City of Algona v. Sharp
| Decision Date | 04 January 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 8731-2-I,8731-2-I |
| Citation | 638 P.2d 627,30 Wn.App. 837 |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | CITY OF ALGONA, Respondent, v. Timothy H. SHARP; Richard Lyons; Henning E. Hanson and Evelyn Hanson, a/k/a Evelyn L. Hanson, his wife, Defendants, F. W. Maples, a/k/a Forrest Maples, Appellant, Ralph Ladd; Lona Masion; George W. Lucker; Carl Lehrohoff; Joe Clarke a/k/a Cassimear Joseph Clarke; Edward Charles Johnson and Eleanor L. Johnson, his wife; Wayne Cuthrie; Kenneth Cederstrand; Eugene Cederstrand; Georgie Wardall, Wendell Hedges& Associates, Inc.; Walt Konrad and Patricia L. Konrad, his wife; Frank B. Rassmusson; F. W. Maples a/k/a Forest Maples; Ralph Ladd, a/k/a Ralph O. Ladd; Seattle First National Bank; Fred Poshl et ux; HJF Rooking, Inc.; Peoples National Bank of Washington; Mutual Credit Association, Inc.; AAAA, Inc.; Weyerhouser Timber Co.; Jesus Masion; Thomas S. Ruttinger and Marcia L. Ruttinger, his wife; Ross D. Potter; Washington Credit Inc.; Judy K. Hamilton; Guiseppee Grossi, Carmela Grossi; Allstores Realty Corporation; Northwest Centers, Inc.; Association Collectors, Inc.; American Western Inc.; Franklin Savings Bank of New York; City of Seattle, Washington; and any unknown owners of the property listed below, or any unknown persons having an interest or claim relating to said property, Defendants. |
Barbara Warren, Evergreen Legal Services, Seattle, for appellant.
Ernest Crane, Auburn, for respondent.
The defendant, F. W. Maples, appeals the denial of his motion to quash order and notice of sale issued on execution after judgment was entered foreclosing a Local Improvement District (LID) assessment lien for the installation of sewers. The primary issue submitted for our consideration is whether the Homestead Exemption Act, RCW 6.12.010 et seq., prevents the forced sale of real property to satisfy a LID lien. We hold in the affirmative and reverse.
Maples has owned his home since 1956 and its uncontested value is less than $20,000. The City of Algona (City) is a third-class city with a population of approximately 1,000. In 1970 the City made a LID sewer assessment against the landowners within the area of service. The defendant's share of the assessment was approximately $800 payable over a period of 20 years, or an annual payment, including interest, of $96.91.
Though he received annual bills, Maples made no payments to the City. The City credited his account for $100, money received from the State upon condemnation of a portion of the property for highway purposes.
The City sent Maples a notice in January, 1979, stating that foreclosure proceedings would commence if the assessment was not paid. This action was filed in May, 1979, with notice given by publication as required by law. Maples received a summons and responded by letter to the City Attorney, seeking damages from the City. His water service had been turned off since 1972.
The City treated this letter as an Appearance but not as an Answer. Maples received a Notice of Presentation and Order of Default in August, 1979. Default judgment was taken on August 7, 1979, and the judgment was signed October 9, 1979, when Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered ex parte by the trial court. The judgment ordered sale of several parcels, including that of Maples, to take place on March 24, 1980. Maples was advised of the judgment by letter from the City Attorney dated October 22, 1979.
After consulting counsel from the Legal Services Center, on March 4, 1980, Maples filed a Declaration of Homestead pursuant to RCW 6.12.010 et seq. On March 14, 1980, Maples filed a motion to vacate the default judgment or, in the alternative, to quash the order and notice of sale. The motions were denied in an order entered March 21, 1980. This appeal follows.
Maples contends that his homestead is exempt from foreclosure and sale to satisfy the LID assessment lien. The Washington State Constitution provides: "The legislature shall protect by law from forced sale a certain portion of the homestead and other property of all heads of families." Const. art. 19, § 1. Pursuant to that provision, the legislature passed laws relating to homesteads, now codified in RCW 6.12.010 et seq. RCW 6.12.090 provides in part: "The homestead is exempt from attachment and from execution or forced sale, except as in this chapter provided ..." RCW 6.12.100 provides:
Homestead subject to execution, when. The homestead is subject to execution or forced sale in satisfaction of judgments obtained:
(1) On debts secured by mechanic's, laborer's, materialmen's or vendor's liens upon the premises.
(2) On debts secured by mortgages on the premises executed and acknowledged by the husband and wife or by any unmarried claimant.
There is no statutory provision for sale to satisfy local assessment liens. 1
Maples points out that the exceptions to the superiority of a homestead right provided by the statute are all contractual in nature, and arise from the debtor's voluntary indebtedness. He argues that the statutory list of exceptions should be strictly construed since the homestead is a valuable right favored in the law for the protection of the debtor. Lien v. Hoffman, 49 Wash.2d 642, 306 P.2d 240 (1957). Under these statutes, Maples argues, the assessment lien cannot be enforced against his homestead.
The City responds that under Const. art. 11 § 12 the legislature may grant to municipalities the power to assess and collect taxes for municipal purposes and argues that RCW 35.24.290(4) is such a grant for the construction of sewers. 2 RCW 35.50.010 establishes an assessment lien, attaching to the affected property, which is superior "to any other lien or encumbrance ... except a lien for general taxes." RCW 35.50.030 et seq. provide for foreclosure of delinquent assessments.
The City contends that these provisions permit the inference that an assessment lien takes priority over the protection of a Declaration of Homestead, claiming that the payment of assessments is an obligation incident to the ownership of property, and that government would cease to operate if taxes and assessments could be avoided in this manner. Maples replies, however, that a homestead is not a lien or an encumbrance but a personal right guaranteed by the constitution, which may be asserted independently of any statutory enactment.
The question presented by this appeal is one of first impression in Washington. It places two important governmental objectives in opposition: (1) the homestead statute, implementing the policy that each citizen have a home "where his family may be sheltered and live beyond the reach of financial misfortune," Clark v. Davis, 37 Wash.2d 850, 852, 226 P.2d 904 (1951), quoting 40 C.J.S. Homesteads, § 2 at 431 (1944); and (2) the interest of the government in ensuring the collection of unpaid local assessments, Palzar v. Tacoma, 17 Wash.App. 745, 565 P.2d 1191 (1977).
The issue before us is one of statutory construction. The general rule is clearly stated in 14 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 38.163 at 391 (3d ed. 1970):
Rather than constituting a personal liability on the part of the owner, a lien for special assessments attaches to the lot of land and the improvements thereon ... Whether it attaches to a homestead is dependent upon the constitutional or statutory provisions of the particular state.
(Footnotes omitted.) The City relies on cases from other jurisdictions which hold that the tax collection process is independent of and superior to the protection afforded by homestead. In those jurisdictions, however, the relevant constitutions and statutes expressly provide for collection of assessments and taxes against homesteads. In Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. Parr, 189 Kan. 475, 370 P.2d 400 (1962), for example, the relevant homestead provision provided in part
but no property shall be exempt from sale for taxes, or for the payment of obligations contracted for the purchase of said premises, or for the erection of improvements thereon: Provided, The provisions of this section shall not apply to any process of law obtained by virtue of a lien given by the consent of both husband and wife ....
Kansas Const. art. 15, § 9, 370 P.2d at 402. Washington has no analogous provision. These cases do not support the City's contention, since...
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