City of Boca Raton v. State

• Decision Date: 27 February 1992
• Docket Number: No. 77468,77468
• Citation: 595 So.2d 25
• Parties: 17 Fla. L. Weekly S142 CITY OF BOCA RATON, Florida, etc., Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. STATE of Florida, etc., et al., Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 25

595 So.2d 25

17 Fla. L. Weekly S142

CITY OF BOCA RATON, Florida, etc., Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. STATE of Florida, etc., et al., Appellees/Cross-Appellants.

No. 77468.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Feb. 27, 1992.

Peter L. Dame of Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, Jacksonville, Griffith F. Pitcher of Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, Miami, and Frank Bartolone, City Atty., Boca Raton, for appellant/cross-appellee.

David H. Bludworth, State Atty. and Leslie M. Ritch, Asst. State Atty., John H. Pelzer, Thomas R. Bolf and Nancy W. Gregoire of Ruden, Barnett, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, and Charles F. Schoech of Caldwell & Pacetti, Palm Beach, for appellees/cross-appellants.

Robert L. Nabors and Thomas H. Duffy of Nabors, Giblin & Nickerson, P.A., and Harry Morrison, Jr., Tallahassee, amicus curiae for Florida League of Cities.

GRIMES, Justice.

This is an appeal from a final judgment which declined to validate special assessment improvement bonds proposed to be issued by the City of Boca Raton. We have jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(2) of the Florida Constitution, and chapter 75, Florida Statutes (1989).

In an effort to revitalize its downtown area, the City of Boca Raton (the City) determined to construct a wide range of specifically enumerated improvements in the infrastructure. The estimated cost of the improvements was $44,000,000. The City determined to obtain a portion of the money to pay the cost from the issuance of bonds in an amount not to exceed $21,000,000. The bonds were to be repaid from special assessments levied over a period of years against the downtown property to be benefitted by the improvements. The City's effort to validate the bonds was opposed by the State pursuant to chapter 75, Florida Statutes (1989), as well as by several property owners. At the trial, the issues devolved into (1) whether the City had the authority to levy special assessments to pay the bonds, and (2) even if such authority existed, whether this proposal met the legal requirements of a proper special assessment.

Following the presentation of testimony, the trial judge held that the City did not have the authority to impose special assessments to fund the bonds. In this respect, the final judgment stated in pertinent part:

12. Boca Raton lacks the power to specially assess without a specific grant of authority from the legislature. Article VII, Section 1(a) has preempted all forms of taxation other than ad valorem taxes to the State. Article VIII, Section 2(b) of the Florida Constitution does not supersede Article VII, Section 1(a) of said Constitution. Chapter 166 of the Florida Statutes does not supersede Article VII, Section 1(a) of the Florida Constitution. Only the State holds the power to impose assessments. By passing Chapter 166 the State did not grant specific statutory authority to municipalities to levy special assessments. Municipalities have only been able to pass such assessments when the State which holds this power has specifically authorized municipalities to pass special assessments. No such authorization exists in today's case.

As a footnote to the judgment, the trial judge also stated:

Other findings of the Court which do not affect the outcome but which could be significant if the Court's ruling is overturned are:

A. The ad valorem assessment is not a tax, it is an assessment.

B. The assessments are directly proportional to the special benefits to be provided each parcel and the benefits are in excess of the assessments.

C. The improvements are properly treated as a single project. Improvements need not necessarily be abutting, adjoining or even completely within the District.

D. Excluded parcels would at most receive only insignificant special benefits.

E. All notice provisions required by law have been fulfilled.

In deciding whether the City has authority to impose special assessments to pay off the bonds, it is necessary to recount the history of municipal powers in Florida. Under the constitution of 1885, all municipal powers were dependent upon a specific delegation of authority by the legislature in a general or special act. Article VIII, section 8 of the 1885 constitution provided in pertinent part:

The Legislature shall have power to establish, and to abolish, municipalities to provide for their government, to prescribe their jurisdiction and powers, and to alter or amend the same at any time.

Powers not granted a municipality by the legislature were deemed to be reserved to the legislature. This reservation of authority was known as "Dillon's Rule" as expressed in John F. Dillon, The Law of Municipal Corporations Sec. 55 (1st ed. 1872). Under the 1885 constitution, the Florida courts consistently followed Dillon's Rule. See, e.g., Williams v. Town of Dunnellon, 125 Fla. 114, 169 So. 631 (1936); Heriot v. City of Pensacola, 108 Fla. 480, 146 So. 654 (1933); Amos v. Mathews, 99 Fla. 1, 126 So. 308 (1930); Malone v. City of Quincy, 66 Fla. 52, 62 So. 922 (1913).

As Florida's population began to boom after World War II, the legislature was flooded with local bills and population acts designed to permit municipalities to provide solutions to local problems. Thus, when our constitution was amended in 1968, municipalities were granted broad home rule powers under article VIII, section 2(b), which provides in pertinent part:

(b) POWERS. Municipalities shall have governmental, corporate and proprietary powers to enable them to conduct municipal government, perform municipal functions and render municipal services, and may exercise any power for municipal purposes except as otherwise provided by law.

Talbot D'Alemberte, the reporter for the Constitutional Revision Commission, described the difference between the above-quoted provisions of the 1968 and the 1885 constitutions as follows:

The apparent difference is that under the new language, all municipalities have governmental, corporate and proprietary powers unless provided otherwise by law, whereas under the 1885 Constitution, municipalities had only those powers expressly granted by law.

26A Fla.Stat.Ann. 292 (1970) (Commentary by Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte).

In the first litigated case involving the scope of municipal powers decided after the adoption of the 1968 constitution, this Court held that the City of Miami Beach had no power to enact a rent-control ordinance in the absence of a legislative enactment authorizing the exercise of such a power. City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc., 261 So.2d 801 (Fla.1972). Prompted by this decision, the legislature in 1973 enacted the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act, ¹ now codified in chapter 166, Florida Statutes (1989). Thereafter, this Court upheld a subsequent rent-control ordinance enacted by the City of Miami Beach on the premise that section 166.021(1) now authorized municipalities to exercise any power for municipal purposes except when expressly prohibited by law. City of Miami Beach v. Forte Towers, Inc., 305 So.2d 764 (Fla.1974). Thereafter, we acknowledged the vast breadth of municipal home rule power when we said:

Article VIII, Section 2, Florida Constitution, expressly grants to every municipality in this state authority to conduct municipal government, perform municipal functions, and render municipal services. The only limitation on that power is that it must be exercised for a valid "municipal purpose." It would follow that municipalities are not dependent upon the Legislature for further authorization. Legislative statutes are relevant only to determine limitations of authority.

State v. City of Sunrise, 354 So.2d 1206, 1209 (Fla.1978).

Section 166.021 provides in pertinent part:

(1) As provided in s. 2(b), Art. VIII of the State Constitution, municipalities shall have the governmental, corporate, and proprietary powers to enable them to conduct municipal government, perform municipal functions, and render municipal services, and may exercise any power for municipal purposes, except when expressly prohibited by law.

(2) "Municipal purpose" means any activity or power which may be exercised by the state or its political subdivisions.

(3) The Legislature recognizes that pursuant to the grant of power set forth in s. 2(b), Art. VIII of the State Constitution, the legislative body of each municipality has the power to enact legislation concerning any subject matter upon which the state Legislature may act, except:

(a) The subjects of annexation, merger, and exercise of extraterritorial power, which require general or special law pursuant to s. 2(c), Art. VIII of the State Constitution;

(b) Any subject expressly prohibited by the constitution;

(c) Any subject expressly preempted to state or county government by the constitution or by general law; and

(d) Any subject preempted to a county pursuant to a county charter adopted under the authority of ss. 1(g), 3, and 6(e), Art. VIII of the State Constitution.

(4) The provisions of this section shall be so construed as to secure for municipalities the broad exercise of home rule powers granted by the constitution. It is the further intent of the Legislature to extend to municipalities the exercise of powers for municipal governmental, corporate, or proprietary purposes not expressly prohibited by the constitution, general or special law, or county charter and to remove any limitations, judicially imposed or otherwise, on the exercise of home rule powers other than those so expressly prohibited.

Thus, a municipality may now exercise any governmental, corporate, or proprietary power for a municipal purpose except when expressly prohibited by law, and a municipality may legislate on any subject matter on which the legislature may act, except those subjects described in paragraphs (a), (b), (c), and (d) of section 166.021(3). The provisions of section 166.021(3)(a) and (d) are irrelevant to the instant case. Therefore, it would appear that the City of Boca Raton can...