State ex rel. City of Jefferson v. Smith

• Decision Date: 25 September 1941
• Docket Number: 37733
• Citation: 154 S.W.2d 101,348 Mo. 554
• Parties: State of Missouri at the relation of the City of Jefferson, a Municipal Corporation of the Third Class of Cole County, Relator, v. Forrest Smith, State Auditor
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

154 S.W.2d 101

348 Mo. 554

State of Missouri at the relation of the City of Jefferson, a Municipal Corporation of the Third Class of Cole County, Relator, v. Forrest Smith, State Auditor

No. 37733

Supreme Court of Missouri

September 25, 1941

Peremptory writ denied.

Frank E. Atwood, James A. Potter and John O. Bond for relator.

(1) The city's ordinance direction that the building shall include and provide office space and facilities for the Unemployment Compensation Commission of Missouri does not affect the validity of the bonds previously voted. (a) The validity of bonds duly authorized by separate proceedings and at a separate election for an entirely valid purpose is not affected by the invalidity of a contract as to disposition of proceeds of the bonds. Green v. Rock Hill, 147 N.E 346, 146 S.C. 234; Doody v. State ex rel. Mobile County, 171 So. 504, 233 Ala. 287; Paine v. Port of Seattle, 70 Wash. 294, 127 P. 580; 5 McQuillin on Municipal Corps. (2 Ed.), sec. 2325, p. 939; Halbruegger v. St. Louis, 302 Mo. 573, 262 S.W. 379. (b) The primary purpose to erect a municipal office building must be regarded in determining the validity of the bond issue. Wheelock v. Lowell, 196 Mass. 220, 81 N.E. 977; Bates v Barrett, 60 Vt. 531, 1 L. R. A. 166; Railroad Co. v Smith, 62 Ill. 273. (2) The bonds are valid notwithstanding the provisions of sections 1 and 3 of Article X of the Constitution of Missouri. Secs. 1, 3, Art. X, Mo. Const. (a) The provision of office space and facilities for the Unemployment Compensation Commission is a public purpose. Secs. 9422, 9425, R. S. 1929. (b) According to the modern weight of authority such provision is also a public municipal purpose. Halbruegger v. St. Louis, 262 S.W. 379, 302 Mo. 573; Egan v. San Francisco, 165 Cal. 581, 133 P. 295, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 754; State ex rel. City of Excelsior Springs v. Smith, 82 S.W.2d 37, 336 Mo. 1104; People ex rel. v. Township Board of Salem, 20 Mich. 452, 4 Am. Rep. 400. (c) In determining what is a municipal purpose great weight is properly given to the necessity for and the benefits to be derived from the proposed building by the municipality. McQuillin on Mun. Corps. (2 Ed.), sec. 2323; Callam v. Saginaw, 50 Mich. 7, 14 N.W. 677; Hackett v. Ottawa, 25 U.S. (L. Ed.) 363; Sacramento Chamber of Commerce v. Stephens, 212 Cal. 607, 299 P. 728; Turner v. Hattiesburg, 53 So. 681; McNulty v. Owens, 188 S.C. 377, 199 S.E. 425; Stewart Machine Co. v. Davis, 81 U.S. (L. Ed.) 1279, 109 A. L. R. 129; Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County, 91 F.2d 665; State ex rel. City of Excelsior Springs v. Smith, 82 S.W.2d 37, 336 Mo. 1104; 6 McQuillin on Mun. Corps., sec. 2439, p. 160. (d) When public purposes are germane to objects of the creation of the municipality they are public municipal purposes. Taylor v. Thompson, 42 Ill. 9; Laws 1921, chap. 351; Laws 1922, Chaps. 365, 446; Sec. 56, Art. IV, and Sec. 1 of Art. V, Mo. Const. 1875. (e) Even if some of the purposes of a city bond issue be not strictly public municipal purposes yet such bond issue is not necessarily violative of these constitutional provisions. 5 McQuillin on Mun. Corps. (2 Ed.), secs. 2325, 2329; Page v. Gallup, 26 N. M. 239, 191 P. 460; City of Mission v. Richards, 274 S.W. 269; Le Coutenlx v. Buffalo, 33 N.Y. 333; Harris v. St. Louis, 111 S.W.2d 995; Clarey v. Philadelphia, 311 Pa. 11, 166 A. 237; McQuillin on Mun. Corps. (2 Ed.), sec. 1247; Jones v. Sandford, 66 Me. 685; Stone v. Oconomowac, 71 Wis. 155, 36 N.W. 829; Bates v. Bassett, 60 Vt. 530; Biddeford v. Yates, 104 Me. 506; Gottleib-Knabe & Co. v. Macklin, 109 Md. 429, 71 A. 949; Worden v. New Bedford, 131 Mass. 23. (f) The courts are inclined to construe these constitutional restrictions with great liberality in the interest of the public welfare and modern progress. Dysart v. St. Louis, 321 Mo. 514, 11 S.W.2d 1045; Jennings v. St. Louis, 332 Mo. 173, 58 S.W.2d 979, 87 A. L. R. 365; State ex rel. City of Hannibal v. Smith, 335 Mo. 825, 74 S.W.2d 367; Krause v. Peoria Housing Authority, 370 Ill. 356, 19 N.E.2d 193; Edwards v. Housing Authority of City of Muncie, 215 Ind. 330, 19 N.E.2d 741; Marvin v. Housing Authority of Jacksonville, 133 Fla. 590, 183 So. 145; Rutherford v. City of Great Falls, 107 Mont. 512, 86 P.2d 656; State ex rel. Helena Housing Authority v. City Council, 108 Mont. 347, 90 P.2d 514; Furlong v. South Park Commissioner, 340 Ill. 363, 172 N.E. 757; Briggs v. Raleigh, 195 N.C. 223, 141 S.E. 597, 600; Oakland v. Williams, 206 Cal. 315, 274 P. 328; Lott v. Orlando, 142 Fla. 338, 196 So. 313. (3) These bonds are not invalid under Section 47 of Article IV or Section 6 of Article IX of the Constitution of Missouri. Sec. 47, Art. IV, and Sec. 6 of Art. IX, Mo. Const.; State v. Curators State University, 57 Mo. 178; State ex rel. v. St. Louis, 216 Mo. 47; Unemployment Compensation Law, Art. 2, R. S. 1939; State ex inf. McKittrick v. Murphy, 148 S.W.2d 527; Vrooman v. St. Louis, 337 Mo. 933, 99 S.W.2d 189; Haeussler v. St. Louis, 205 Mo. 656; Sun Ptg. & Pub. Assn. v. New York, 40 N.Y.S. 607, 8 A.D. 230, 75 N.Y. 1, affirmed 152 N.Y. 257, 46 N.E. 499, 37 L. R. A. 788; State ex rel. City of Boonville v. Hackmann, 293 Mo. 313, 240 S.W. 135; State ex rel. Zoological Board of Control v. St. Louis, 318 Mo. 910, 1 S.W.2d 1021; Dysart v. St. Louis, 11 S.W.2d 1045; State ex rel. Polerie v. Housing Authority of New Orleans, 190 La. 710, 182 So. 725. (4) Relator has ample constitutional and statutory authority to issue these bonds, and they should be duly registered. Secs. 6719, 6865, 6980, R. S. 1939; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 128.

Roy McKittrick, Attorney General, and Tyre Burton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent; John L. Graves of counsel.

(1) The ordinance directing the issuance of these bonds shows on the face thereof that the proceeds of said bonds are not to be used solely or primarily for a municipal purpose, but are to be used for the erection of a building which "shall include and provide office space and facilities for the Unemployment Compensation Commission of Missouri and office space and facilities for said City of Jefferson," contrary to and in excess of the authority granted to the municipality. (2) The true purpose, as disclosed by all the proceedings of the city, should be subject to the test of whether or not such purpose is a lawful municipal purpose. Bates v. Barrett, 60 Vt. 531, 1 L. R. A. 166; Wheelock v. Lowell, 196 Mass. 220, 81 N.E. 977; Brooks v. Incorporated Town of Brooklyn, 146 Iowa 136, 124 N.W. 868; Myers v. Jeffersonville, 145 Ind. 431, 44 N.E. 452. (3) The municipal taxing power may be granted by the General Assembly and may be exercised by the municipality only for municipal "corporate purposes." Sec. 1, Art. X, Mo. Const. (4) Municipal taxes are authorized only for municipal purposes. State v. Curators of State University, 57 Mo. 178; St. Louis v. Telephone Co., 96 Mo. 623, 10 S.W. 197; State ex rel. v. Orear, 210 S.W. 392, 277 Mo. 303; St. Louis v. Dreisoerner, 243 Mo. 217, 147 S.W. 998; L. R. A. 1917E, p. 845; Dysart v. St. Louis, 11 S.W.2d 1045, 321 Mo. 514; 26 R. C. L. 46; 1 McQuillin, Mun. Corps., sec. 374. (5) The tax to be levied for the payment of such bonds would not be levied for a municipal purpose. Sec. 3, Art. X, Mo. Const.; State ex rel. v. Orear, 277 Mo. 303, 210 S.W. 392. (6) A municipal corporation can only exercise the following powers: (a) Those granted in express words. (b) Those necessarily or fairly implied in, or incident to, the powers expressly granted. (c) Those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation -- not simply convenient, but indispensable. Any fair, reasonable doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved by the courts against the corporation and the power is denied. 1 Dillon Mun. Corps. (3 Ed.), sec. 89; State ex rel. Blue Springs v. McWilliams, 335 Mo. 816; State ex rel. v. Orear, 210 S.W. 396; St. Louis v. Telephone Co., 96 Mo. 628; Kansas City to use of Frear Stone & Pipe Mfg. Co. v. Swope, 79 Mo. 446; State ex rel. Hannibal v. Smith, 335 Mo. 837. (7) Missouri third class cities are authorized to erect buildings for their own municipal use, but such authority does not fairly or necessarily imply the further authority to erect buildings for other than municipal uses. Sec. 6980, R. S. 1939. (8) The power vested in a municipality to purchase and hold real estate does not imply a power to do so for other than municipal purposes. Sec. 6865, R. S. 1939; Kennedy v. Nevada, 281 S.W. 56. (9) The General Assembly may not authorize a municipality to borrow money in aid of any individual, association or corporation. Sec. 47, Art. IV, Mo. Const.; State v. Curators of State University, 57 Mo. 178; State ex rel. v. St. Louis, 115 S.W. 534, 216 Mo. 47. (10) No municipality may lend its credit to or in aid of any institution "whether created for or to be controlled by the State or others." Sec. 6, Art. IX, Mo. Const.; State v. Curators of State University, 57 Mo. 178; State ex rel. v. St. Louis, 115 S.W. 534, 216 Mo. 47. (11) The Unemployment Compensation Commission of Missouri is an institution "created for or to be controlled by the State." Sec. 9424, R. S. 1939.

OPINION

Gantt, C. J.

Original action in mandamus. The City of Jefferson seeks to compel the State Auditor to register certain bonds. The case is submitted on the pleadings. The Auditor contends that the bonds are invalid under Sec. 3, Art. X of the Constitution, which provides that "taxes may be levied and collected for (municipal) public purposes only." The rule is stated as follows:

"If the dominating motive for the erection of the hall is a strictly public use, then the expenditure for it is legal, although incidentally it may be devoted occasionally to uses that are not public. If, however, the...