City of Cleveland v. Austin

• Decision Date: 02 February 1978
• Citation: 380 N.E.2d 1357,55 Ohio App.2d 215
• Parties: , 9 O.O.3d 368 The CITY OF CLEVELAND, Appellee, v. AUSTIN, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 215

55 Ohio App.2d 215

380 N.E.2d 1357, 9 O.O.3d 368

The CITY OF CLEVELAND, Appellee, v. AUSTIN, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth District, Cuyahoga County.

Feb. 2, 1978.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Criminal Rule 3, which defines a complaint as a written statement under oath, does not apply in cases covered by the Ohio Uniform Traffic Rules. Criminal Rule 1(C)(3).

2. The complaint (and summons) in traffic cases is the Ohio Uniform Traffic Ticket

set out in the Appendix of the Forms of Ohio Uniform Traffic Rules and is binding on all courts inferior to the Court of Common Pleas. Traffic Rules 1(A) and 3(A).

3. The Ohio Uniform Traffic Ticket issued under penalties of perjury and falsification is a valid complaint although it is not sworn to by the issuing officer.

4. The Ohio Uniform Traffic Ticket is legally sufficient if it describes the nature of the offense and refers to the statute or ordinance that gave rise to the citation even though the description may not contain all of the elements of the offense charged.

Almeta A. Johnson, City Pros., Cleveland, for appellee.

Paul Mancino, Jr., Cleveland, for appellant.

PRYATEL, Judge.

On June 7, 1976, defendant-appellant Dexter Austin was convicted of three traffic violations: driving without a license in violation of Section 9.3109 of the Codified Ordinances of the city of Cleveland; reckless driving in violation of Section 9.1304 of the Codified Ordinances of the city of Cleveland; ¹ and eluding a police officer in violation of R.C. 4511.02.

The record reveals that on December 5, 1975, police officer David Cavulic observed defendant run a stop sign. In a marked police car, Officer Cavulic proceeded to follow defendant's vehicle. When defendant sped up, Officer Cavulic turned on his red lights and siren and chased the defendant at speeds over seventy-five miles per hour. Defendant was apprehended when he struck a tree.

On appeal, defendant raises six assignments of error:

"1. The court committed prejudicial error in not granting the Motion for Discharge of the defendant by reason of the fact that he had not been brought to trial within the time specified by Section 2945.71 of the Ohio Revised Code.

"2. The court committed prejudicial error in not dismissing the charge of fleeing a police officer as it did not charge an offense.

"3. The court committed prejudicial error in not dismissing these charges as none of the complaints are sworn to.

"4. The court committed prejudicial error in not requiring the prosecuting attorney to produce the statement made by the arresting officer, David Kovulic (Sic ) when requested during his cross-examination.

"5. The court committed prejudicial error in permitting the police officer to testify concerning the status of a license or lack thereof by the defendant.

"6. Other errors apparent upon the face of the record and occurring during the course of the proceedings."

I.

Appellant alleges that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss the charge of fleeing a police officer as the complaint did not state all of the material elements of the offense since it did not include the word "willfully."

The complaint by way of a uniform traffic ticket filed in the Cleveland Municipal Court reads as follows:

"Eluded police car Fleeing from police car from traffic viol (Sic ) Involved in accid. (Sic ) in violation of Sec. No. 4511.02 Ohio Revised Code."

R.C. 4511.02 insofar as applicable provides:

"No person shall operate a motor vehicle so as to Willfully elude or flee a police officer after receiving a visible or audible signal from a police officer to bring his motor vehicle to a stop." (Emphasis added.)

The Ohio Constitution guarantees that every defendant has the right to know "the nature and cause of the accusation against him." Section 10, Article I, Constitution. Ohio courts have consistently held that the complaint must state all of the essential elements of the offense or it is invalid. See State v. Cimpritz (1953), 158 Ohio St. 490, 110 N.E.2d 416; State v. Goodman (1966), 8 Ohio App.2d 166, 221 N.E.2d 202; In re Campfield (1950), 91 Ohio App. 74, 105 N.E.2d 661; Lerch v. City of Sandusky (1926), 23 Ohio App. 109, 155 N.E. 393. A review of these cases reveals that they dealt with indictments, or were decided before the advent of the Ohio Traffic Rules.

Under authority of R.C. 2935.17 and 2937.46, the Supreme Court of Ohio promulgated Uniform Traffic Rules for all courts inferior to the Court of Common Pleas effective January 1, 1969. ² Traffic Rule 21 mandates the use of a specific form for the issuance of traffic citations, which requires a Description of the offense and citation to the statute or ordinance allegedly violated.

In weighing the reasons for the adoption of the Uniform Traffic Ticket, it must be borne in mind that various localities were issuing different tickets and that there is a huge volume of citations dispensed annually throughout the state. For instance, in Cleveland, 69,582 of the 95,695 (over 73%) of the municipal criminal code violations, were traffic infractions. ³ These citations are issued at the scene of the violation, throughout the day and night, in rain, snow or ice, by officers (who are not lawyers), often in areas perilous to both the accused and the officer, such as high speed freeways. To achieve the goals of simplicity and uniformity, and to eliminate unjustified expense and delay, the ticket requires only a description of the offense together with a reference to the law that defines the alleged violation.

On this principle the Supreme Court of Wyoming said, in its Per curiam opinion in Swisse v. City of Sheridan (Wyo.1977), 561 P.2d 712, 713-14:

"The purpose behind uniform traffic citations is to provide for the speedy and effective disposition of traffic offenses. Within such an informal procedure it is not necessary that the charge be set forth with the same technical precision and formality as required in an information or verified complaint. All that is required is that the accused be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged. Such a requirement can be fulfilled by stating the commonly used name of the offense and the statute or ordinance violated. This is sufficient even if it means the accused may be required to inquire of the arresting officer or someone else exactly what the offense includes. Such a philosophy and point of view is neither original nor without authoritative support. Harper v. Field, Okl.Crim.1976, 551 P.2d 1161, 1162; People v. Clyne, Colo.1975, 541 P.2d 71, 72; State v. Ebert, 1972, 10 Or.App. 69, 498 P.2d 792; People v. Brausam, 1967, 83 Ill.App.2d 354, 227 N.E.2d 533, 539; State v. Waggoner, 1961, 228 Or. 334, 365 P.2d 291; Yunker v. Quillin, 1954, 202 Or. 362, 275 P.2d 240. The notation 'careless driving' accompanied by reference to the ordinance number informed defendant with the nature of the offense charged with all the specificity needed."

This reasoning has been followed in other jurisdictions. In State v. Atkinson (1977), 28 Or.App. 909, 562 P.2d 978, the Court of Appeals of Oregon stated, at 28 Or.App. 913, 562 P.2d at 982:

"The purpose of the uniform traffic citation system 'is to permit a charge against a motorist to be made with a minimum of formality,' State v. Ebert, 10 Or.App. 69, 498 P.2d 792 (1972), and the uniform citation is not controlled by the statutes which apply to indictments. State v. Waggoner, 228 Or. 334, 365 P.2d 291 (1961). In Waggoner the complaint charged the offense simply as DUIIL, the Supreme Court in rejecting a challenge to the complaint said:

" 'It is readily apparent that the legislature intended to make traffic complaints effective even though a person defending against one might have to make some reasonable inquiry of the arresting officer or of some other person in order to know exactly what offense is charged. * * *' 228 Or. at 337, 365 P.2d at 292. Given the purposes of the uniform traffic citation system the same 'reasonable inquiry' principle would apply to challenges of alleged defects in other parts of the citation. * * *"

We find the same thought expressed in People v. Clark (1977), 47 Ill.App.3d 568, 5 Ill.Dec. 936, 362 N.E.2d 407:

"Traffic offenses need not be charged with the specificity of indictments. Naming the offense and citing the statute are generally sufficient." Id., at 571, 5 Ill.Dec. at 938, 362 N.E.2d at 409.

We believe it is sufficient if the ticket gave the accused Notice of the offense and reference to the law under which he is charged. To expect the officer to recite the law completely, refer to the ordinance involved, as well as describe the result of the offense such as an accident, so that the court has all the facts, places an onerous burden on the enforcement agency, that is impractical and unnecessary. Nor is there room for all of this information in the limited space provided by the ticket. We hold that the ticket need not contain every element of the offense in its description. It will satisfy legal requirements if it apprises the defendant of the nature of the charge Together with a citation of the statute or ordinance involved. Thus, a uniform traffic complaint charging the following is sufficient to notify the accused of the nature of the charge and the cause of the accusation: "Eluded police car Fleeing from police car from traffic viol (Sic ) Involved in accid. (Sic ) in violation of Sec. No. 4511.02 * * *."

The appellant relies on City of Euclid v. Sivillo, unreported No. 29861, decided by this court on July 28, 1970.

At that time, the usual procedure of this court was to issue a journal entry without a supporting opinion. There we sustained appellant's Assignments of Error 1, 2, 3 and 4. Only Assignment No. 4, which contended that the affidavit failed to allege facts which constituted an offense, is pertinent here.

In that case the ticket alleged that the defendant did "operate a vehicle and...