Mason v. Georgia-Pac. Corp.

• Decision Date: 29 February 2012
• Docket Number: No. 41138–5–II.,41138–5–II.
• Citation: 271 P.3d 381
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: William MASON, Deceased, and Mary Mason, Appellants, v. GEORGIA–PACIFIC CORPORATION, Respondent,Washington State Department of Labor & Industries, Appellant.

271 P.3d 381

William MASON, Deceased, and Mary Mason, Appellants,

v.GEORGIA–PACIFIC CORPORATION, Respondent,Washington State Department of Labor & Industries, Appellant.

No. 41138–5–II.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2.

Feb. 29, 2012.

Jill Amanda Karmy, Parham, Hall & Karmy, Longview, WA, Natalee Ruth Fillinger, WA St. Attorney General's Office, Olympia, WA, for Appellants.

James L. Gress, The Law Office of Gress & Clark, Portland, OR, for Respondent.

JOHANSON, J.

¶ 1 Mary Mason and the Department of Labor and Industries appeal the superior court's calculation of her surviving spouse pension under the Industrial Insurance Act. Mary ¹ and the Department primarily argue that (1) the legislature intended to provide wage based death benefits to survivors of voluntarily-retired workers who die from occupational diseases and (2) because former RCW 51.32.050 (1986) conflicts with RCW 51.32.180, the conflict should be resolved in favor of the survivor. We reverse the superior court and hold that Mary's survivor benefits should be based on her deceased husband's wages at the time he retired.

FACTS

¶ 2 William D. Mason worked for Georgia–Pacific Corporation for more than 35 years until his voluntary retirement on April 30, 1986. Working mostly as a millwright, William was extensively exposed to caustic chemicals, including asbestos and chlorine dioxide. In June 1988, William filed a claim for industrial insurance benefits based on a bilateral lung condition related to chemical exposure during his employment. The Department accepted the claim.

¶ 3 William died in December 2006. Mary, his wife of many years, survived him. His claim for industrial insurance benefits was still open at the time of his death. In April 2007, the Department found that an occupationally-related condition caused Mason's death and approved surviving spouse benefits. In July, the Department determined that the appropriate date for the manifestation of William's occupationally-related condition was the last day he worked (April 30, 1986), and established a surviving spouse pension based on his last day of work wages.

¶ 4 Georgia–Pacific protested the Department's manifestation date for William's occupationally-related condition, but the Department affirmed the order. Georgia–Pacific appealed to the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals, which affirmed the order.

¶ 5 Both Mary and Georgia–Pacific appealed to superior court, which consolidated their appeals.² At trial, Georgia–Pacific argued that Mary was entitled to benefits calculated using the statutory minimum survivor pension rate because William had voluntarily retired before his lung condition manifested.

¶ 6 Based on the jury's finding that William's condition did not manifest until after his voluntary retirement, the trial court determined, as a matter of law, that RCW 51.32.180 required Mary's survivor benefits to be set at the statutory minimum. The trial court reversed and remanded, directing the Department to grant a spousal pension to Mary using the statutory minimum rate to calculate the pension amount and to close the claim. Both the Department and Mary appeal.

ANALYSIS

I. Standard of Review

¶ 7 Unlike our review of other administrative decisions, we review workers' compensation cases appealed from superior court in the same way we review nonadministrative civil cases. RCW 51.52.140; Rogers v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 151 Wash.App. 174, 180, 210 P.3d 355, review denied, 167 Wash.2d 1015, 220 P.3d 209 (2009).³ The superior court's construction of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo. Jacobsen v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 127 Wash.App. 384, 389, 110 P.3d 253 (2005), review denied, 156 Wash.2d 1024, 132 P.3d 1094 (2006). Here, the parties do not dispute the facts, and the only question is one of statutory construction, a question of law.

¶ 8 If a statute's meaning is plain on its face, then we give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent. State ex rel. Citizens Against Tolls (CAT) v. Murphy, 151 Wash.2d 226, 242, 88 P.3d 375 (2004). We discern plain meaning not only from the provision in question but also from closely related statutes and the underlying legislative purposes. Murphy, 151 Wash.2d at 242, 88 P.3d 375. In contrast, when a statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, it is ambiguous and we use canons of statutory construction or legislative history. Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash.2d 1, 12, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). We consider and harmonize statutory provisions in relation to each other and interpret a statute to give effect to all statutory language. King County v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 142 Wash.2d 543, 560, 14 P.3d 133 (2000). We avoid construing a statute in a manner that results in “unlikely, absurd, or strained consequences.” Glaubach v. Regence BlueShield, 149 Wash.2d 827, 833, 74 P.3d 115 (2003).

¶ 9 Washington's Industrial Insurance Act “is remedial in nature and is to be liberally construed in order to achieve its purpose of providing compensation to all covered employees injured in their employment, with doubts resolved in favor of the worker.” Dennis v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 109 Wash.2d 467, 470, 745 P.2d 1295 (1987). Regarding statutory interpretation, our fundamental objective is to give effect to the legislature's intent. Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash.2d at 9–10, 43 P.3d 4.

II. Legislative Intent of Survivor Benefits

A. Expressio Unius est Exclusio Alterius

¶ 10 Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius—where a statute specifically designates the things or classes of things on which it operates—an inference arises in law that the legislature intentionally omitted all things or classes of things omitted from it. Wash. Natural Gas Co. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 77 Wash.2d 94, 98, 459 P.2d 633 (1969).

¶ 11 The 1986 Act provided to workers and their families four types of wage-based, periodically-paid monetary benefits. These benefits included permanent total disability pension benefits,⁴ temporary total disability time loss compensation,⁵ loss of earning power benefits (also known as partial time loss compensation),⁶ and death benefits.⁷ In 1986, the legislature amended three of the four wage-based, periodically paid monetary benefits. The amendments provided that if the worker voluntarily retires then “benefits shall not be paid.” Former RCW 51.32.060, former RCW 51.32.090(1), (3). But the legislature did not amend the fourth provision, which provided death benefits to the worker's survivors.

¶ 12 Georgia–Pacific argues that we should not assume that the legislature “knew what it was doing” because there is no legislative history that expressly articulates a purposeful omission of a similar provision to the death benefit. Br. of Resp't at 20. However, one rule of statutory construction is that the court presumes the legislature to be familiar with its own law, including prior subjects of legislation, the rules, and court decisions construing the former legislation. In re Wissink, 118 Wash.App. 870, 875, 81 P.3d 865 (2003). Additionally, no legal authority supports Georgia–Pacific's argument requiring express evidence of legislative intent.

¶ 13 Georgia–Pacific also argues that RCW 51.32.050, the provision that restricts the benefits of a worker who voluntarily retires is not an example of “classes of things” referred to by the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Br. of Resp't at 22. Georgia–Pacific seeks to narrow the application of the maxim to parallel “classes of things” identified in previous case law. Br. of Resp't at 22. This argument misunderstands the maxim. Instead, the various types of benefits available to retired workers under the Act are types or classes of a thing to which we apply the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

¶ 14 The principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is “the law in Washington, barring a clearly contrary legislative intent.” City of Algona v. Sharp, 30 Wash.App. 837, 842, 638 P.2d 627 (1982). Applying it here, we infer that by amending the language regarding three out of four wage-based, periodically-paid monetary benefits, the legislature intentionally omitted a similar limitation to survivors' death benefits.

B. Unique Character of Death Benefit

¶ 15 Mary and the Department argue that a surviving spouse's lifetime pension is different in character from the worker's wage replacement benefits. Specifically, they argue That a worker can choose to resume work, thereby reversing his or her voluntary retirement; but a surviving spouse does not have the ability to reverse the voluntary retirement of his or her deceased spouse. Second, a worker cannot waive the survivor's rights to benefits. Georgia–Pacific argues that death benefits merely extend the worker's wage replacement benefits to the spouse and the legislative purpose of the survivor's death benefit is the same as the worker's wage replacement benefit. We agree with Mary and the Department.

¶ 16 Although the legislature made no express statement, it is reasonable to conclude that the legislature intended to provide different benefits for workers and survivors. The Department's regulations provide a means for a worker to reverse voluntary retirement; however, no means exist for a survivor to reverse his or her deceased spouse's retirement. WAC 296–14–100(1)(b) (voluntary retirement is negated by evidence showing the worker's “bona[ ]fide attempt to return to work after retirement”). In addition, our Supreme Court has held that “the worker cannot waive the survivor's rights to benefits.” Kilpatrick v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 125 Wash.2d 222, 228, 883 P.2d 1370, 915 P.2d 519 (1994). Kilpatrick supports the argument that the survivor's death benefit has a separate character and is not merely an extension of the worker's wage replacement benefit.

¶ 17 Although Georgia–Pacific correctly argues that the Act does...