City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., Civ.A. 99-11511-REK.
| Decision Date | 07 October 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ.A. 99-11511-REK.,Civ.A. 99-11511-REK. |
| Citation | 66 F.Supp.2d 246 |
| Parties | CITY OF BOSTON and The Boston Public Health Commission, Plaintiffs, v. SMITH & WESSON CORP., F.I.E. Corp., Beretta U.S.A. Corp., Colts Mfg. Corp., Browning Arms Corp., Glock Corp., Charter Arms Corp., Savage Arms Corp., Davis Industries Corp., Interarms Corp., Harrington & Richardson, Inc., Hi-Point Firearms Corp., Sigarms Corp. aka Sigarms, Inc., Navegar Inc., dba Intratec USA Corp., B.L. Jennings Corp., Bryco Arms Corp., Kel-Tec CNC Corp., Phoenix Arms Corp., Heritage Manufacturing, Inc., Import Sport Corp., Lorcin Engineering Corp., Marlin Firearms Corp., Sturm, Ruger & Co. Corp., Sundance Industries Corp., Taurus Firearms Corp., U.S. Repeating Arms Corp., Mossberg & Sons, Remington Arms Corp., American Shooting Sports Council, Inc., National Shooting Sports Foundation, Inc., Sporting Arms and Ammunition Manufacturers Institute, Inc., and Does 1-250, Defendants. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
John M. Townsend, Eileen A. Roach, Elise Brassil, Boston Public Health Commission, Office of General Counsel, Boston, MA, for City of Boston, Boston Public Health Commission, plaintiffs.
John H. Henn, David R. Geiger, Daniel H. Haines, Foley, Hoag & Eliot, Boston, MA, James B. Vogts, James P. Dorr, Anne G. Kimball, Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, Chicago, IL, for Smith & Wesson Corp., F.I.E. Corp., Beretta U.S.A. Corp., Colts Mfg. Corp., defendants.
Peter M. Durney, Kelly L. Wilkins, David G. Braithwaite, Patricia A. Hartnett, Cornell & Gollub, Boston, MA, for Browning Arms Corp., Glock Corp., Charter Arms Corp., Savage Arms Corp., Davis Industries Corp., Interarms Corp., Harrington & Richardson, Inc., Hi-Point Firearms Corp., Sigarms Corp., Kel-Tec CNC Corp., U.S. Repeating Arms Corp., Mossberg & Sons, American Shooting Sports Council, Inc., National Shooting Sports Foundation, Inc., Sporting Arms and Ammunition Manufacturers Institute, Inc., defendants.
Michael F. Sommerville, Cetrulo & Capone, LLP, Boston, MA, for Navegar Inc. dba Intratec USA Corp., defendant.
John P. Roache, Erin O. Bradbury, William T. Hogan, III, Hogan, Roache & Malone, Boston, MA, James Clifford Sabalos, Newport Beach, CA, Melissa Anne Maye, Law Offices of Melissa Anne Maye, Yorkville, IL, for B.L. Jennings Corp., Bryco Arms Corp., defendants.
John P. Roache, Erin O. Bradbury, William T. Hogan, III, Hogan, Roache & Malone, Boston, MA, Timothy A. Bumann, Budd, Larner, Gross, Rosenbaum, Greenberg & Sade, Atlanta, GA, for Phoenix Arms Corp., Heritage Mfg., Inc., Taurus Firearms Corp, defendants.
Peter M. Durney, Kelly L. Wilkins, Patricia A. Hartnett, Boston, MA, Leonard S. Rosenbaum, Renzulli & Rutherford, LLP, New York City, for Import Sport Corp., defendant.
John P. Roache, Erin O. Bradbury, William T. Hogan, III, Hogan, Roache & Malone, Boston, MA, for Lorcin Engineering Corp., defendant.
James B. Vogts, James P. Dorr, Anne G. Kimball, Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon Chicago, IL, for Marlin Firearms Corp., Sturm, Ruger & Co. Corp., Sundance Industries Corp., defendants.
Anne E. Cohen, Karin S. Schwartz, Debevoise & Plimpton, New York City, for Remington Arms Corp., defendant.
Before this court are the following filings:
(1) Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand (Docket No. 24, filed August 25, 1999), with supporting memoranda (Dockets No. 25, 34, 45);
(2) Defendants' Memoranda in Opposition (Dockets No. 28, 42, 43);
(3) Joint Motion to Defer Automatic Disclosure (Docket No. 26, filed September 2, 1999);
(4) Defendant Savage Arms, Corp.'s Motion to Dismiss Complaint Against Savage Arms, Corp. (sic) (Docket No. 29, filed September 8, 1999), with supporting memorandum (Docket No. 30, filed September 8, 1999).
On June 3, 1999, plaintiffs filed this case in the Suffolk Superior Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts under Suffolk Docket Number 99-02590C. On July 15 or 16, 1999, attorney Peter M. Durney of Cornell & Gollub, 75 Federal Street, Boston MA 02110, as attorney for Sigarms, Inc., filed in Suffolk Superior Court and the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts a Notice of Removal (Docket No. 1 in Civil Action No. 99-11511-REK, U.S.Dist.Ct., filed July 16, 1999).
Plaintiffs filed the instant motion to remand on August 25, 1999. Parties filed a joint motion to defer automatic disclosure on September 2, 1999. Defendant Savage Arms, Corp. filed the instant motion to dismiss on September 8, 1999. This court heard oral arguments on the motion to remand on September 15, 1999.
In the Motion to Remand, plaintiffs allege that this court lacks jurisdiction over the subject-matter of this action and, alternatively, that remand is required under principles of judicial federalism and comity. This court determines itself to be without subject-matter jurisdiction over the matter, thus mooting the argument for discretionary remand, and making it inappropriate for this court to rule on the Motion for Dismissal as to Defendant Savage Arms, Inc. and the Joint Motion to Defer Automatic Disclosure.
Because no submission has alleged complete diversity, subject-matter jurisdiction over this case, if any exists, must be based on federal-question jurisdiction. A state court action may be removed to federal court only "if it qualifies as a `civil action ... of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction,' unless Congress expressly provides otherwise." Rivet v. Regions Bank of Louisiana, 522 U.S. 470, 474, 118 S.Ct. 921, 139 L.Ed.2d 912 (1998) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)). Here, defendants allege that plaintiffs' suit is "founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution ...," satisfying the requirements for original federal-question jurisdiction in district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). Specifically, defendants argue that plaintiffs' causes of action are "completely preempted" by the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Clauses (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8), the Import/Export Clause (U.S. Const. art. I, § 10), and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (U.S. Const.amend.XIV, § 1) of the United States Constitution.
It is a basic principle of adjudication that a plaintiff is master of his or her claim. The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25, 33 S.Ct. 410, 57 L.Ed. 716 (1913). But it is also a court's responsibility, in considering either the propriety of removal or the propriety of remand, to look beyond the statutory citations in the pleadings to the nature of the claims as they appear on the face of the complaint at the time the petition for removal was filed. See, e.g., Ching v. Mitre Corp., 921 F.2d 11, 13 (1st Cir.1990). Even though plaintiffs seek to address a problem of national scope, and their claims may implicate federal law, I conclude that plaintiffs cannot reasonably be accused of "artful pleading" designed to make what is in fact a federal claim appear not to be. Neither does any preclusive effect of any Constitutional provision support the court's recasting any of plaintiffs' claims as a federal cause of action.
Defendants assert that plaintiffs' causes of action, while adumbrated as common law tort claims, are more akin to state regulation of interstate (and international) commerce. Defendants' Mem. at 6-7. Such regulation, they argue, is precluded by various provisions of the United States Constitution. It is this potentially preclusive effect, defendants contend, that should lead this court to extend that line of cases that have found complete preemption of state causes of action in the context of the Labor Management Relations Act, Avco Corp. v. Machinists, 390 U.S. 557, 560, 88 S.Ct. 1235, 20 L.Ed.2d 126 (1968), and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65-66, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987), to include the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Clauses, the Import/Export Clause, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because I determine that the potentially preclusive effect of the Commerce Clause against some forms of injunctive relief sought is not identical to the express Congressional displacement of state claims required for complete preemption, I reject defendants' proposal.
Defendants support their argument for complete preemption by referring to those factual allegations in plaintiffs' complaint that describe actions occurring outside of Massachusetts that cause damage to plaintiffs inside the state. Defendants also point to excerpts of plaintiffs' allegations that allude to violations of federal firearms statutes both within Massachusetts and outside the state. Further, they point to the relief plaintiffs seek, particularly the injunctive relief concerning the marketing and distribution of firearms by defendants. Defendants argue that the combination of these items — that is, the allegations of out-of-state actions causing harm, the borrowing of federal criminal statutes in alleging negligence, and the requested relief involving out-of-state behavior — reveals these causes of action to be federal claims. None of these elements, however, is sufficient to transform plaintiffs' state claims into federal claims, either individually or when aggregated.
To determine that an area has been completely preempted for purposes of federal-question jurisdiction, a United States district court must determine that Congress expressly manifested an intent to displace state claims in favor of an alternative federal claim. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust 463 U.S. 1, 23-24, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983) (). Those few instances in which a court has decided...
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