City of Clearwater v. Acker

Decision Date09 December 1999
Docket Number No. 983, No. 984., No. 93, No. 800
PartiesCITY OF CLEARWATER, Petitioner, v. Judi ACKER, Respondent. City of Clearwater, Petitioner, v. Lawrence Hahn, Respondent. City of Clearwater, Petitioner, v. Terrence Rowe, Respondent.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

H. George Kagan, Ann Marie Vernon, and Elliot B. Kula of Miller, Kagan, Rodriguez & Silver, West Palm Beach, Florida; and Nancy A. Lauten and Mark E. Hungate of Fowler, White, Gillen, Boggs, Villareal & Banker, P.A., Tampa, Florida, for Petitioner.

Christopher J. Smith and William H. Yanger, Jr. of Yanger & Yanger, Tampa, Florida; and Richard A. Sicking, Coral Gables, Florida, for Respondent.

Derrick E. Cox of Hurley, Rogner, Miller, Cox & Waranch, P.A., Orlando, Florida, for Brevard County Board of County Commissioners, Amicus Curiae.

Katrina D. Callaway, Senior Attorney and Edward A. Dion, General Counsel, Tallahassee, Florida, for Department of Labor & Employment Security, Amicus Curiae.

David A. McCranie of McCranie & Lower, P.A., Jacksonville, Florida, for Department of Insurance, Division of Risk Management, Amicus Curiae.

Richard Sicking, Coral Gables, Florida, for Clearwater Fire Fighters Association, Inc., Local 1158, International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, and Florida Professional Firefighters, Inc., International

Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, Amici Curiae.

Mark L. Zientz of Levine, Busch, Schnepper & Stein, P.A., Miami, Florida, for Florida Workers' Advocates, Amicus Curiae.

QUINCE, J.

We have for review three decisions certifying the following question to be of great public importance:

WHERE AN EMPLOYER TAKES A WORKERS' COMPENSATION OFFSET UNDER SECTION 440.20(15), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985), AND INITIALLY INCLUDES SUPPLEMENTAL BENEFITS PAID UNDER SECTION 440.15(1)(e)1, FLORIDA STATUTES (1985), IS THE EMPLOYER ENTITLED TO RECALCULATE THE OFFSET BASED ON THE YEARLY 5% INCREASE IN SUPPLEMENTAL BENEFITS?

Acker v. City of Clearwater, 755 So.2d 651, 653 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Hahn v. City of Clearwater, 755 So.2d 137 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Rowe v. City of Clearwater, 755 So.2d 137 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). We have jurisdiction. See Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons stated below, we answer the certified question in the negative.

City of Clearwater v. Judi Acker, Case Number 93,800

In 1986, Ms. Acker was injured in the scope of her employment. Initially, the City of Clearwater (the City) denied her workers' compensation benefits. From 1986 until 1994, Ms. Acker only received an in-line-of-duty disability pension. In 1994, she was awarded retroactive workers' compensation consisting of two lump sum payments in excess of $150,000. Thereafter, she received workers' compensation permanent total disability benefits (workers' compensation benefits) and workers' compensation permanent total supplemental disability benefits (supplemental benefits) in addition to her in-line-of-duty disability pension benefits (pension benefits).

Because Ms. Acker was receiving more than 100 percent of her average weekly wage (AWW),1 her pension benefits were offset so that her actual compensation would not exceed 100 percent of her previous AWW. See § 440.20(15), Fla. Stat. (1985). The offset was initially calculated by adding together all the benefits she was entitled to receive, including workers' compensation benefits, pension benefits and supplemental benefits, which had accrued as of that date, then subtracting her previous AWW. Each year, pursuant to the supplemental benefits statute, Ms. Acker was attributed a five percent cost-of-living increase. See § 440.15(1)(e)1, Fla. Stat. (1985). However, because her total benefits already exceeded her AWW, she never actually received any of the increases. The five percent increases rolled over into the offset.

Ms. Acker conceded it was proper to include supplemental benefits in the initial offset calculation; however, she asserted it was improper for the City to recalculate the offset annually to include subsequent increases in supplemental benefits. She argued the purpose of increases in supplemental benefits was to provide permanently and totally disabled workers with cost-of-living increases, and that including increases in supplemental benefits in the pension offset defeated the Legislature's purpose for enacting the supplemental benefits statute. The judge of compensation claims (JCC) was sympathetic to the argument, but held it was proper for the pension offset to be recalculated annually to include increases in supplemental benefits. The JCC relied on City of North Bay Village v. Cook, 617 So.2d 753 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), and Escambia County Sheriffs Department v. Grice, 692 So.2d 896 (Fla.1997). The First District reversed the JCC's decision, holding annual increases in supplemental benefits should not be used to calculate offsets. See Acker v. City of Clearwater, 755 So.2d 651 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)

. The district court adopted Ms. Acker's argument that recalculating the offset to encompass increases in supplemental benefits would frustrate the legislative purpose of providing cost-of-living increases to permanently and totally disabled workers. See id. The district court acknowledged its decision that not to include the increases in supplemental benefits in the pension offset appeared to conflict with the figures this Court used to calculate the offset in Grice, 692 So.2d at 896; however, it dismissed the apparent conflict, opining that this Court failed to squarely address the supplemental benefits issue in that case. See Acker v. City of Clearwater, 755 So.2d 651 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).

For the reasons expressed below we answer the certified question in the negative and approve the First District's decision in Acker. See id.

The supplemental benefits statute, which was enacted by the Legislature during its 1974 session and became effective on October 1, 1974,2 provides:

[T]he injured employee shall receive additional weekly compensation benefits equal to 5 percent of his weekly compensation rate, as established pursuant to the law in effect on the date of his injury, multiplied by the number of calendar years since the date of injury. The weekly compensation payable and additional benefits payable pursuant to this paragraph, when combined, shall not exceed the maximum weekly compensation rate in effect at the time of payment as determined pursuant to s. 440.12(2).

§ 440.15(1)(e)(1), Fla. Stat. (1985).

The City now claims increases in supplemental benefits are compensation and should be included in offset calculations under section 440.20(15), which provides:

When an employee is injured and the employer pays his full wages or any part thereof during the period of disability, or pays medical expenses for such employee, and the case is contested by the carrier or the carrier and employer and thereafter the carrier, either voluntarily or pursuant to an award, makes a payment of compensation or medical benefits, the employer shall be entitled to reimbursement to the extent of the compensation paid or awarded, plus medical benefits, if any, out of the first proceeds paid by the carrier in compliance with such voluntary payment or award, provided the employer furnishes satisfactory proof to the judge of compensation claims of such payment of compensation and medical benefits. Any payment by the employer over and above compensation paid or awarded and medical benefits, pursuant to subsection (14), shall be considered a gratuity.

§ 440.20(15), Fla. Stat. (1985). Section 440.20(15) has been interpreted to mean that an injured worker's compensation from all sources cannot exceed 100 percent of his individual AWW at the time of the injury. See Barragan v. City of Miami, 545 So.2d 252 (Fla.1989)

.

It is undisputed that the Legislature intended supplemental benefits to provide cost-of-living increases for permanently and totally disabled workers to account for the impact of inflation. See Department of Labor & Employment Sec. v. Vaughan, 411 So.2d 294, 295 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)

(stating purpose of five percent increase is to "partially offset the effects of inflation"). In Shipp v. State Workers' Compensation Trust Fund, 481 So.2d 76 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), the First District elaborated on the Legislature's purpose for enacting the statute stating:

Claimant's argument[3] is inconsistent with the purpose of supplemental benefits, which is to protect recipients of periodic benefits from the long-term effects of inflation that reduce the value of a fixed amount of benefits. The effects of inflation are the same irrespective of the method of calculating supplemental benefits. Once a lump-sum payment is authorized and received pursuant to section 440.20, a claimant has the option to invest the funds and offset the effects of inflation so that the purpose of supplemental benefits is satisfied.

Id. at 79 (emphasis added).

Clearly, the stated purpose for the enactment of section 440.15(1)(e)1, as a hedge against inflation, would be frustrated under the City's interpretation of section 440.20(15).4 Thus, there is an apparent conflict between the purpose of the supplemental benefits statute and the City's argument that section 440.20(15) requires increases in supplemental benefits to be included in offset calculations. "Where ... two statutes are found to be in conflict, rules of statutory construction must be applied to reconcile ... the conflict. We are aided in this task by the maxim that `legislative intent is the pole star by which we must be guided in interpreting the provisions of a law.'" DeBolt v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 427 So.2d 221, 224 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)(quoting Parker v. State, 406 So.2d 1089, 1092 (Fla.1981)).

Accordingly, to read the supplemental benefits statute and the 100 percent cap statute harmoniously, this Court must assume the Legislature did not intend offsets to be annually recalculated to account for cost-of-living...

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