No. Civ. 97-CV-73777-DT.,Civ. 97-CV-73777-DT.
• Citation: 993 F.Supp. 1041
• Parties: CITIZENS FOR LEGISLATIVE CHOICE, Michigan Handicapped Voters' Rights Association, Ruby M. Turner, Victor L. Marsh, Matthew McNeely and Evelyn Spence, Plaintiffs, v. Candice S. MILLER, Secretary of State of Michigan, Defendant, Taxpayers United for Term Limitation, Allan Schmid, and Patrick Anderson, Intervening Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

993 F.Supp. 1041

CITIZENS FOR LEGISLATIVE CHOICE, Michigan Handicapped Voters' Rights Association, Ruby M. Turner, Victor L. Marsh, Matthew McNeely and Evelyn Spence, Plaintiffs, v. Candice S. MILLER, Secretary of State of Michigan, Defendant Taxpayers United for Term Limitation, Allan Schmid, and Patrick Anderson, Intervening Defendants.

No. Civ. 97-CV-73777-DT.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

February 5, 1998.

Robert A. Sedler, Otto J. Hutzel, Detroit, MI, John E. Mogk, Grosse Pointe Park, MI, Gregory I. Gilbert, Wyandotte, MI, for plaintiffs.

Gary P. Gordon, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lansing, MI, for defendant.

Michael A. Zagaroli, Daniel Brubaker, Grand Rapids, MI, Stephen J. Safranek, Detroit, MI, for intervening defendants.

OPINION

DUGGAN, District Judge.

This action concerns the constitutionality of art. 4, § 54 of the Michigan Constitution. Section 54 provides for lifetime term limits for state legislators.

In the 1992 Michigan general election, the following proposed amendment to the Michigan Constitution was placed on the ballot as "Proposal B:"

A PROPOSAL TO RESTRICT/LIMIT THE NUMBER OF TIMES A PERSON CAN BE ELECTED TO CONGRESSIONAL, STATE EXECUTIVE AND STATE LEGISLATIVE OFFICE

The proposed constitutional amendment would:

Restrict the number of times a person could be elected to certain offices as described below:

1) U.S. Senator: two times in any 24-year period.

2) U.S. Representative: three times in any 12-year period.

3) Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State or Attorney General: two times per office.

4) State Senator: two times.

5) State Representative: three times.

Office terms beginning on or after January 1, 1993 would count toward the term restrictions. A person appointed to an office vacancy for more than one-half of a term would be considered elected once in that office.

Should this proposal be adopted?

This ballot language was prepared by the State Board of Canvassers, as required by art. 12, § 2, cl. 3 of the Michigan Constitution. The initiative petition from which this statement was derived contained the complete text of the proposed changes to the Michigan Constitution, i.e., art. 2, § 10, art. 4, § 54, and art. 5, § 30.¹

Proposal B received the support of approximately 58.8% of the voters. The text of art. 4, § 54, the constitutional provision at issue in this action, provides:

No person shall be elected to the office of state representative more than three times. No person shall be elected to the office of state senate more than two times. Any person appointed or elected to fill a vacancy in the house of representatives or the state senate for a period greater than one half of a term of such office, shall be considered to have been elected to serve one time in that office for purposes of this section. This limitation on the number of times a person shall be elected to office shall apply to terms of office beginning on or after January 1, 1993.

This section shall be self-executing. Legislation may be enacted to facilitate operation of this section, but no law shall limit or restrict the application of this section. If any part of this section is held to be invalid or unconstitutional, the remaining parts of this section shall not be affected but will remain in full force and effect.

On August 1, 1997, plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendant Candice Miller, Michigan's Secretary of State. The complaint alleged that § 54 violates plaintiffs' rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. On October 15, 1997, the Court granted the motion of Taxpayers United for Term Limitation ("Taxpayers"), Allan Schmid, and Patrick Anderson (collectively "intervening defendants") to intervene as defendants in the instant action. On October 24, 1997, plaintiffs amended their complaint to add a claim that the process by which the Michigan voters adopted § 54 violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs seek, inter alia, a declaratory judgment that § 54 violates their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and a permanent injunction against Miller from enforcing § 54.

Currently before the Court are plaintiffs' and intervening defendants, cross motions for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 56. Defendant Miller has also moved for summary judgment and, in the alternative, seeks dismissal of this action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). The Court held a hearing on these motions on January 29, 1998.

Discussion

Standing

Defendant Miller argues that plaintiffs lack standing and that this action should therefore be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1).²

"Article III of the United States Constitution provides that parties attempting to invoke federal jurisdiction must allege an actual case or controversy." Miyazawa v. City of Cincinnati, 45 F.3d 126, 127 (6th Cir.1995).

One of [the] landmarks, setting apart the "Cases" and "Controversies" that are of the justiciable sort referred to in Article III — "serv[ing] to identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process," Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 1722, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990) — is the doctrine of standing.

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). In Lujan, the Supreme Court identified three components of the standing requirement:

First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact" — an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) "actual or imminent, not `conjectural' or `hypothetical[.]'" Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of — the injury has to be "fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court." Third, it must be "likely," as opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision."

504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. at 2136 (citations omitted).

Defendant Miller argues that the individual plaintiffs, i.e., Turner, Marsh, McNeely, and Spence, cannot establish that they have suffered an "injury in fact."

In support for her argument, defendant relies on Miyazawa. In Miyazawa, the plaintiff challenged an amendment to Cincinnati's city charter limiting city council members to four consecutive terms in office. The Miyazawa court commented, "[a]s the effect of [the amendment to the city charter] is not retroactive for persons who had already served four consecutive two-year terms when it went into effect, it would be difficult to identify a candidate presently who would be affected by this provision." 45 F.3d at 128 (citation omitted). The plaintiff's position in Miyazawa was distinguishable from cases in which "the plaintiff/voter had a personal stake in the outcome of the election (i.e., the voter was a potential candidate, a supporter of the potential candidate, or was unable to vote for his specific candidate of choice due to the subject law)." Id. (citing Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 92 S.Ct. 849, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972); Erum v. Cayetano, 881 F.2d 689 (9th Cir.1989); Henderson v. Ft. Worth Independent School Dist., 526 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1976)). The court concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing to pursue her action because she merely alleged that "sometime in the future she may want to vote for an unidentified candidate who may not meet the requirements of the subject legislation." 45 F.3d at 128.

The instant case is distinguishable from Miyazawa because plaintiffs' injury is not merely conjectural. Plaintiffs desire to vote for specific candidates in an upcoming election.³ They allege that by preventing their chosen candidates from running, § 54 violates their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiffs' chosen candidates must file to run in the 1998 election by May 12, 1998. Because § 54 prevents plaintiffs from voting for their chosen candidates in 1998, their alleged injury is both real and imminent. See Zielasko v. State of Ohio, 873 F.2d 957 (6th Cir.1989) (holding that a municipal judge and a political supporter of the judge had standing to challenge an age restriction on running for judicial office); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 206, 82 S.Ct. 691, 704, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962) ("[V]oters who allege facts showing disadvantage to themselves as individuals have standing to sue.").

Defendant Miller argues that plaintiffs will not suffer imminent harm to their constitutional rights because, if the Court were to determine that lifetime term limits are unconstitutional, § 54's severability clause would require the Court to interpret § 54 as prohibiting candidates from serving three consecutive terms in office.⁴ The Court rejects this argument because § 54 cannot be read as imposing consecutive term limits,⁵ and even if it could, the Court does not believe that the constitutional problems alleged by plaintiffs would necessarily be eliminated by interpreting § 54 as imposing consecutive term limits.⁶

Finally, Defendant argues that Citizens and Handicapped Voters lack standing.

[A]n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members of the suit.

Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 2441, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977). Defendant believes that Citizens and Handicapped Voters lack standing because their members have not suffered an injury in fact and because these plaintiffs have not shown how this action is germane to their organizational purposes.

The Court rejects these arguments. Plaint...