City of Los Angeles v. Carson
| Citation | 181 Cal.App.2d 540,5 Cal.Rptr. 356 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Decision Date | 01 June 1960 |
| Parties | CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a municipal corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. William K. CARSON, Dean Carson and David M. Carson, co-partners, doing business as Cross Town Lines, a co-partnership, Defendants and Appellants. Civ. 24088. |
Newell & Chester and Robert M. Newell, Los Angeles, for appellants.
McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Enersen, San Francisco, Cal., George W. Rauch, Chicago, Ill., John E. Munholland and Pray, Price & Williams, Long Beach, amici curiae on behalf of appellants.
Roger Arnebergh, City Atty., Bourke Jones, Asst. City Atty., and James A. Doherty, Asst. City Atty., Los Angeles, for respondent.
This is an appeal by the defendants from a judgment in favor of the City of Los Angeles in an action to recover municipal license taxes.
At the times involved in this action, the defendants were copartners. They conducted their business under the name of Cross Town Lines. The defendants' place of business was in Lynwood and they had no established place of business in the city of Los Angeles. In 1953 and 1954, they operated buses on schedule over fixed routes through Compton, Lynwood, Huntington Park, Downey, Bellflower and Paramount. None of their equipment was garaged in the city of Los Angeles. The equipment so operated on regular transit lines was also used for charter bus service. An example of such service would be the transportation of a group of people into the city of Los Angeles to the Coliseum to witness a sporting event. The bus would be parked at the Coliseum and, after the event, the passengers would be returned to a point outside the city of Los Angeles.
On December 15, 1954, the City Clerk of the City of Los Angeles made an assessment against the defendants for unpaid license taxes claimed to be due from the defendants under section 21.154 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code. The pertinent portion of that section is as follows:
'For every person engaged in the business of running, driving or operating any automobile or motor-propelled vehicle for the transportation of passengers for hire, when driven by the owner or a representative of the owner at rates per mile, per trip, per hour, per day, per week or per month, and such vehicle is routed under the direction of such passenger or passengers or of such persons hiring the same, and when such vehicle does not stand in or upon any public street, alley or other public place while awaiting employment, for each vehicle having a seating capacity of 5 to 7 persons, inclusive, $7.50 per quarter;
'For each such vehicle having a seating capacity of 8 to 10 persons, inclusive, $10.00 per quarter;
'For each such vehicle having a seating capacity of 11 to 15 persons, inclusive, $18.00 per quarter;
'For each such vehicle having a seating capacity of 16 to 20 persons, inclusive, $27 per quarter;
'For each such vehicle having a seating capacity of more than 20 persons, $36.00 per quarter * * *.'
Thereafter a hearing as provided for in section 21.26 of the Municipal Code was held. The findings of the Board of Review made as a result of such hearing contained a summary of charter bus trips for the period of time in question. The defendants did not dispute the factual accuracy of such summary which was as follows:
" Number of seprate
buses which
either picked up Total number of No. of
or discharged trips into Los trips
passengers in Angeles during originating
Period Los Angeles period in Los Angeles
------ ----------------- --------------- --------------
1953 1 Q 16 34 2
2 Q 11 62 10
3 Q 14 56 -
4 Q 16 48 -
1954 1 Q 10 23 8
2 Q 19 52 8
3 Q 12 56 9
4 Q 14 17 3
The findings also contained the following statements:
'Taxpayer did not disagree with the above figures, but stated he would be happy to obtain the required licenses if the Board of Public Utilities would permit him to operate in Los Angeles.
'Taxpayer was informed by the Board that the liability existed under Section 21.154 L.A.M.C. regardless of whether or not his buses were licensed by the Board of Public Utilities.'
The basis upon which the case of the respondent is predicated is thus stated in its brief:
It is, of course, clear that chartered cities are empowered to exact business license taxes for revenue purposes. West Cost Advertising Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, 14 Cal.2d 516, 95 P.2d 138; City of Glendale v. Trondsen, 48 Cal.2d 93, 98, 308 P.2d 1; Franklin v. Peterson, 87 Cal.App.2d 727, 732, 197 P.2d 788. However, as stated in the Franklin case, 87 Cal.App.2d at page 730, 197 P.2d at page 789, with respect to an ordinance imposing such a tax, '* * * it is manifest that an ordinance such as the one before us operates only within the territorial limits of the municipality and affects only those engaged in a business or profession within such limits.' In the case at bar, more than an occasional, isolated act of bringing persons into Los Angeles on a chartered bus is involved. The table heretofore set forth shows that a substantial and steady charter business was done by the defendants in each quarter of the years 1953 and 1954. The evidence was sufficient to establish that the defendants were engaged in the city of Los Angeles in the business described in section 21.154 of the Municipal Code. In City of Los Angeles v. Tannahill, 105 Cal.App.2d 541, 233 P.2d 671, the appellants were conducting a forhire trucking business with headquarters in the city of Vernon. From Vernon their trucks operated throughout southern California, hauling merchandise into the city of Los Angeles but never moving a cargo from one point to another within that municipality. In upholding the ordinance therein involved wherein the license fee was based on each vehicle used and the unladen weight thereof, the court said with respect to the power of the city to levy a license tax for revenue purposes in such a case, at page 547 of 105 Cal.App.2d, at page 674 of 233 P.2d: 'Also, it may levy a license tax upon those who have their offices elsewhere but conduct a business of transporting goods for hire in a neighboring city. California Fireproof Storage Co. v. City of Santa Monica, 206 Cal. 714, 275 P. 948. In that case the plaintiff maintained offices in Los Angeles and had no depot or warehouse in the bay city; no equipment there except its trucks used in transporting household goods to and from Santa Monica; had no solicitors or agents there, but merely sent its trucks into the city on call. After reviewing appellate decisions the court held, 206 Cal. at page 722, 275 P. at page 951, that if plaintiff 'is to enter said city ad libitum upon 'call,' * * * it will transact business therein precisely as it transacts its business in the city of Los Angeles. It does not matter at which end of the line the business is initiated, its situs is the municipality of Santa Monica.'' In the present case, with respect to trips which originated outside the city, the passengers were transported to a specific point in the city for a particular event, left the bus, and later re-entered for the purpose of returning to the place from which their trip commenced.
We turn now from the question of the power of the city to impose such a license tax to the problem of the construction of section 21.154 of the Municipal Code in the lights of the facts in this case. Our duty is to ascertain the legislative intent so as to effectuate the purpose of the ordinance. In that pursuit, we cannot sacrifice that purpose to a literal construction of any part of the ordinance. Cf. Select Base Materials, Inc. v. Board of Equalization, 51 Cal.2d 640, 335 P.2d 672. Section 21.154, in that portion thereof which has been set forth herein, imposes the license tax 'when such vehicle does not stand in or upon any public street, alley or other public place while awaiting employment.' A later portion of that section relates to the amount of tax '[f]or each such...
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