City of Bremerton v. Spears
| Decision Date | 08 January 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 64336-9,64336-9 |
| Citation | 949 P.2d 347,134 Wn.2d 141 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | CITY OF BREMERTON, Petitioner, v. John L. SPEARS, Respondent. STATE of Washington, Petitioner, v. John L. SPEARS, Respondent. |
Russell Hauge, Kitsap County Prosecutor, Pamela Loginsky, Deputy County Prosecutor, Port Orchard, for petitioner.
Martin Fox, Seattle, Christine Gregoire, Atty. Gen., S. Kim O'Neal, William Collins, Asst. Attys. Gen., Olympia, for respondent.
Two issues are before us in this case. The State asks us to clarify whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in cases involving review of civil traffic infractions involving small fines. John Spears and the State ask us to decide whether the mandatory motorcycle helmet statute, as implemented by the current administrative rule defining helmets, is constitutional. We hold that the Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction, and that there is no constitutional defect in the regulation implementing the mandatory helmet law.
John Spears was cited for traffic infractions on five occasions in 1995 for violating the Head Injury Prevention Act of 1990 by not wearing a helmet while riding his motorcycle. The Act prohibits the operation of a motorcycle without wearing an approved helmet. RCW 46.37.530. Each of the notices of infraction listed the fine as $66. The hearing on two of the violations was before the Bremerton Municipal Court and the hearing on the other three was before the Kitsap County District Court. Mr. Spears challenged the constitutionality of the statute in both courts, arguing that the Act, as implemented by the rule setting the standards for approved helmets, was unconstitutionally vague. Mr. Spear's challenge failed in the Bremerton Municipal Court. The court found that the helmet statute was not unconstitutionally vague and imposed a fine of $33 for each of the infractions. However, in the Kitsap County District Court, a judge pro tem found the statute to be unconstitutionally vague and dismissed the citations.
Mr. Spears appealed the municipal court decision and the State appealed the district court decision. The appeals were consolidated by the superior court, which upheld the constitutionality of the statute. Mr. Spears then sought review in the Court of Appeals. The City and State moved to transfer the request for discretionary review to this Court on the ground that the Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction. Commissioner Weathersby granted that motion, finding that under RCW 2.06.030 the Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction to hear civil matters where the original amount in controversy is less than $200. Mr. Spears moved to modify the Commissioner's ruling. The Court of Appeals granted the motion and reinstated the appeal. The City and State sought review of the jurisdictional issue in this Court and supported Mr. Spears' request to address the constitutionality of the helmet statute because of the conflicting decisions being issued by courts of limited jurisdiction regarding that law.
We accepted review of both the jurisdictional question and the issue involving the constitutionality of the helmet law.
Does the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to grant review of a case involving a civil traffic infraction when the original amount in controversy is less than $200?
The State of Washington and the City of Bremerton argue that while this Court has jurisdiction of civil cases when the amount in controversy is less than $200 in certain situations, including when the constitutionality of a statute is at issue, the Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction in civil cases when the amount in controversy is less than $200.
There is no constitutional right to appeal in civil cases; the right exists in civil cases when granted by the Legislature or at the discretion of the court. In re Dependency of Grove, 127 Wash.2d 221, 239, 897 P.2d 1252 (1995). Our statute gives the superior courts appellate jurisdiction in cases arising in courts of limited jurisdiction. RCW 2.08.020. Mr. Spears had the right to appeal to the superior court the judgment that he had committed an infraction. IRLJ 5.1. All parties agree he had that first right of appeal. At issue in this case is only the question of from which court may he seek further, discretionary, review.
The Court of Appeals was created in 1968 and its jurisdiction was set by statute. Const. art. IV, § 30(2) (amend.50). RCW 2.06.030 establishes the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals:
Subject to the provisions of this section, the [Court of Appeals] shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction in all cases except:
(a) cases of quo warranto, prohibition, injunction or mandamus directed to state officials;
(b) criminal cases where the death penalty has been decreed;
(c) cases where the validity of all or any portion of a statute, ordinance, tax, impost, assessment or toll is drawn into question on the grounds of repugnancy to the Constitution of the United States or of the state of Washington, or to a statute or treaty of the United States, and the superior court has held against its validity;
(d) cases involving fundamental and urgent issues of broad public import requiring prompt and ultimate determination; and
(e) cases involving substantive issues on which there is a direct conflict among prevailing decisions of panels of the court or between decisions of the supreme court;
all of which shall be appealed directly to the supreme court....
The appellate jurisdiction of the court of appeals does not extend to civil actions at law for the recovery of money or personal property when the original amount in controversy, or the value of the property does not exceed the sum of two hundred dollars.
The underlined portion of this 1969 statute was added in 1979. Laws of 1979, ch. 102, § 1.
The final bill report summary explains the changes made in 1979:
Courts of Appeals no longer have appellate jurisdiction over civil actions at law which involve the recovery of money or personal property valued at two hundred dollars or less. Litigants may no longer appeal as a matter of right those cases where a less-than-unanimous court of appeals decision has reversed a superior court decision. Discretionary review by the Supreme Court is still available. The result is that every litigant has one appellate review as a matter of right, and further review is at the discretion of the Supreme Court.
FINAL L EGISLATIVE R EPORT, 46th Legis., 1st Reg. Sess. 33 (1979).
Article IV, section 4 of the Washington Constitution establishes the jurisdiction of this Court and contains the same language regarding the $200 amount in controversy. However, it also contains an exception clause to that limitation. Article IV, section 4 provides in relevant part:
The supreme court shall have ... appellate jurisdiction in all actions and proceedings, excepting that its appellate jurisdiction shall not extend to civil actions at law for the recovery of money or personal property when the original amount in controversy, or the value of the property does not exceed the sum of two hundred dollars ($200) unless the action involves the legality of a tax, impost, assessment, toll, municipal fine, or the validity of a statute....
Emphasis added.)
A court must dismiss an appeal when the lack of jurisdiction is apparent because the amount claimed does not reach the statutory amount of $200. Green v. Nichols, 40 Wash.2d 661, 663, 245 P.2d 468 (1952).
The Washington Appellate Practice Deskbook states:
The Court of Appeals statutory lower limit, RCW 2.06.030, does not have the tax, fine or statute exception of the constitutional provision [Const. art. IV, § 4]. Thus, a civil action disputing the validity of a tax, but involving less than $200, might be reviewable only in the Supreme Court....
1 WASHINGTON STATE BAR ASS' N, APPELLATE PRACTICE DESKBOOK § 9.2(4), at 9-7 (2d ed.1993); see also Yakima County Credit Serv., Inc. v. Mons, 26 Wash.App. 911, 913, 614 P.2d 691 (1980).
Mr. Spears argues that traffic infractions are not civil actions but are, rather, "quasi-criminal." We disagree. The Legislature has decriminalized many minor traffic offenses. RCW 46.63.010 states that the Legislature intended to decriminalize certain traffic offenses. A violation of Title 46 is designated as "a traffic infraction and may not be classified as a criminal offense," with the exception of a list of enumerated offenses. RCW 46.63.020. The mandatory helmet law is a part of Title 46 and is not included in the list of exceptions. Therefore, violation of the helmet law is a civil traffic infraction.
Mr. Spears also argues that the jurisdiction statute, RCW 2.06.030, was passed in 1969 and the law decriminalizing traffic infractions was not passed until 1979. He therefore concludes the 1969 statute was not intended to preclude the Court of Appeals from reviewing the constitutionality of traffic infractions. This argument is based on erroneous facts. The relevant section of the jurisdiction statute (setting the $200 limit for civil cases in the Court of Appeals) was added in 1979, the same year the Legislature decriminalized minor traffic infractions. Laws of 1979, ch. 102, § 1; Laws of 1979, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 136, §§ 1-2.
Mr. Spears argues that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction because he raises a constitutional issue and that the amount in controversy is unimportant to his case. The problem with this argument is that the jurisdictional amount clause in the Court of Appeals statute is absolute, while the jurisdictional amount clause for this Court includes an exception for cases involving the constitutionality of a statute. The state constitutional provision describing the jurisdiction of this Court specifically gives this Court jurisdiction over challenges to the legality of municipal fines or to the validity of a statute, even when the amount...
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