City of Bridgeport v. Steiber

• Decision Date: 30 October 1956
• Citation: 126 A.2d 823,143 Conn. 720
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: CITY OF BRIDGEPORT et al. v. Richard I. STEIBER, Administrator (ESTATE of Joseph GRAHAM). Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 823

126 A.2d 823

143 Conn. 720

CITY OF BRIDGEPORT et al. v. Richard I. STEIBER, Administrator (ESTATE of Joseph GRAHAM).

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Oct. 30, 1956.

Adrian W. Maher, Bridgeport, with whom were James F. Kenney and James J. Maher, Bridgeport, for appellants (plaintiffs).

Frank L. Wilder, Bridgeport, for appellee (defendant).

Before INGLIS, C. J., and BALDWIN, O'SULLIVAN, WYNNE and DALY, JJ.

INGLIS, Chief Justice.

The sole question on this appeal is whether the plaintiffs are aggrieved by, and therefore have a standing to appeal from, a decree of the Probate Court appointing an administrator of the estate of a presumptively dead person who had a claim against them for personal injuries sustained as a result of their alleged fault.

The Probate Court for the district of Bridgeport rendered a decree finding that Joseph Graham had been absent and unheard of for a period of more than seven years and was thus presumed to be dead and appointing Richard I. Steiber administrator of his estate. From this decree the plaintiffs appealed to the Superior Court. In their motion for appeal they made the following allegations concerning their interest in the subject matter of the decree appealed from. In 1948 suits were instituted against the plaintiffs claiming damages for personal injuries sustained by Graham as a result of the failure of the plaintiff city to perform its duty with respect to the maintenance of public highways and as a result of the negligence of the plaintiff Platt and Company. In each of these suits a judgment of nonsuit was rendered on May 6, 1955, because Graham was not available to proceed to trial. The motion for appeal also set forth the following: 'The subscribers are aggrieved by [the] order and decree [of the Probate Court] because the appointment of the Administrator herein was made for the sole purpose of pursuing the presumed decedent's causes of action against them and said appointment has resulted in subjecting the subscribers to suits for the claimed injuries * * *. But for said order and decree the suits involving the subscribers would be impossible and, therefore, the subscribers have direct pecuniary interest in said order and decree * * *.'

In the Superior Court the defendant moved that the appeal be erased for want of jurisdiction in that the plaintiffs are not aggrieved by the decree appealed from. The court granted the motion and rendered judgment erasing the appeal, and from this judgment the plaintiffs have appealed.

Appeals to the Superior Court from decrees of probate courts are authorized by § 7071 of the General Statutes. Under that section such an appeal may be taken only by a person aggrieved by the order or decree appealed from. If the appeal is taken by a person who is not 'aggrieved,' the court to which it is taken is without jurisdiction to hear it. O'Leary v. McGuinness, 140 Conn. 80, 83, 98 A.2d 660; Weidlich v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 139 Conn. 652, 656, 96 A.2d 547. To be aggrieved by a probate decree admitting will to probate or appointing an administrator, a person must have a legally protected interest in the estate which has been adversely affected by the decree. Williams v. Houck, 143 Conn. 433, 438, 123 A.2d 177; O'Leary v. McGuinness, supra. It must appear, moreover, that the interest which is adversely affected is a direct interest in the subject matter of the decree appealed. Williams v....