City of Boston v. Board of Educ.

• Decision Date: 15 August 1984
• Citation: 392 Mass. 788,467 N.E.2d 1318
• Parties: , 19 Ed. Law Rep. 1124 CITY OF BOSTON & others 1 v. BOARD OF EDUCATION et al. 2
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 1318

467 N.E.2d 1318

392 Mass. 788, 19 Ed. Law Rep. 1124

CITY OF BOSTON & others ¹ v. BOARD OF EDUCATION et al. ²

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Suffolk.

Argued May 7, 1984.

Decided Aug. 15, 1984.

Stephen S. Ostrach, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Bd. of Educ.

Cathleen Cavell, Brookline, for town of Brookline.

Michael J. Betcher, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Boston (H. Charles Hambelton, Sp. Asst. Corp. Counsel, Boston, with him), for plaintiffs.

Charles J. Beard, Stephen B. Deutsch, and Martha B. Sosman, Boston, for Metropolitan Council for Educational Opportunity, Inc., amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and LIACOS, ABRAMS, NOLAN and O'CONNOR, JJ.

HENNESSEY, Chief Justice.

This appeal concerns the city of Boston's liability for the cost of special education services provided to a city of Boston resident, Melissa M., attending school in Brookline under the provisions of G.L. c. 76, § 12A, more commonly known as the METCO program. It arises from a determination by the Department of Education, Bureau of Special Education Appeals (bureau), that Melissa M.'s 1978-1979 "individual education plan" (IEP) was "inadequate and inappropriate in so far as it provides for funding of Melissa's tutoring through METCO ... and of her speech and language therapy through Brookline special education monies rather than through a bill-back to Boston." Boston commenced an action against the Board of Education (board) and the town of Brookline (Brookline) challenging this decision. It sought review of the decision pursuant to G.L. c. 30A and a declaration, pursuant to G.L. c. 231A, that the Commonwealth is obliged under G.L. c. 76, § 12A, to pay for the special education costs of students in the METCO program. A judge of the Superior Court reviewed the decision under G.L. c. 30A and concluded that the bureau's decision contained an error of law. He reversed and modified the decision, ruling that Brookline be reimbursed by the Commonwealth, pursuant to G.L. c. 76, § 12A, for the costs of special education services provided to Melissa M. The board and Brookline appealed and Boston cross-appealed from the judge's allowance of a motion in limine brought by Brookline. We allowed the board's application for direct appellate review. ³ We conclude that responsibility for paying the cost of special education services provided to Melissa M. under the METCO program rests with Boston.

Neither party challenges the factual findings of the bureau and they may be summarized as follows. In 1979 Melissa M. was a ten year old fourth grader residing in Boston and attending the Brookline school system under the METCO program. ⁴ Melissa had long-standing speech and language problems and was receiving tutorial assistance as a special needs student. Brookline charged the METCO program for the cost of these services. In 1978 Melissa's special needs assistance was terminated for six weeks due to METCO budgetary constraints. Melissa's 1978-1979 IEP also called for individualized special needs tutoring that was to be provided by METCO. Melissa's parents, not wanting Melissa's education to be further interrupted as it was in 1978, rejected Melissa's IEP because it was funded by METCO. They petitioned the bureau for a hearing under 603 Code Mass.Regs. §§ 28-400 to challenge the propriety of Melissa's IEP and the method of funding her educational program.

1. The Defendants' Appeal.

At issue in considering whether Boston or the METCO program should pay for the costs of special education services provided to Melissa M. under the METCO program is the interrelation of two statutes: G.L. c. 71B, §§ 3, 5, and G.L. c. 76, § 12A. First, G.L. c. 71B, inserted by St. 1972, c. 766, establishes a comprehensive system for the provision of special education services to residents of the Commonwealth. Section 3 of G.L. c. 71B, as amended by St. 1978, c. 552, § 20, provides in part that "the school committee of every city, town or school district shall identify the school age children residing therein who have special needs, diagnose and evaluate the needs of such children, propose a special education program to meet those needs, [and] provide or arrange for the provision of such special education program ...." Section 5 of G.L c. 71B then provided ⁵ that "[a]ny school committee which provides or arranges for the provision of special education pursuant to the provisions of section three shall pay for such special education personnel, materials and equipment." Second, G.L. c. 76, § 12A, establishes a program by which a Boston resident may attend school outside of Boston, pursuant to agreements between the municipalities of attendance and the board of education. General Laws c. 76, § 12A, as appearing in St. 1974, c. 636, § 7, provides in relevant part as follows: "Any child residing in any ... town, and attending therein a public school in which such racial imbalance exists may attend a public school or a publicly authorized non-sectarian school in a ... town, ... in which he does not reside if the school committee of such ... town ... has adopted and the board has approved, as provided by this section, a plan for the attendance of such non-resident children therein. The commonwealth shall, subject to appropriation and upon certification by the board, provide financial assistance in accordance with such agreement. Such financial assistance shall include payments for: (i) the cost per pupil of educating each non-resident child, as approved by the board."

The defendants claim that G.L. c. 71B, §§ 3, 5, controls the allocation of responsibility for paying the costs of special education services provided to Melissa M. through the METCO program. They point out that Melissa M. is a school age child residing in Boston who is in need of special education services. They then stress that G.L. c. 71B, §§ 3, 5, place sole responsibility for "provid[ing] or arrang[ing]" and paying for a student's special education services on the town of the student's residence. Accordingly, they argue that Boston is responsible for the cost of such services provided to a Boston resident, regardless of whether the child is participating in the METCO program. Nothing in either G.L. c. 71B or G.L. c. 76, § 12A, they claim, relieves Boston of this responsibility. Alternatively, Boston asserts that G.L. c. 76, § 12A, relieves it of the responsibility to pay for special education services provided to one of its residents where the resident is participating in the METCO program and the services are not provided by Boston. It focuses on the language of G.L. c. 76, § 12A, which requires the State to pay to participating communities the "cost per pupil of educating" students enrolled in the METCO program. It claims that, since Melissa M. is entitled to special education services under G.L. c. 71B, § 3, and since the statute does not indicate otherwise, the "cost per pupil of educating" must be intended to include the cost of special education services, as well as regular educational expenses.

To determine which reading of the statutes is correct, we follow "[t]he general and familiar rule that a statute must be interpreted according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated." Commonwealth v. Collett, 387 Mass. 424, 432, 439 N.E.2d 1223 (1982), quoting Industrial Fin. Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 367 Mass. 360, 364, 326 N.E.2d 1 (1975). See Oxford v. Oxford Water Co., 391 Mass. 581, 587, 463 N.E.2d 330 (1984). In doing so, we also bear in mind the principles applicable in construing the interrelation of different statutes. Where two statutes are alleged to be inconsistent, they are construed in a manner which gives reasonable effect to both statutes and creates a consistent body of law. Goldsmith v. Reliance Ins. Co., 353 Mass. 99, 102, 228 N.E.2d 704 (1967). We will find an implied repeal of one statute by another only when "the prior statute is so repugnant to, and inconsistent with, the later enactment that both cannot stand." Commonwealth v. Graham, 388 Mass. 115, 125, 445 N.E.2d 1043 (1983). See Doherty v. Commissioner of Admin., 349 Mass. 687, 690, 212 N.E.2d 485 (1965).

Applying these principles to the statutes before us, we conclude that G.L. c. 71B, §§ 3, 5, places responsibility on Boston to pay for special education services provided to Boston residents participating in the METCO program and that this responsibility is unaltered by the provisions of G.L. c. 76, § 12A. ⁶ To find otherwise, we would have to conclude that the Legislature intended in G.L. c. 76, § 12A, to repeal some of the clear financial burden placed on Boston under G.L. c. 71B, §§ 3, 5. This we are unwilling to do.

General Laws c. 71B, §§ 3, 5, plainly states that Boston is responsible for providing or arranging and paying for the special education services of its residents. The parties do not dispute that Melissa M. is a resident of Boston who qualifies for special education services under G.L. c. 71B, § 3. Accordingly, unless G.L. c. 76, § 12A, contains plain language or a "clear implication" that the Legislature intended it to repeal the specific obligations established by G.L. c. 71B, § 3, Boston must pay for the services. Boston has not demonstrated that the Legislature intended explicitly or impliedly to repeal part of the obligations imposed on Boston in G.L. c. 71B by enacting G.L. c. 76, § 12A. "Where the repealing effect of a statute is doubtful, the statute is strictly construed to effectuate its consistent operation with previous legislation" (emphasis in original). Commonwealth v. Hayes, 372 Mass. 505, 512, 362 N.E.2d 905 (1977), quoting 1A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 23.10 (4th ed. ...