City of Los Angeles v. Hensler, B199045 (Cal. App. 3/7/2008), B199045
Decision Date | 07 March 2008 |
Docket Number | B199045 |
Court | California Court of Appeals |
Parties | CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ROBERT R. HENSLER, Defendant and Appellant. |
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. BC330791, Bruce E. Mitchell, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed.
Schadrack & Chapman and Mark A. Schadrack for Defendant and Appellant.
Rockard J. Delgadillo, City Attorney (Los Angeles), Susan D. Pfann, Assistant City Attorney and Peter E. Langsfeld, Deputy City Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent.
This is an eminent domain action brought by plaintiff, the City of Los Angeles, to condemn an underground sewer easement. The property owner, defendant, Robert R. Hensler, appeals from a judgment awarding him only $3,330.43 in compensation for the taking, and $1,066 for a temporary construction easement. Defendant raises two contentions. First, defendant argues the trial court erroneously ruled the easement would result in only a 10 percent decrease in land value. Second, defendant argues it was inappropriate and unrealistic to assess the temporary construction easement based on a typical rent. We conclude substantial evidence supported the trial court's valuation conclusion and the temporary construction easement argument is not properly raised. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
Defendant owns commercial property adjacent to the Bob Hope Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport. Plaintiff sought to acquire an underground sewer easement running along the northwest property line and consisting of a strip 10 feet wide and 100 feet long. Defendant waived his right to a jury. Just compensation was determined in a February 6 and 7, 2007 court trial. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 19; Metropolitan Water Dist. of So. California v. Campus Crusade for Christ, Inc. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 954, 965.) There was substantial evidence, and the trial court found, the proposed sewer location was already encumbered by a 30-foot wide private roadway easement as well as a gas pipeline easement.
Conflicting easement valuation evidence was presented at trial. Okey W. Njoku, a real estate appraiser employed by defendant's public works department, had appraised the easement's value as of June 4, 2004, and found a 40 percent diminution in land value. Mr. Njoku noted the sewer easement area was part of a private street, accessible by the general public, which had been used as such for many years. With respect to the land's best use, Mr. Njoku concluded: At trial, plaintiff relied on an appraisal by Norman Eichel of Eichel Inc., a real estate analysis firm. Mr. Eichel concluded defendant's property value was "relatively unaffected" by the proposed easement, particularly given existing utility and access easements in the same location. He valued the easement as 10 percent of the fee value.
Defendant testified the sewer easement would reduce his land value by 70 percent. Defendant presented evidence he planned to build a heliport on his property. In defendant's opinion, a heliport would be the most feasible use of the property. The heliport building would occupy the area encumbered by the: roadway easement; the gas pipeline easement; and the proposed sewer easement. Defendant understood he needed a zoning variance to build a heliport, but he had not applied for one. He had not conducted any inquiry to determine what he needed from the Department of Airports in order to build a heliport. Defendant had hired an "expert" to do that. He had not applied to the Federal Aviation Administration for permission to operate a heliport. Defendant did not know whether he could get permission. Defendant had not made any effort to determine what kind of permit would be needed to store helicopter fuel on the property. It was his expert's opinion, however, that defendant could build a heliport on his property.
The trial court awarded defendant compensation based on a 10 percent diminution in land value. The trial court calculated the easement consumed 1,152 square feet valued at $28.91 per square foot for a total of $33,304.32. Defendant was awarded 10 percent of that amount as just compensation for the taking.
Defendant contends the trial court erroneously concluded the taking would result in only a 10 percent impairment to the property. Defendant argues the trial court's decision rests on unsupported and erroneous assumptions. We find substantial evidence supported the trial court's conclusion.
A property owner is entitled to compensation when an easement is taken for public use. (Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Hufford (1957) 49 Cal.2d 545, 552-553; County Sanitation Dist. v. Watson Land Co. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1278-1279.) Under article I, section 19 of the California Constitution, "Private property may be taken or damaged for public use only when just compensation . . . has first been paid to . . . the owner." (Mt. San Jacinto Community College Dist. v. Superior Court (2007) 40 Cal.4th 648, 653 & fn. 1.) Just compensation is defined as "the fair market value of the property" that is taken by the public entity. (§ 1263.310; Metropolitan Water Dist. of So. California v. Campus Crusade for Christ, Inc., supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 965.) "Fair market value" is defined in section 1263.320, "(a) The fair market value of the property taken is the highest price on the date of valuation that would be agreed to by a seller, being willing to sell but under no particular or urgent necessity for so doing, nor obliged to sell, and a buyer, being ready, willing, and able to buy but under no particular necessity for so doing, each dealing with the other with full knowledge of all the uses and purposes for which the property is reasonably adaptable and available." The Supreme Court has held: (Metropolitan Water Dist. of So. California v. Campus Crusade for Christ, Inc., supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 965.)
A property owner may present evidence of a possible use of the land as affecting market value—that is, as an example of the highest and best use to which the property might be put—provided there is a probability of such use in the reasonably near future. (Metropolitan Water Dist. of So. California v. Campus Crusade for Christ, Inc., supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 966-968; People v. La Macchia (1953) 41 Cal.2d 738, 751, disapproved on another point in County of Los Angeles v. Faus (1957) 48 Cal.2d 672, 679.) As the Court of Appeal explained in San Diego Metropolitan Transit Development Bd. v. RV Communities (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 313, 343: `As a general rule,
But in People v. La Macchia, supra, 41 Cal.2d at page 751, our Supreme Court held: ...
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