City of Arlington v. Lillard
Decision Date | 04 May 1927 |
Docket Number | (No. 4352.) |
Citation | 294 S.W. 829 |
Parties | CITY OF ARLINGTON et al. v. LILLARD et al. |
Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Appeal from Court of Civil Appeals of Second Supreme Judicial District.
Suit by Lee A. Lillard and others against the City of Arlington and others for injunction to restrain enforcement of ordinance. Temporary injunction was granted, and defendants appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, which certifies questions to the Supreme Court. Questions answered.
J. W. Beaird, of Arlington, and R. E. Rouer and Gillis A. Johnson, both of Fort Worth, and E. F. Smith, of Austin, for appellants.
Mayer, Rowe & Brown, of Fort Worth, for appellees.
The city of Arlington passed an ordinance which prohibits the use of Abrams and Division streets, from the west boundary line of the city limits to the east boundary line of the city, by those engaged in the operation of motorbusses or motor vehicles for hire, and provided a penalty for its violation.
Appellees operate a motorbus line for the carrying of passengers for hire from the city of Fort Worth to the city of Dallas, through the city of Arlington and other intermediate points, taking on and letting off passengers at said intermediate points. Appellees brought this suit in the district court of Tarrant county for an injunction to restrain the enforcement of the ordinance. Among other things, appellees allege that they accept and transport no passengers, and that it is their purpose hereafter not to accept or transport any passengers between points within the city of Arlington; that Division street is a part of the Bankhead highway; and further allege, in effect, as construed by the honoroble Court of Civil Appeals, that Abrams and Division streets are the only streets, thoroughfares, and highways through the city of Arlington which can be used in going from Fort Worth and other points west of Arlington through to Dallas or other points beyond and east of Arlington; that under the provisions of the ordinance they are in fact prohibited from passing through the city of Arlington; that the use of the state highways between the points named is interrupted and denied to them and others similarly situated; and that the prohibition thus exercised is beyond the power under the law for the city to exercise. The other allegations are immaterial.
The district court granted a temporary injunction, from which the city of Arlington appealed without otherwise joining issue, thereby admitting as true the allegations of fact. The honorable Court of Civil Appeals certify to us the following questions:
The facts of the case as pleaded and certified to us raise two distinct and important issues, either of which, under our view of the law, is conclusive of the case. One involves the power of a municipal corporation in the exercise of its dominion over its streets to affect and interfere with the use of a state thoroughfare or highway outside of and beyond the city limits by prohibiting the use of two certain streets within the city, one of which is a part of said highway. This issue is embodied in question No. 1. The other issue is the power of a city to prohibit the use of all its streets to those carrying passengers for hire. This issue is certified in question No. 2.
In the order that we have stated them above, we shall dispose of these issues.
Appellees alleged Abrams and Division streets are the only streets or thoroughfares which can be used by them in traveling from Fort Worth and other points west of Arlington through the latter city to Dallas and other points east of Arlington; that there are no other ways through Arlington over which they may travel; and that a denial of the use of Abrams and Division streets prevents them from passing through the city, which affects and interferes with their use of the state highway between Fort Worth and Dallas and intermediate points. That such a prohibition and denial does affect and interfere with their use of the state highway, not only through the city of Arlington but outside of and beyond that city's limits, is fairly evident.
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... ... Weaver v. Public Service ... Commission, 1929, 40 Wyo. 462, 278 P. 542; Western Auto ... Transport v. Cheyenne, supra; Arlington v. Lillard, ... 1927, 116 Tex. 446, 294 S.W. 829 cited in 121 A. L. R. 573 ... and 586; Walker v. Comm., 1909, 40 P. S.Ct. 638, 121 A. L. R ... ...
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