City of Concord v. All Owners of Taxable Property Within City of Concord, No. 307PA91

• Decision Date: 06 December 1991
• Docket Number: No. 307PA91
• Citation: 330 N.C. 429,410 S.E.2d 482
• Parties: CITY OF CONCORD v. ALL OWNERS OF TAXABLE PROPERTY WITHIN THE CITY OF CONCORD and all citizens residing in the city of Concord.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 482

410 S.E.2d 482

330 N.C. 429

CITY OF CONCORD v. ALL OWNERS OF TAXABLE PROPERTY WITHIN THE CITY OF CONCORD and all citizens residing in the city of Concord.

No. 307PA91.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Dec. 6, 1991.

Parker, Poe, Adams & Bernstein by Charles C. Meeker and Blair Levin, Raleigh, for plaintiff-appellee.

Critz, Black & Rogers, P.A. by William F. Rogers, Jr. and Robert M. Critz, Concord, for defendants-appellants.

Douglas A. Johnston, Asst. Atty. Gen., Raleigh, for Atty. Gen. of the State of N.C., amicus curiae.

James B. Blackburn, III, Gen. Counsel, Raleigh, for North Carolina Ass'n of County Com'rs.

S. Ellis Hankins, Gen. Counsel, Raleigh, for North Carolina League of Municipalities, amicus curiae.

WEBB, Justice.

N.C.G.S. § 159-72 and N.C.G.S. § 159-78 allow municipalities to issue general obligation refunding bonds in an amount greater than the bonds to be refunded without a vote of the people. The only question involved in this appeal is whether these sections violate N.C.Const. art. V, § 4, which provides in pertinent part:

(2) Authorized purposes; two-thirds limitation. The General Assembly shall have no power to authorize any county, city or town, special district, or other unit of local government to contract debts secured by a pledge of its faith and credit unless approved by a majority of the qualified voters of the unit who vote thereon, except for the following purposes:

(a) to fund or refund a valid existing debt[.]

The City contends that the plain words of subsection (2)(a), quoted above, create an exception to the constitutional prohibition against creating a debt secured by the faith and credit of the City without a vote of the people. Defendants contend that by allowing the issuance of refunding bonds in an amount in excess of the face amount of the outstanding bonds, the City will create more of a debt than the debt to be retired. The defendants say that this creates a new debt and is proscribed by N.C.Const. art. V, § 4.

Statutes enacted by the General Assembly are presumed to be constitutional. Wayne County Citizens Assn. v. Wayne County Bd. of Comrs., 328 N.C. 24, 29, 399 S.E.2d 311, 314 (1991). A statute will not be declared unconstitutional unless its unconstitutionality is so clear that no reasonable doubt can arise, or the statute cannot be upheld on any reasonable ground. Ramsey v. Veterans Commission, 261 N.C. 645, 135 S.E.2d 659 (1964). The North Carolina Constitution is a restriction on the power of the General Assembly and enactments of the General Assembly not forbidden therein will not be declared unconstitutional. In re Housing Bonds, 307 N.C. 52, 57, 296 S.E.2d 281, 284 (1982).

We hold that the plain words of the Constitution of North Carolina allow the General Assembly to provide for the issuance of refunding bonds in this case. The exception created by subsection (2)(a) simply and clearly states that voter approval is not required if the municipality's purpose for contracting the debt is to refund a valid existing debt. No requirement that the refunding indebtedness be less than or equal to the outstanding indebtedness appears in the Constitution and we decline to impose one.

The defendants, relying on cases from other jurisdictions, contend that N.C.Const. art. V, § 4...