City of Biddeford v. Yates

• Decision Date: 14 December 1908
• Citation: 104 Me. 506,72 A. 335
• Parties: CITY OF BIDDEFORD v. YATES.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

72 A. 335

104 Me. 506

CITY OF BIDDEFORD

v. YATES.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Dec. 14, 1908.

(Official.)

Report from Supreme Judicial Court, York County.

Trespass quare clausum by the City of Biddeford against Frederick Yates. Case reported to the law court. Judgment for defendant.

Trespass quare clausum, alleging that the defendant with force and arms broke and entered a certain close belonging to the plaintiff city. Plea, the general issue, with a brief statement, alleging, in substance, that during the time mentioned in the writ the defendant was legally in possession of the premises described in the writ, under and by virtue of a certain lease of the premises given to the defendant by the plaintiff city, and that under said lease the defendant had a legal right to do all the things which he did do.

When this action came on for trial, an agreed statement of facts was filed, and the case was then reported to the law court with the stipulation that "upon so much of the evidence as is legally admissible the court is to enter such judgment as the legal rights of the parties require."

The case is stated in the opinion.

Argued before EMERY, C. J., and WHITEHOUSE, SAVAGE, PEABODY, SPEAR, and BIRD, JJ.

Robert B. Seidel, City Sol., and N. B. Walker, for plaintiff. Cleaves, Waterhouse & Emery, for defendant.

SPEAR, J. This is an action of trespass involving the validity of a lease of the plaintiff to the defendant. There is no material dispute upon the facts. The locus in quo is the "opera house," so called, embracing the hall in the city building and used for the purpose of giving plays, operas, etc., together with all the rooms and appurtenances belonging to and connected with the hull. On May 24, 1904, the plaintiff was the owner of the hah and appurtenances. On the same day the city council by its committee on public property made and delivered to the defendant an instrument, purporting to be a lease of the hall, expiring June 1, 1907. On February 20, 1907, another city council by the same committee made a second Instrument purporting to be a lease of the same hall to take effect, in futuro, at the expiration of the first lease, to wit, June 1, 1907, for a term of three years from the latter date. Between February 20, 1907, the date of the second lease, and June 1, 1907, when it was to take effect, the term of office of the city officials under whom this lease was made had expired, and on the third Monday of March a new city government had been inaugurated.

On the 10th day of June, the city council passed the following order: "Ordered that the city solicitor be, and hereby is, authorized to obtain possession of the opera house and to adopt any proceedings that he may deem necessary therefor, including the institution and prosecution of any action at law or equity."

On the 23d day of August, 1907, the city solicitor, whose official capacity is admitted, took physical possession of the leased premises without the knowledge or consent of the lessee, for the express purpose of excluding him therefrom, and notified the defendant of his assumption of possession and the purpose thereof and to abstain from any interference therewith. On the 24th day of August, Yates, the lessee, demanded of the city solicitor permission to enter, without being obliged to break in, claiming a right of occupancy under the instrument purporting to be a lease dated February 20, 1907. Being refused admission, he forcibly entered and took possession of the hall.

This was the only public hall owned by the city of Biddeford from May 1, 1904, to the date of the plaintiff's writ. The charter of the city of Biddeford contains the following clause: "The city council shall have the care and superintendence of city buildings and the custody and management of all such property, with power to let or sell what may be legally let or sold." Under the city charter admitted to have been duly accepted, authorizing the establishment of by-laws and ordinances for the government of the city, was promulgated in 1887 the following ordinance:

"Chapter 15. City Building. Section 1. The committee on public property shall have the care and custody of such building and its appurtenances, and all the alterations and repairs thereof. Sec. 2. The said committee are authorized to lease any part of said building not already under lease or appropriated to any of the branches of the city government for any period not exceeding the term of three years, and upon such terms and conditions as they may deem expedient, subject, however, to the approval of the mayor and aldermen."

During the period covering both the first and the second alleged lease, the following joint rule was passed both by the city council of 1904 and that of 1907: "Rule 1. At the commencement of the municipal year the following joint standing committees shall be appointed by the mayor unless otherwise ordered by the respective boards, namely: Committee on public property * * * to consist of the mayor, one alderman and three members of the common council." A committee thus appointed negotiated the terms and executed the leases above referred to, both of which were approved by the mayor and a majority of the aldermen of the city. At the time the above leases were executed and delivered to Yates, that part of the city building known as the "opera house" was not appropriated to the use of any of the branches of the city government nor leased to any other person. The defendant fulfilled all the stipulations and conditions contained in the first lease. He had also complied with all the requirements of the second lease so far forth as he could; the city having refused to accept payment of rent and having notified the defendant that it would not in the future accept rent.

In addition to the admitted facts, the plaintiff claims that the second lease was made to usurp the powers of the administration then about to be elected, and was given for a grossly inadequate consideration, and was thereby fraudulent. As the evidence does not sustain the allegation of fraud, the political aspect of the case disappears, and we feel authorized to consider it only upon the admitted facts.

These in our opinion involve simply a question of power on the part of the city government.

(1) Could the city council itself authorize a lease of this property?

(2) If so, could it delegate its powers to a committee to effectuate its purpose?

(3) If yes, could the city council execute and deliver a lease under one city government to take effect, in future, under anotner?

Plaintiff admits the authority of the city government to lease the opera house, if of that species of city property that "may be legally let," but the city claims that the property covered by the second lease was "already under lease," and therefore within the exception of the ordinance. Chapter 15, § 2. We think this position untenable. The second lease did not take effect until after the expiration of the term of the first one, and therefore cannot be said, in the sense in which the ordinance should be construed, to cover property "already under lease." The interpretation of this phrase as claimed by the plaintiff would prevent the city from renewing a lease even a day before it expired. Such construction is contrary to all business methods and should not be established unless the language of the ordinance expressly requires it. The phraseology does not require it, but rather its usual and ordinary meaning, the one naturally suggested, is that the city should not execute two leases covering the same property for the same period of time. If the ordinance was intended to mean any more than this, it could easily have been made to say so; and, if the construction claimed by the plaintiff had been in the mind of the Legislature, it would have said so. It would never have left so important and unusual a provision, if intended to mean what the plaintiff claims, to be established by the uncertain interpretation permissible by the language employed.

Again, the plaintiff contends that the premises let were public property, and could be rented only for public purposes (Thorndike v. Camden, 82 Me. 39, 19 Atl. 95, 7 L. R. A. 463; Goss v. Greenleaf, 98 Me. 436, 57 Atl. 581), and could be used for private purposes when not needed for public use (Reynolds v. Waterville, 92 Me., dissenting opinion, page 317, 42 Atl. 559, and cases cited), and that under the leases in question the public use was made subservient to the private use. The agreed statement does not furnish any evidence of this contention, and, so far as it goes, tends to show the reverse; it being admitted that the part of the city building known as the "opera house" was not appropriated to the use of the city, and was reserved for Memorial Day, for the graduation exercises of the high school, and necessary rehearsals therefor. The lessee was also required to...