City of Chicopee v. Manset Realty Corp.
| Decision Date | 16 April 1946 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
| Parties | CITY OF CHICOPEE v. MANSET REALTY CORPORATION & another. |
January 10, 1946.
Present: FIELD, C.
J., QUA, DOLAN RONAN, & WILKINS, JJ.
Taxation, Real estate tax: lien, demand, certification, interest, taking. Interest.
The lien for a tax assessed upon real estate in 1932 continued although a sale in 1933 for nonpayment of that tax and a duly recorded collector's deed following the sale were adjudicated invalid solely because of insufficient descriptions of the premises in the notice of the sale and in the deed.
Under G. L. (Ter Ed.) c. 60, Sections 37, 61, as amended, the liens for taxes for 1933 and 1936, inclusive, on a parcel of real estate which had been certified and added to a tax title account established after the city in 1933 had received a tax deed following a sale for nonpayment of the 1932 tax, were not extinguished where in 1940 there was a recorded alienation of the property and in 1942 the 1933 tax deed was adjudicated invalid for want of a sufficient description of the property in the notice of the 1933 sale and in the deed, and the tax collector recorded a disclaimer of the tax title; and a tax title later acquired by the city by a taking for nonpayment of the taxes for 1932 to 1940, inclusive, was valid.
A demand upon the taxpayer is not necessary for a valid certification of a tax for addition to a tax title account under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c 60,
Section 61, as amended.
Authority for a requirement of a demand upon a taxpayer as a condition precedent to a valid certification of a tax for addition to a tax title account under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 60, Section 61, as amended, not provided by statute, cannot be supplied through a form approved by the tax commissioner under Section 105 as amended.
A demand for payment of a real estate tax was properly made to the one who had owned the real estate in the year of assessment, although he was no longer the owner at the time of making the demand.
Upon a taking of real estate for nonpayment of taxes for 1932 to 1940, inclusive, after a purported tax title had been acquired by deed following a sale for nonpayment of the 1932 tax and the taxes for the following years had been certified and added to the tax title account but the purported tax title had been adjudged invalid for insufficient description of the property in the notice of the sale and in the deed and had been disclaimed, the taxpayer was chargeable with interest on the taxes from the time they respectively became due up to the date of the taking even though an interest item had been omitted from the tax title account.
A notice of intention to take land for nonpayment of a tax thereon and the instrument of taking were not defective in that they did not refer to an earlier tax title which had been acquired for nonpayment of the same tax but had been adjudicated invalid and disclaimed.
PETITIONS, filed in the Land Court on May 22, 1944. The cases were heard by Cotton, J.
Among exceptions saved by the respondents respecting the questions dealt with in the opinion on page 442, were exceptions to the refusal of requests as follows: The respondents further excepted to the refusal of requests in substance that on "all the evidence, a finding must be made that the takings on which this petition is based are invalid because of the attempt to include," severally, amounts as interest on the 1932-1940, inclusive, taxes "from the original accrual dates up to the time of the said takings"; and that on "all the evidence, a finding must be made that the interest in the takings at bar covers such periods of time for which interest was not allowable that the takings are invalid"; and that "a finding must be made that there are improper amounts of interest in the takings on which this petition is based, in amounts so great that the errors are substantial."
L. A. Stone, (R.
J. Rosa with him,) for the respondents.
N. J. Vigeant, (W.
M. Shea, City Solicitor, with him,) for the petitioner.
S. S. Dennis, by leave of court, submitted a brief as amicus curiae.
These are five petitions filed in the Land Court by the city of Chicopee under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 60, Section 65, as amended by St. 1933, c. 325, Section 12, and St. 1938, c. 305, to foreclose all rights of redemption under tax titles acquired by the city on May 2, 1942, to five parcels of land for the nonpayment of taxes assessed in the years 1932 to 1940 inclusive. The judge found that these tax titles were valid, and at the request of the respondents ordered the petitions to stand for further hearing on the question of redemption. The respondents have appealed from the decision of the judge sustaining the validity of the tax titles, and have also excepted to certain rulings on evidence and upon requests for rulings.
As the bill of exceptions includes not only the same questions raised by the appeal but also the rulings on evidence and on the requests, Harrington v. Anderson, 316 Mass. 187 , 193, we shall dismiss the appeal and consider the exceptions. Worcester v. Bennett, 310 Mass. 400 .
There is little dispute as to the material facts. These five parcels of land were owned by Clarence E. Day prior to 1932 and continuously thereafter until he conveyed them on March 28, 1933, to the C. E. Day Lumber Co., which conveyed them on December 31, 1940, to the Manset Realty Corporation. This last corporation transferred them on August 22, 1944, to the Hampden County Realty, Inc., the present owner. The city acquired tax title to these premises in 1933 for the nonpayment of the taxes for 1932. The city in 1940 filed a foreclosure petition in the Land Court based upon the 1933 tax deeds and covering these same five parcels. The judge found that the notices of sale and the 1933 tax deeds did not contain a sufficient description of the parcels, and as a result that petition was dismissed on February 6, 1942. When this decision was made the taxes assessed for the years 1933 to 1940, inclusive, had been certified for addition to and were added to the tax title accounts set up pursuant to G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 60, Section 50, as amended. The tax collector of the city on March 27, 1942, recorded disclaimers of the 1933 tax titles. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 60, Section 84, as appearing in St. 1935, c. 260. Demands were made on
March 30, 1942, on Gertrude G. Day, "heir" of Clarence E. Day, for payment of the 1932 taxes, and on the C. E. Day Lumber Co. for payment of the taxes for 1933 to 1940, inclusive. Copies of these demands were mailed to the Manset Realty Corporation, the then record owner of these premises. After notice by posting and publication, the premises were taken by the city on May 2, 1942, for the nonpayment of the taxes for the years 1932 to 1940, inclusive, and the instruments of taking were recorded on May 4, 1942.
The principal contention of the respondents is that the recorded alienation of these five parcels in 1940 extinguished the liens for taxes for 1933 to 1936, inclusive, because, as they say, there was no provision for the continuance of tax liens for taxes certified in a tax title account where the tax title was invalid until a provision therefor was made on March 23, 1936, the effective date of St. 1936, c. 146, G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 60, Section 37, and because prior to this statute there was no provision for a continuance of the liens for the years just mentioned after the filing of disclaimers of the 1933 tax titles.
The creation of a lien as security for the payment of taxes assessed upon real estate has been for many years one of the methods used for the collection of the tax. The legislative history of statutes creating a lien for the tax on real estate is set forth in Curtiss v. Sheffield, 213 Mass. 239. See Shruhan v. Revere, 298 Mass. 12; Massachusetts Hospital Life Ins. Co. v. Shulman, 299 Mass. 312; Boston v. Quincy Market Cold Storage & Warehouse Co. 312 Mass. 638 . We need not repeat what was said in those decisions as to the origin, nature or duration of a tax lien, because in determining whether the tax liens for the years 1933 to 1936, inclusive, existed on May 2, 1942, at the time of the taking by the city, we need only to examine the pertinent statutes in effect at the time these taxes were assessed.
The statute providing that taxes shall be a lien upon the real estate assessed is G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 60, Section 37. The form in which this statute stood in 1932 and also its form in 1942 at the time of the takings are shown in the footnote. [1] The two important amendments to Section 37 were effected by St. 1933, c. 325, Section 1, which inserted the first group of italicized words and lengthened the period for recording tax deeds from thirty to sixty days, and by St. 1936, c. 146, inserting the second group of italicized words.
[2]
There can be no question that the deeds for the 1932 taxes were executed while the liens for those taxes existed and that they were duly recorded in 1933, all in accordance with G. L. (Ter Ed.) c. 60, Section 37, as amended. These 1933 tax deeds were later adjudicated to be invalid because the...
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