City of Atlanta v. Pickens

• Decision Date: 12 April 1933
• Docket Number: 9217.
• Parties: CITY OF ATLANTA v. PICKENS.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

169 S.E. 99

176 Ga. 833

CITY OF ATLANTA v. PICKENS.

No. 9217.

Supreme Court of Georgia

April 12, 1933

Syllabus by the Court.

Compensation Act provision classifying municipal corporations as "employers" held not invalid as applied to city employee injured while repairing street, as against contention that municipalities were unauthorized to levy taxes for payment of compensation, since repair of streets is "ordinary current expense" of municipal government (Laws 1920, p. 167, § 2(a); Civ. Code 1910, §§ 864, 865).

Compensation Act provision classifying municipal corporations as "employers" held not unconstitutional as authorizing municipal corporations to appropriate money for association for noncharitable purposes (Laws 1930, p. 167, § 2(a); Const. art. 7, § 6, par. 1).

Compensation Act provision classifying municipal corporations as "employers" held not violative of constitutional provision forbidding municipalities to incur any debt until provision therefor is made (Laws 1920, p. 167 § 2(a); Const. art. 7, § 10, par. 1).

Compensation Act provision classifying municipal corporations as "employers" held not unconstitutional as granting gratuity (Laws 1920, p. 167, § 2(a); Const. art. 7 § 16, par. 1).

Compensation Act, although classifying municipal corporations as "employers," held not violative of constitutional provision requiring amending or repealing act to distinctly describe law amended or repealed, as well as alteration made (Laws 1920, p. 167, § 2(a); Const. art. 3, § 7, par. 17).

Awarding compensation against city for injury received by city employee, struck by automobile while engaged in repairing street, held proper (Laws 1920, p. 167, § 2(a).

1. The maintenance and repair of the streets of a municipality is an "ordinary current expense" of the municipal government as that term is employed in the Civil Code, § 865; and the General Assembly was authorized, in the passage of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Ga. La. 1920, p. 167, § 2(a), to provide for compensation for the employees of municipal corporations who might be injured while engaged in its service, in order to better effectuate the exercise of a municipal duty. One of the most important functions of city government is the maintaining of the public streets, and the payment of compensation for injuries which may be sustained by those employed by the city to keep the streets in repair may largely tend to the efficiency and economy of this public duty.

2. The Workmen's Compensation Act, requiring municipal corporations to insure their employees against or pay them for personal injuries or for their death, does not violate article 7, § 6, par. 1, of the Constitution of 1877, which declares that the General Assembly shall not authorize any municipal corporation to appropriate money for or to loan its credit to any corporation, company, association, institution or individual, except for purely charitable purposes. City of Macon v. Benson, 175 Ga. 502, 166 S.E. 26.

3. The Workmen's Compensation Act does not violate article 7, § 10, par. 1, of the Constitution, which forbids municipalities from incurring any debt until provision therefor shall have been made.

4. The workmen's Compensation Act does not violate article 7, § 16, par. 1, of the Constitution, which provides that the General Assembly shall not grant any donation or gratuity in favor of any person, corporation, or association.

5. The Workmen's Compensation Act does not violate article 3, § 7, par. 17, of the Constitution, which provides that no section of the Code shall be amended or repealed unless the amending or repealing act shall distinctly describe the law to be amended or repealed, as well as the alteration to be made, for any reason presented by the bill of exceptions. The assignment of error fails to refer to any existing law which will be amended or repealed by the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act in conflict therewith.

6. The court did not err in affirming the award of the department of industrial relations.

Error from Superior Court, Fulton County; Edgar E. Pomeroy, Judge.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Mrs. R. D Pickens, for the death of her husband, R. D. Pickens, opposed by the City of Atlanta, employer. Award of compensation was affirmed by the superior court, and the employer brings error.

Affirmed.

J. L. Mayson, C. S. Winn, and J. C. Savage, all of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.

C. W. Buchanan and Clarke & Clarke, all of Atlanta, for defendant in error.

RUSSELL Chief Justice.

It appears from the record R. D. Pickens, an employee of the city of Atlanta, was struck by the driver of an automobile passing along a street. R. D. Pickens was a member of the "asphalt gang" employed by the city for the purpose of repairing its streets. From the collision with the automobile Pickens suffered certain injuries. Pneumonia developed, and Pickens died. His widow filed a claim for compensation, on the ground that her husband received the injury while in the employment of the city, although the injury was done by a person other than those in the employment of the city, with whom the city had no connection. She contended that the city was liable, because her husband at the time of the injury was in the employment of the city and working on its street. The city objected to an award of compensation, on various grounds, but "the primary objection is that there is no authority for a municipality in this State to pay workmen's compensation. In other words, while the act of the General Assembly undertakes to require municipalities to pay compensation to injured workmen, the same is illegal, void, and unconstitutional, particularly because there is no authority under the laws of the State of Georgia nor under the charter of the City of Atlanta whereby taxes may be levied and collected for the purpose of compensating employees under the Georgia workmen's compensation law." The department of industrial relations rendered an award in favor of Mrs. Pickens. The city appealed, and the judge of the superior court overruled the appeal and rendered judgment in favor of Mrs. Pickens. To this judgment the city excepted. Several grounds are stated in the appeal which are dependent upon the evidence; but it is not necessary to consider these, because the plaintiff in error seemingly purposely confined the portions of the record specified in the bill of exceptions to be sent to this court to (1) the appeal, (2) the answer, and (3) the order overruling the appeal. As a consequence, nothing is involved in the consideration of the present writ of error except a pure question of law. Nothing else is argued in the briefs. As stated in the brief of learned counsel for plaintiff in error, its "primary objection is that there is no authority for a municipality in this State to levy taxes for the payment of workmen's compensation, and that an act of the General Assembly which requires this to be done and to require municipalities to pay compensation to injured workmen is illegal and void and unconstitutional." The city admits that the General Assembly has specifically stated in the Workmen's Compensation Act that municipalities are subject thereto.

It is provided in the Civil Code 1910, §ß864, 865: "No municipal corporation shall levy or collect for the ordinary current expenses of said corporation, except as hereinafter provided, any ad valorem tax upon the property within said corporation, exceeding one half of one per cent. upon the value of said property. *** The term 'ordinary current expenses' shall be construed to include all current expenses, excepting only expenditures for education, for paving or macadamizing streets, and for payment of the principal and interest of the public debt, which shall be known as 'extraordinary expenses."' It will be noted from the foregoing that the term "ordinary current expenses" excepts all expenditures for education, for paving or macadamizing streets, and for payment of the principal and interest of the public debt. These are designated as "extraordinary expenses." It is not to be implied from this that any additional tax is necessary to cover current expenses; and so the real question in this case is whether the General Assembly, in the passage of the Workmen's Compensation Act, could properly say that compensation of such employees of the city as the husband of the claimant in the present instance, who might be injured or lose their lives, in as everyday occurrence as the repair of the streets of the city, would be a legitimate exercise of the sovereign power of the state. We deem this a matter altogether of legislative discretion. It would seem clear that the municipal duty of keeping its streets and thoroughfares safe by properly repairing and maintaining them would be an ordinary current expense of the city; and until it is shown that one-half of one per cent. upon the value of the property within the municipality subject to ad valorem taxation is insufficient for the purpose of affording such compensation to the employees of the municipality who may be injured while in its service, the question is not one for judicial determination. This for the reason that it is a question of municipal government, in which the sovereign state has instructed the municipal corporation to act in a specific manner. Furthermore, it does not appear in this case that the city of Atlanta has availed itself of the privileges granted by its charter to raise additional moneys by various business and occupation taxes, which may be devoted to ordinary current expenses. So it is not made to appear that the Workmen's Compensation Act relating to municipalities is unconstitutional so far as it affects the plaintiff in error. If it affects any other...