City of Boca Raton v. Gidman

• Decision Date: 10 November 1983
• Docket Number: No. 62473,62473
• Citation: 440 So.2d 1277
• Parties: CITY OF BOCA RATON, etc., et al., Petitioners, v. Justin V. GIDMAN, et al., Respondents.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 1277

440 So.2d 1277

CITY OF BOCA RATON, etc., et al., Petitioners, v. Justin V. GIDMAN, et al., Respondents.

No. 62473.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Nov. 10, 1983.

M.A. Galbraith, Jr., City Atty., Boca Raton, for petitioners.

Steven I. Greenwald of Stuto & Greenwald, Boca Raton, for respondents.

J. Michael Fitzgerald, Jr., and Steven E. Siff of McDermott, Will & Emery, Miami, for Catholic Community Services, Inc., amicus curiae.

ADKINS, Justice.

This case is before us on discretionary review of a question certified to be of great public importance. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

The city of Boca Raton contracted with the State of Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services to contribute $29,730.10 to match state and federal funds to be used for the operation of the Florence Fuller Child Development Center. The state and federal funds to be contributed were $29,730.10 and $178,380.60 respectively. The center is a non-profit educational child care center in Boca Raton. It provides subsidized child care services including infant nursery care, pre-school and after school programs and summer programs for disadvantaged children.

The respondents, taxpayers and citizens of the city, sued the petitioners, the city of Boca Raton, et al., to enjoin the contribution. They contended that such contribution was expressly prohibited by section 7.06, Boca Raton City Charter which provides:

Expenditure of Funds Limited

No city funds shall be expended in any manner whatsoever to accrue either directly or indirectly to the benefit of any religious, charitable, benevolent, civic or service organization.

The circuit court found that the child care center is an educational facility rather than a charitable organization. Therefore, the express limitation of the city charter did not prohibit the instant contribution. The judgment also provided:

The Court concludes that a functional test should be applied in transactions of this nature and that test should be determined in light of whether or not the service which is being performed on a contractual basis is, in fact, a municipal service of which the City under the Constitution of the State of Florida and its Charter is permitted to engage.

On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the judgment of the trial court. Gidman v. City of Boca Raton, 416 So.2d 1168 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). In doing so it held that although the child care center is undoubtedly an educational facility, it is also a charitable organization. Therefore, any contribution to that organization by the city is proscribed by the city charter. The court further determined that the "functional test" supplied by the trial court could not be applied in this instance. The Florida Constitution authorizes municipalities to exercise "any power for municipal purposes except as otherwise provided by law." Art. VIII, § 2(b), Fla. Const. The court said that in this case the law provides a limitation, the city charter. In addition, The Municipal Home Rule Powers Act provides that the legislature intends to extend to municipalities the exercise of powers for municipal purposes "not expressly prohibited by the constitution, general or special law, or county charter...." § 166.021(4), Fla.Stat. (1979). The court held that the charter provision is such an express limitation and a "functional test" cannot be applied.

On petition for rehearing, the Fourth District Court of Appeal certified the following question as one of great public importance:

Does Section 7.06 of the Charter of the City of Boca Raton, which provides that

[n]o city funds shall be expended in any manner whatsoever to accrue either directly or indirectly to the benefit of any religious, charitable, benevolent, civic or service organization

prohibit the City Council from contracting with the State of Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, pursuant to which the City is obligated to contribute public funds to the Department to match State and Federal funds to be used in the operation of a child day care center such as the Florence Fuller Child Development Center described in this case?

416 So.2d at 1171 (on petition for rehearing).

Although we approve the result of the trial court's decision, we disagree with the rationale upon which it was based and we answer the certified question in the negative.

The petitioners argue that while the child care center is a tax-exempt educational facility which is defined as both "educational" and "charitable" by section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, it should not be considered charitable for purposes of the city charter's limitation. They argue further that the section should not be read literally because it would lead to absurd results. Instead, the focus should be on the nature of the services provided. If the services are for a "municipal purpose" the organization which provides them is irrelevant.

The respondents argue that the day care facility does not constitute a valid municipal purpose and, in any event, the instant contribution was to a charitable organization and therefore violates the city charter. We agree in part with the petitioners' argument and disagree in whole with the respondents'.

In order to avoid the limitation of the city charter, the trial court determined the child care center is an educational facility. In order to apply the limitation, the district court of appeal found it to be a charitable organization. To focus only on a label for the organization is to avoid interpretation of the meaning of the charter provision. We think the section is sufficiently ambiguous to warrant an interpretation of its probable intent.

Article VIII, section 2(b) of the Florida Constitution provides that:

Municipalities shall have governmental, corporate and proprietary powers to enable them to conduct municipal government, perform municipal functions and render municipal services, and may exercise any power for municipal purposes except as otherwise provided by law.

This language was new in the 1968 revision of the constitution. It appears to provide that all municipalities have governmental, corporate and proprietary powers unless otherwise limited by law, whereas under the 1885 Constitution, municipalities had only those powers expressly granted by law. In 1973 the legislature made clear its intent to allow broad exercise of the home rule powers granted by the constitution. The Municipal Home Rule Powers Act, section 166.021(4) of the Florida Statutes (1979) provides in part:

It is the further intent of the Legislature to extend to municipalities the exercise of powers for municipal governmental, corporate, or proprietary purposes not expressly prohibited by the Constitution, general or special law, or county charter and to remove any limitations, judicially imposed or otherwise, on the exercise of home rule powers other than those expressly prohibited (emphasis added).

Thus, whenever a municipality exercises its powers, a two-tiered question should be asked. Was the action undertaken for a municipal purpose? If so, was that action expressly prohibited by the constitution, general or special law, or county charter? See State v. City of Sunrise, 354 So.2d 1206 (Fla.1978).

"Municipal purpose" is nowhere clearly defined. Section 166.021(2) states that it is "... any activity or power which may be exercised by the state or its political subdivision." Providing day care educational facilities for the disadvantaged would seem to be an activity which may be carried on by the state. The term has been broadly interpreted by this Court and has included such activities as maintenance and operation of a radio broadcasting system by the city. State v. City of Jacksonville, 50 So.2d 532 (Fla.1951). In that case, the Court stated:

Though there was a time when a municipal purpose was restricted to police protection or such enterprises as were strictly governmental that concept has been very much expanded and a municipal purpose may now comprehend all activities essential to the health, morals, protection and welfare of the municipality.

Id. at 535.

This Court has never addressed the specific issue of whether day care facilities constitute a "municipal purpose". The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, however, has. In Hopper v. City of Madison, 79 Wis.2d 120, 256 N.W.2d 139 (1977), that court held that there is no doubt the supervision and care of the community's children promotes the health and welfare of the city and it is reasonable to conclude that a program to make available and improve day care serves a valid municipal purpose.

If the legislature has determined that an activity is for a municipal purpose, there will be no interference from the courts absent a clear abuse of discretion. 50 So.2d at 534. See also State v. City of Tallahassee, 142 Fla. 476, 195 So. 402 (1940). Section 167.28, Florida Statutes (1971) (repealed 1973) provided:

167.28 Support of public schools, poor, etc.--

The city or town council may provide for the support of the poor, the infirm and the insane, and establish public schools and provide for their maintenance.

That section, along with all other specific grants of power, was deleted in 1973 from the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act. In reference to the deletion, section 166.042, Florida Statutes (1979), provides:

166.042 Legislative intent.--

(1) It is the legislative intent that the repeal by chapter 73-129, Laws of Florida, of chapters 167, 168, 169, 172, 174, 176, 178, 181, 183, and 184 of Florida Statutes shall not be interpreted...