City of Aurora By and on Behalf of People v. Rhodes
| Decision Date | 22 October 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 82SC174,82SC174 |
| Citation | 689 P.2d 603 |
| Parties | The CITY OF AURORA, By and on Behalf of the PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Shannon Noel RHODES, Respondent. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Patrick E. Kowaleski, Stephen R. Ruddick, Aurora, for petitioner.
Ralph B. Rhodes, Denver, for respondent.
Eileen A. Muench, Patricia C. Tisdale, Arvada, for amicus curiae City of Arvada.
The District Court of Arapahoe County reversed a judgment of conviction for careless driving entered by the municipal court of the City of Aurora because of the municipal court's refusal to exclude from the jury those prospective jurors who resided within the city limits but did not live within that part of the city located in Arapahoe County, the county in which the offense allegedly took place. We granted Aurora's petition for certiorari to consider whether a petition for rehearing filed within fourteen days after a district court's reversal of a municipal court judgment of conviction tolls the thirty-day period for filing a petition for certiorari review in this court, and also whether in a prosecution for a municipal ordinance violation all the jurors must reside in the county where the offense was committed even though the territorial boundaries of the municipality encompass lands in more than one county. Because we conclude that Aurora's petition for certiorari was timely filed in this court and that its procedure for summoning and selecting jurors was not prohibited by either article II, section 16 of the Colorado Constitution or the provisions of the Uniform Jury Selection and Service Act, §§ 13-71-101 to -122 (1973 & 1983 Supp.), we reverse the judgment of the district court.
The City of Aurora is a home rule municipality, with a population of approximately 180,000, that encompasses lands in both Adams County and Arapahoe County. 1 Aurora's municipal code establishes a municipal court with jurisdiction over all cases arising out of the provisions of the code, Aurora City Code §§ 25-1 and 25-2 (1979), and further requires that a verbatim record be made of proceedings and evidence in municipal court trials by either electrical devices or stenographic means. Aurora City Code § 25-4 (1979). Aurora's municipal court is a "qualified municipal court of record," § 13-10-102(3), 6 C.R.S. (1973), 2 located in the Arapahoe County portion of the city, with the result that appeals from municipal court convictions are taken to the Arapahoe County District Court and are resolved on the basis of briefs and the record of the municipal court proceedings. § 13-10-116(2), 6 C.R.S. (1973); C.M.C.R. 237(b), Crim.P. 37. 3 The municipal code authorizes "[t]he presiding judge or his designated jury commissioner [to] issue a venire for a jury by the issuance of a summons or writ for jury service by mailing the summons or writ by first class mail ... to the usual place of abode of the juror at least five (5) days before the day on which the jurors are required to appear." Aurora City Code § 25-16 (1979).
On April 14, 1981, Shannon Noel Rhodes was cited for careless driving in violation of the municipal code. Aurora City Code § 37-108 (1979). The alleged offense occurred in that part of Aurora located in Arapahoe County. Careless driving is punishable by a jail sentence of not more than ninety days, a fine of not more than $300, or both. Aurora City Code § 1-14 (1979).
Rhodes entered a not guilty plea and demanded a jury trial. On the day of trial Rhodes, relying on that provision of the Uniform Jury Selection and Service Act which requires a prospective juror to be "a resident of the county," § 13-71-109(2)(a), 6 C.R.S. (1973), moved to exclude from the jury panel all prospective jurors who, although living within the municipal boundaries of Aurora, did not reside in that part of the city located in Arapahoe County. The municipal court denied Rhodes' motion. Citing section 13-71-102, 6 C.R.S. (1973), which provides that "all persons selected for jury service shall be selected at random from a fair cross section of the population of the area served by the court," the court ruled that the "area served by the court" meant the entire municipality of Aurora. During jury selection Rhodes also challenged for cause three prospective jurors on the ground that they did not reside in that part of Aurora located in Arapahoe County. These challenges were denied. The six-person jury ultimately sworn was comprised of two jurors who resided in that part of Aurora located in Adams County and four jurors who resided in that part of Aurora located in Arapahoe County. The jury returned a guilty verdict to careless driving on July 30, 1981, and the court imposed a fine of thirty-five dollars.
Rhodes appealed her conviction to the Arapahoe County District Court, alleging that the municipal court erred in failing to exclude from the jury panel those persons who resided in that part of Aurora located in Adams County. The district court on March 15, 1982, issued a written opinion reversing Rhodes' conviction and granting her a new trial. The district court held that the Uniform Jury Selection and Service Act (UJSSA), §§ 13-71-101 to -122, 6 C.R.S. (1973 & 1983 Supp.), was applicable to Rhodes' trial. The court based this determination on section 13-10-114(2), 6 C.R.S. (1973), which was enacted in 1969, two years prior to the adoption of the UJSSA, as part of legislation relating to municipal courts. Section 13-10-114(2) provides that "[i]n municipalities having a population of five thousand or more, juries shall be selected from a jury list as is provided for courts of record." Because the UJSSA requires the jury commissioner of each county to maintain a master list of potential jurors and a master jury wheel, §§ 13-71-106 and -107, 6 C.R.S. (1973), and because section 13-71-109(2)(a), 6 C.R.S. (1973), states that a prospective juror is disqualified if he or she is not "a resident of the county," the district court ruled that Aurora had not summoned jurors in accordance with the UJSSA and that the three prospective jurors who were on the jury panel for Rhodes' trial but who did not reside in that part of Aurora located in Arapahoe County were disqualified from jury service. In its written ruling the court stated, in pertinent part, as follows:
The City of Aurora lies partially within Adams County and partially within Arapahoe County. Prospective jurors summoned to the Municipal Court of the City of Aurora, for jury trial of an alleged violation of the City Code that occurs in Arapahoe [C]ounty, must be drawn from a master wheel of jurors who are residents of Arapahoe [C]ounty, in accordance with the Uniform Jury Selection and Service Act.
The denial by the trial court of the defendant's challenges for cause of the three prospective jurors, who resided in Adams [C]ounty, was error.
The City of Aurora filed a petition for rehearing on March 29, 1982, and the district court, on April 12, 1982, entered the following written order:
THIS MATTER came on for consideration of appellee's petition for rehearing, and the Court having considered said petition and being fully advised in the premises IT IS ORDERED that said petition for rehearing, is hereby denied.
Aurora thereafter filed its petition for certiorari in this court on May 11, 1982, which was twenty-nine days after the denial of Aurora's petition for rehearing and fifty-seven days after the district court's reversal of Rhodes' conviction.
Rhodes asserts that Aurora's petition for certiorari is untimely because it was filed in excess of thirty days after the district court's judgment on March 15, 1982. Aurora, in contrast, argues that its petition was timely in that it was filed within thirty days after the district court's denial of its petition for rehearing. Aurora also claims that its procedures for summoning and selecting jurors from within its municipal boundaries do not violate the constitutional right to a trial "by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed," Colo. Const. art. II, § 16, and that its procedures are not prohibited by the UJSSA. We address these respective claims separately.
Relying on C.A.R. 52(a), which requires that a petition for writ of certiorari to review a judgment of the district court be filed not later than thirty days after the rendition of the final judgment, Rhodes argues that Aurora's petition for certiorari should be dismissed as untimely. We conclude that Aurora's petition was timely filed.
There is no provision in statute or appellate rule expressly addressing the filing of a petition for rehearing in connection with an appeal to the district court from a municipal court judgment. Section 13-10-116(2), 6 C.R.S. (1973), for example, merely authorizes an appeal from a judgment of a municipal court of record to the district court of the county in which the municipal court of record is located. The practice and procedure for such an appeal is the same as provided by section 13-6-310, 6 C.R.S. (1973), which governs appeals to the district court from final county court judgments. Further review of the district court judgment may be sought by a certiorari proceeding in this court pursuant to the Colorado Appellate Rules. § 13-6-310(4), 6 C.R.S. (1973). Although C.A.R. 40(a) does authorize the filing of a petition for rehearing within fourteen days after the entry of judgment, the provisions of C.A.R. 40(b) are cast in terms that might well be interpreted to limit the rule to rehearing petitions filed in the supreme court or the court of appeals. 4 Thus, while the above provisions do not specifically authorize the filing of a petition for rehearing directed to a district court's appellate review of a municipal court judgment, none of them expressly prohibit the filing of such a request.
A petition for rehearing directed to a district court's review of a municipal court...
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