Greenberg v. Hollywood Turf Club

• Citation: 7 Cal.App.3d 968,86 Cal.Rptr. 885
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Decision Date: 22 May 1970
• Parties: Saul GREENBERG, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. HOLLYWOOD TURF CLUB, a corporation, California Horse Racing Board, Edgar A. Hills, Louis H. Kornik, J. R. Fluor, James Stewart, John Maluvius, Mervyn Leroy, et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 33917.

Page 885

86 Cal.Rptr. 885

7 Cal.App.3d 968

Saul GREENBERG, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. HOLLYWOOD TURF CLUB, a corporation, California Horse Racing Board, Edgar A. Hills, Louis H. Kornik, J. R. Fluor, James Stewart, John Maluvius, Mervyn Leroy, et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 33917.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 5, California.

May 22, 1970.

Covey & Covey and Thomas J. Scully, Los Angeles, for plaintiff and appellant.

Mitchell, Silberberg & Knupp and Charles A. Collier, Jr., Los Angeles, for defendants and respondents Hollywood Turf Club and James Stewart.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., Henry Lewin, Deputy Atty. Gen., for defendants and respondents California Horse Racing Board, Edgar A. Hills, Louis H. Kornik and J. R. Fluor.

KAUS, Presiding Justice.

Plaintiff filed a complaint on November 13, 1967, alleging five causes of action against defendants. Six of the eight defendants countered with demurrers. Taken together the demurrers attacked all of plaintiff's alleged causes of action. On February 8, 1968, all demurrers were sustained 'on the grounds stated therein.' Leave to amend was granted. Plaintiff failed to amend and, on June 3, 1968, the action was dismissed under section 581(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure as to defendants Hollywood Turf Club ('Hollywood'), Stewart, California Horse Racing Board ('the Board'), Hills, Kornik and Fluor. Plaintiff has appealed.

There are two groups of defendants on appeal. The first consists of Hollywood and Stewart, its alleged agent. The second group is comprised of the Board and its members, Hills, Kornik and Fluor.

The alleged facts common to all counts of the complaint are these: Plaintiff is a trainer of horses and stable agent licensed to practice in both capacities by the Board. On or about May 3, 1967, he secured employment with one Michael Millerick, a licensed trainer of horses, who had previously obtained stable space at the Hollywood Park race track, which is run by defendant Hollywood. Plaintiff was employed as a stable agent for the racing meet at Hollywood Park starting May 10, 1967. The duties of a stable agent consist of supervising the business procedures of a race track stable. In order to perform the duties, it is necessary for the agent to enter the stable area of the track. After plaintiff was employed Hollywood required Millerick to submit a list of all of his employees who would be entering the stable area at Hollywood Park during the meet. With knowledge that plaintiff was a licensed stable agent and employed by Millerick, defendants Hollywood and Stewart 'summarily and without notice to plaintiff ordered * * * Millerick to remove the name of plaintiff from the list * * * on the ground that Hollywood * * * would not permit plaintiff to enter said stable area.' Plaintiff alleged that Hollywood excluded him 'without reason or just cause.'

In addition to the alleged facts recounted above, plaintiff alleged in his purported third cause of action that he had protested his exclusion from the stable area to the Board, that he had requested a hearing, but that the Board had denied such a hearing.

The five causes of action can be summarized as follows: In Count I plaintiff sought a declaration that the order excluding him from the race track stable area was 'unconstitutional' since it denied him due process and equal protection of the laws. In Count II plaintiff sought a declaration that Hollywood lacks constitutional power to exclude him from the area since he is licensed by the Board as a stable agent. ¹ Count III is a declaratory relief count against the Board in which plaintiff claims that he was improperly denied a hearing by the Board on his exclusion from the track stable area. In Count IV plaintiff sought actual and exemplary damages against Hollywood and Stewart for intentionally and successfully inducing Millerick to breach his employment contract with plaintiff. In Count V plaintiff sued Hollywood and Stewart for damages for intentionally interfering with plaintiff's prospective economic advantage by preventing his negotiations with other trainers and horse owners in the stable area for employment at other racing meets.

General demurrers were directed to all counts by each defendant. In addition, defendants Hollywood and Stewart attacked the complaint as uncertain. Code Civ.Proc. § 430(7).) The trial court clearly sustained the demurrer filed by the Board and its members on the ground that the complaint did not state a cause of action against that group of defendants. As to the other group, the court's ruling sustaining their demurrers was made 'on the grounds stated therein,' which we must take to include the special demurrers. Since plaintiff declined to amend, we must affirm the judgment as to those defendants--Hollywood and Stewart--if any objection raised by them is valid. (Stowe v. Fritzie Hotels, Inc., 44 Cal.2d 416, 424, 282 P.2d 890; cf. Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist., 70 Cal.2d 240, 251--252, 74 Cal.Rptr. 398, 449 P.2d 462.) In order to narrow the issues confronting us, we shall first consider the special demurrers and then proceed to a discussion of the general demurrers.

The complaint is claimed to be uncertain in two ways. First, Hollywood and Stewart charged that they cannot determine whether plaintiff has based his claims upon an alleged order requiring Millerick to remove plaintiff's name from his list of employees, or upon an alleged order excluding plaintiff from the stable area at Hollywood Park. We think the ambiguity is insignificant. Obviously, the thrust of plaintiff's complaint is that he is unhappy because he has been prevented from entering the stable area in order to practice his vocation. The allegation sufficiently apprised defendants of the issues they had to meet. (Smith v. Williams, 55 Cal.2d 617, 619, 12 Cal.Rptr. 665, 361 P.2d 241; Lord v. Garland, 27 Cal.2d 840, 853, 168 P.2d 5.)

The second objection is more substantial, Hollywood and Stewart say they cannot ascertain from the complaint whether plaintiff has attempted to state a cause of action against Stewart in Counts I, II, III and IV and against Hollywood in Count III. As to defendant Stewart, we agree that it is uncertain whether Counts I and II are aimed at him because nowhere in those counts is it alleged that he personally excluded plaintiff from the track stable area. Since plaintiff did not use the opportunity to amend, we must assume that he stated his claims as forcefully as he could. (Sierra Investment Corp. v. Sacramento County, 252 Cal.App.2d 339, 341, 60 Cal.Rptr. 519; Straughter v. Safety Savings & Loan Assn., 244 Cal.App.2d 159, 162, 52 Cal.Rptr. 871.) Consequently, the lower court could well have sustained the special demurrer of Stewart as to Counts I and II.

Count III is clearly not directed against Hollywood or Stewart and even their general demurrer, was therefore properly sustained. Count IV on the other hand is equally clearly addressed to Stewart. It alleges that he and one Maluvius, a defendant who has never appeared in the action, made the order excluding plaintiff with the intent to induce Millerick to breach his contract of employment. Stewart's special demurrer to Count IV should have been overruled.

After our disposition of the special demurrers, we are left with a complaint that purports to state claims against the following defendants: Counts I and II are addressed to Hollywood only, Count III is directed against the Board and its members, and Counts IV and V are addressed to Hollywood and Stewart.

We turn now to a consideration of the general demurrers.

THE COUNTS SEEKING DAMAGES (IV & V)

In Count IV plaintiff claims that defendants Hollywood and Stewart induced Millerick to breach his employment contract with plaintiff. The allegations cover each element of the cause of action. Plaintiff alleged (1) that a contract existed between himself and Millerick, (2) that the two defendants barred plaintiff from the race track stable areas, (3) that at the time they ordered plaintiff excluded from the stable area the defendants knew of the existence of the contract, (4) that they made the order with the intent wrongfully to induce Millerick to breach the contract, and (5) that the order proximately caused Millerick ² to breach the contract, resulting in damages to the plaintiff. (Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier, 18 Cal.2d 33, 112 P.2d 631; Pacific Auto. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 273 Cal.App.2d ---, --- ^a , 77 Cal.Rptr. 836; Freed v. Manchester Service, Inc., 165 Cal.App.2d 186, 189, 331 P.2d 689; cf. Charles C. Chapman Building Co. v. California Mart, 2 Cal.App.3d 846, 853, 82 Cal.Rptr. 830.) Justification for defendants' exclusion of plaintiff being a matter of affirmative defense (Herron v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 56 Cal.2d 202, 207, 14 Cal.Rptr. 294 363 P.2d 310; Collins v. Vickter Manor, Inc., 47 Cal.2d 875, 883, 306 P.2d 783; Freed v. Manchester Service, Inc., Supra, 165 Cal.App.2d 186, 190, 331 P.2d 689), the absence of an allegation that the two defendants acted capriciously should not be considered upon a general demurrer, at least where the complaint does not reveal such justification on its face.

Count V charges that Hollywood and Stewart intentionally interfered with plaintiff's lawful vocation without justification. The count alleges that at the time of plaintiff's exclusion Hollywood and Stewart knew that because of plaintiff's employment as a stable agent by Millerick, ³ he was in a position to realize extensive economic benefits by negotiating for future employment with other trainers and owners in the stable area, that he would have realized such benefits had he not been excluded, that in the past all of plaintiff's employment had been procured in the stable areas of other tracks and that the exclusion order was made with intent to destroy and interfere with plaintiff's economic relationship with the other trainers and owners.

It is evident that plaintiff...