City of Coronado v. Sexton
| Citation | 38 Cal.Rptr. 827,227 Cal.App.2d 444 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Decision Date | 26 May 1964 |
| Parties | CITY OF CORONADO et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Charles J. SEXTON et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 7415. |
John R. Goodbody, San Diego, Heller, Ehrman, White & McAuliffe, Eugene S. Clifford and M. Laurence Popofsky, San Francisco, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Bertram McLees, Jr., County Counsel and Joseph Kase, Jr., Deputy County Counsel, for defendants and respondents.
Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., and Ariel Hilton, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent State of California.
This appeal is from a judgment of dismissal entered after demurrers had been sustained to the five counts set forth in plaintiffs' first amended complaint. Before us also is respondents' motion to dismiss the appeal which was continued to be heard and submitted at the time of the hearing and submission of the appeal.
The action concerns proceedings taken to form the San Diego Unified Port District in which appellant, City of Coronado, was sought to be included and regarding which proceedings were instituted under the provisions of the San Diego Unified Port District Act (Stat.1962, 1st Ex.Sess., Ch. 67; as amended; Stat., 1963, Reg.Sess., Ch. 673).
Originally the action was commenced by the cities of Coronado, Chula Vista and Imperial Beach in which action an injunction was sought by these cities to prevent the holding of the election required as a step in forming the District under the provisions of Chapter 67. The injunction was denied and the election held resulting in a vote of approval of the formation of the District. No steps for review were taken by any of the plaintiffs. After the election was held the City of Coronado joined with R. J. Townsend, a taxpayer, and filed an amended complaint in five counts. Upon this complaint a preliminary injunction was issued restraining respondent, Charles J. Sexton, the Registrar of Voters from certifying the result of the election and restraining the Board of Supervisors from making any order declaring the District formed and from taking any further steps toward the establishment of the District. General and special demurrers were filed by all defendants (respondents herein).
Following is an account, in brief, of proceedings taken in connection with the demurrers to the five counts of the complaint.
General demurrers of all defendants to the first cause of action were sustained with leave to amend.
SECOND COUNT:
General demurrers of all defendants were sustained without leave to amend.
THIRD, FOURTH & FIFTH COUNTS:
The demurrers of all defendants excepting the State of California were sustained without leave to amend. The demurrers of the State of California were overruled without prejudice.
At the hearing on December 13, 1962, the court also gave plaintiffs until December 17, 1962, within which to amend where amendments were allowed and also dissolved the preliminary injunction.
On December 18, respondent Sexton, Registrar of Voters, canvassed the returns and certified the election results to the Board of Supervisors which Board then adopted its resolution setting forth the results of the election and declaring the District to have been duly formed. Under the provisions of Sections 13 and 14 of the Act, the District entered upon the performance of its duties.
Appellants chose not to amend their complaint, but instead filed a new and different action which we shall refer to as Cal.App., 38 Cal.Rptr. 834, in the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco naming as defendants the San Diego Unified Port District, the individuals acting as commissioners of the District, and pursuant to section 6308 of the Public Resources Code, the State of California.
On December 20, 1962, plaintiffs having failed to amend where allowed in the present action, which we shall refer to as No. 7415, a judgment of dismissal of the action was entered in favor of the Registrar of Voters and the Supervisors and on January 3, 1963, a judgment of dismissal of the first and second counts was entered in favor of the State of California. On January 4, 1963, plaintiffs filed with the trial court a request for dismissal without prejudice of all counts as to the State of California. Consequently, as to the State of California the result was judgment in its favor on counts one and two. As to counts three, four and five by reason of the dismissal filed by appellants the State ceased to be a party to the action.
The complaint in Action No. 7416 filed in San Francisco is practically identical with the amended complaint herein. Both complaints contain five counts.
The first count challenges the adequacy of petitions filed on behalf of the City of Coronado calling for the election and formation of the District. It is alleged that the petitions were void in that they were not signed by at least five per cent of the voters registered for the last municipal election held in the City of Coronado as required by section 6(a) of the Port District Act. It is stated that the insufficiency of the petitions was shown to the Board of Supervisors of San Diego County by the City of Coronado, but the Board disregarded the infirmity and continued with the process of forming the District.
The second count incorporates allegations of the first cause of action and also alleges that the board of supervisors ought to have held public hearings to determine whether unincorporated territory should be included within the District.
The third count alleges that the State of California cannot revoke the grant in trust of certain tide and submerged lands to the City of Coronado by implementation of the Port District Act.
The fourth count alleges that the voting formula for approving the formulation of the port district violated the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment of the U. S. Constitution, in that the voters of the City of San Diego were given an absolute right to approve or disapprove the District, whereas the voters of Coronado were lumped together with voters of other cities and their negative vote was swallowed up by the affirmative votes of these other cities.
The fifth count is practically the same as the fourth.
The essential difference between the two actions is that No. 7415, here under consideration, was commenced before the District was formed and all proceedings took place in the trial court during the period of the District's formation. Action No. 7416 was commenced after the District had been declared formed and was functioning as such and the District and its commissioners were named parties defendant. Also in Action No. 7416 the State of California is a party defendant as to all counts. These differences must be borne in mind in considering respondents' motion to dismiss the appeal in this Action No. 7415.
Respondents' motion to dismiss is predicated upon their contention that the issues raised herein are now moot. They contend that it is too late to enjoin the formation of the District; that no other effectual relief can be granted to appellants and even if the judgments of the trial court should be reversed there is no relief available to appellants in this action. They further contend that after the District was declared formed and commenced functioning Quo Warranto became the only remedy available to contest its formation.
Appellants oppose the motion on the ground that 'significant and effective relief vital to the protection of appellants' interests may be obtained in the present action and because evaluation of the mootness contention requires consideration of the merits of the causes of action asserted in the First Amended Complaint.'
Appellants assess the first amended complaint and their request for relief thereunder as follows:
'The complaint alleges five causes of action. The first two causes challenge the execution of certain procedures prescribed by the San Diego Unified Port District Act (Stats.1962, First Ex. Sess., Chapter 67) for establishment of the District. The third cause of action alleges that the State of California, by implementation of Chapter 67, is without power to revoke a tide and submerged land trust originally created by a statutory grant to the City of Coronado. The final two causes of action allege that the voting procedures established by Chapter 67 violate the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the United States Constitution in that they arbitrarily and discriminatorily classify voters in the City of Coronado in a manner different from the classification of voters in the City of San Diego.
'Injunctive relief was admittedly the primary aim of appellants when they initiated the proceedings below. If any one of the causes of action were sustained appellants prayed for a decree effectively enjoining establishment of the District. The appellants were aware, however, that injunctive relief might be denied even though a court found them legally aggrieved. Accordingly, appellants requested declaratory relief and such additional relief as might seem just and proper with respect to each and every one of the causes of action alleged in the complaint. Appellants prayed:
'3. That the Court determine the rights and duties of the plaintiff CITY OF CORONADO under the aforesaid grant in trust;
'4. That said determination be that said grant in trust remains binding upon the City of Coronado and that the State of California is without power to revoke said grant in trust by implementation of Chapter 67 and that plaintiff City of Coronado may continue to discharge its fiduciary obligations to the beneficiaries of said trust;
'7. That the court make such further order and provide for such additional relief as may seem just and proper. (Emphasis added.)
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