City Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Property Tax Appeal Bd.

• Decision Date: 23 September 1983
• Docket Number: No. 57413,57413
• Citation: 97 Ill.2d 378,454 N.E.2d 652,73 Ill.Dec. 555
• Parties: , 73 Ill.Dec. 555 CITY NATIONAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Trustee, Appellee, v. The PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD et al. (The Property Tax Appeal Board, Appellant).
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 652

454 N.E.2d 652

97 Ill.2d 378, 73 Ill.Dec. 555

CITY NATIONAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Trustee, Appellee, v. The PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD et al. (The Property Tax

Appeal Board, Appellant).

No. 57413.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 23, 1983.

Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Tyrone C. Fahner, Former Atty. Gen., Chicago, for defendant-appellant Illinois Property Tax Appeal Bd., Patricia Rosen, Kathryn A. Spalding, Asst. Attys. Gen., Chicago, of counsel.

Curtis D. Worden, Ltd., Rockford, for plaintiff-appellee; Curtis D. Worden, Rockford, of counsel.

GOLDENHERSH, Justice:

Plaintiff, the City National Bank & Trust Company, filed actions under the Administrative Review Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 110, par. 264 et seq.) to review the decision of the Property Tax Appeal Board (hereafter defendant) denying reductions in the assessments of its real estate in Winnebago County. The circuit court of Winnebago County, upon allowance of defendant's motions, dismissed the actions on the ground that they were not timely commenced. The appellate court reversed the circuit court's order and remanded the cause (108 Ill.App.3d 979, 64 Ill.Dec. 493, 439 N.E.2d 1301), and we granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal (87 Ill.2d R. 315).

It is alleged in the complaints that plaintiff is the titleholder to certain parcels of real property situated in Winnebago County; that these parcels were incorrectly assessed, and said assessments should be reduced; that the Winnebago County board of review denied plaintiff's request to reduce the assessments; that on review by defendant the decision was affirmed. On March 20, 1981, defendant rendered its decision and served it upon plaintiff by mail. On April 24, 1981, a Friday, the 35th day after the mailing of the decision, plaintiff's attorney presented to the office of the clerk of the circuit court of Winnebago County two complaints for administrative review. The summonses were issued by the circuit clerk on the following Monday, April 27, 1981.

Affidavits filed by plaintiff's attorney and the deputy circuit clerk stated that on April 24 the attorney had told the deputy clerk that the summonses had to be issued that day and that the clerk told him that the summonses would not be mailed until the following Monday, but assured him that, in accordance with the procedure in the clerk's office, although the summonses might not be mailed until later, they would be issued "effective" on the date the complaint was filed. The summonses, however, were dated April 27.

Defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that under section 4 of the Administrative Review Act the actions were not timely filed. Section 4 in pertinent part provided:

"Every action to review a final administrative decision shall be commenced by the filing of a complaint and the issuance of summons within 35 days from the date that a copy of the decision sought to be reviewed was served upon the party affected thereby." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 110, par. 267.)

The circuit court found that plaintiff had filed the actions within the 35-day period fixed by the statute, but because the summonses were not issued until after the 35th day, the motions to dismiss were allowed.

The appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that if a plaintiff files his complaint within the 35-day period, and "in good faith attempts to have the clerk issue summons within the same period, he is not deprived of his right to appeal on jurisdictional grounds." 108 Ill.App.3d 979, 983, 64 Ill.Dec. 493, 439 N.E.2d 1301.

Defendant contends that the language of section 4 of the Administrative Review Act is explicit and that the issuance of summons within 35 days is a mandatory and jurisdictional prerequisite to commence an action for administrative review. It concedes, however, that when a party has done all that he can to meet the statutory requirements, but there is failure to comply with the statute because of the action or inaction of a third person outside his control, to deny him the right to pursue his administrative remedy would constitute a deprivation of due process. (Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. (1982), 455 U.S. 422, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 71 L.Ed.2d 265.) It suggests that, in the event of intervention of action or inaction of such third party over whom the party seeking administrative review has no control, the party should be required to prove that he has done everything reasonably possible to assure the filing of the complaint and the issuance of summons within the statutory time. Defendant argues that whether plaintiff...