City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court
| Decision Date | 02 November 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. B143088.,B143088. |
| Citation | 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 156,84 Cal.App.4th 767 |
| Parties | CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent; Jeremy Brandon, Real Party in Interest. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
James K. Hahn, City Attorney, Cecil W. Marr, Senior Assistant City Attorney and Julie S. Raffish, Deputy City Attorney for Petitioner.
No appearance by Respondent.
Richard Leonard, for Real Party in Interest.
Michael P. Judge, Public Defender, Albert J. Menaster and Mark Harvis, Deputy Public Defenders as Amici Curiae.
Evidence Code section 1045, subdivision (b)(1), prohibits a court from ordering the disclosure of information concerning a complaint against a police officer arising from conduct that occurred more than five years before the incident that is the subject of the pending litigation. The superior court in this case ordered the disclosure of information from a ten-year-old complaint against a police officer despite the statutory prohibition. Petitioner City of Los Angeles contends the order was error and seeks writ relief.
A state law that conflicts with a criminal defendant's rights under the federal Constitution must yield to those constitutional rights. The supremacy clauses in the federal and state Constitutions (U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2; Cal. Const., art. Ill, § 1) require that result. We conclude that the disclosure ordered in this case is required to protect the defendant's Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a fair trial and that the city has not shown error.
Two city police officers arrested defendant Brandon in February 2000 for allegedly committing a lewd act upon a child. The officers were responding to a call from the child's mother who reported that the child had complained that defendant Brandon, a neighbor of theirs in a residential hotel, had confronted the child outside of their common bathroom and fondled him. One of the arresting officers interviewed the child on the scene, apparently in the presence of the other officer, and the child repeated the allegation.
An information filed in March 2000 charged defendant Brandon with a forcible lewd act upon a child under the age of 14 (Pen.Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1)) and failure to register as a convicted sex offender relating to an incident eight years earlier (Pen.Code, § 290, subd. (g)(2)), with enhancements for prior convictions. The prosecutor later withdrew the allegation that the act was forcible (see Pen.Code § 288, subd. (a)).
Defendant Brandon moved for pretrial discovery in June 2000 against both the police department and the district attorney, requesting disclosure of the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of all persons who had filed complaints with or were interviewed by the police department concerning alleged misconduct by the two arresting officers reflecting on their honesty or truthfulness, and of certain related documents. He argued that he was entitled to the discovery under Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 113 Cal.Rptr. 897, 522 P.2d 305, Evidence Code section 1043, and Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215. The motion was unopposed, and the police department produced the documents for an in camera inspection by the trial court in July 2000, two months before the scheduled trial date in September 2000.
Among the documents was a complaint against one of the officers concerning an incident in 1996 in which the officer allegedly had failed to report the beating of a prisoner in his presence by another officer. The 1996 complaint also referred to a prior complaint involving an incident in 1990 in which the officer allegedly had unjustifiably sprayed mace in someone's face and failed to report the incident. An internal police department investigation had determined in each case that the allegations were true despite the officer's denials and that the officer had engaged in serious misconduct. The court ordered the police department to disclose the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of the complainants and witnesses relating to the two complaints and to provide a brief summary of the incidents.
The city moved for reconsideration of the order as to the information concerning the 1990 complaint, contending the five-year rule of Evidence Code section 1045, subdivision (b)(1), precluded the discovery of that information. The defendant opposed the motion on the ground that the prosecutor's obligation to disclose evidence favorable to the defendant under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, as articulated in Brady v. Maryland, supra, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 and its progeny, supersedes the five-year limitation of Evidence Code section 1045. The court denied reconsideration in July 2000, and the city petitioned this court for writ relief. We issued an order to show cause and a stay of the enforcement of the disclosure order.
Both parties agree that the five-year rule of Evidence Code section 1045, subdivision (b)(1), would prohibit the court from ordering the disclosure of information concerning the 1990 complaint. The issue presented is whether due process requires that the information be disclosed despite the statute. The city contends the five-year rule is reasonable and therefore does not violate due process. Defendant Brandon contends the requested information is material for purposes of impeachment of a prosecution witness and to prohibit disclosure would violate his due process right to a fair trial under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The city also contends that even if defendant Brandon is entitled to disclosure of information concerning the 1990 complaint, the prosecutor and not the city bears that obligation and the court has no authority to order disclosure by the city.
Penal Code section 832.7, subdivision (a), declares that the personnel records of a peace officer are confidential and shall not be disclosed except as provided under Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1046,1 or for certain purposes that are not applicable here (Pen.Code, § 832.7, subd. (d)). Confidential personnel records include records concerning a complaint against a police officer. (Pen.Code, §§ 830.1, subd. (a), 832.8, subd. (e).)
Evidence Code section 10432 provides that the party seeking disclosure must file a written motion describing the records or information sought and an affidavit showing good cause for the disclosure.3 Evidence Code section 1045, subdivision (b),4 provides that the trial court must examine in camera the documents produced by the agency to determine their relevance and must exclude from disclosure "information consisting of complaints concerning conduct occurring more than five years before the event or transaction which is the subject of the litigation in aid of which discovery or disclosure is sought." Evidence Code section 1045, subdivision (c), states that in determining relevance the court also must consider whether the information sought may be obtained from other records maintained by the agency that would not require the disclosure of personnel records. These provisions generally codified a procedure that had become known as a Pitchess motion after Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 113 Cal.Rptr. 897, 522 P.2d 305, in which the Supreme Court held in the absence of statutory authority that the trial court had the discretion to compel the discovery of records concerning complaints against deputy sheriffs. (Id. at pp. 535-538, 113 Cal.Rptr. 897, 522 P.2d 305; see City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 47, 50-52, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 73, 850 P.2d 621.)
Evidence Code section 1045, subdivision (b)(1), thus establishes a per se rule precluding the disclosure of information concerning complaints against a police officer if the complaints concern conduct that occurred more than five years before the incident that is the subject of the pending litigation.
A prosecutor has an obligation to disclose to the defendant evidence favorable to the defendant and material to the issue of guilt or punishment. (Strickler v. Greene (1999) 527 U.S. 263, 280-282, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286; Brady v. Maryland, supra, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215.) Disclosure is necessary to protect the defendant's right to present a complete defense. (California v. Trombetta (1983) 467 U.S. 479, 485, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413.) The failure to disclose favorable evidence would deprive the jury of the opportunity to consider all material evidence, offend our standards of justice, and deny the defendant a fair trial in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Brady, at pp. 87-88, 83 S.Ct. 1194.) The prosecutor's disclosure obligation arises even if the defendant has not requested disclosure. (Strickler, at p. 280, 119 S.Ct. 1936; United States v. Agurs (1976) 427 U.S. 97, 107, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342; Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 356, 378, 285 Cal.Rptr. 231, 815 P.2d 304.)
Evidence is material for purposes of the disclosure obligation if there is a reasonable probability that its disclosure would have produced a different verdict or punishment. (Strickler v. Greene, supra, 527 U.S. at pp. 280-281, 119 S.Ct. 1936; United States v. Bagley (1985) 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481.) "A `reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." (Bagley, at p. 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; see Kyles v. Whitley (1995) 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490.) The disclosure obligation encompasses both exculpatory and impeachment evidence (Bagley, at p. 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375) and includes not only information known to the prosecutor but also extends to information known...
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