City of Corsicana v. Willmann

• Decision Date: 05 January 1949
• Docket Number: No. A-1899.,A-1899.
• Citation: 216 S.W.2d 175
• Parties: CITY OF CORSICANA v. WILLMANN et al.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

216 S.W.2d 175

CITY OF CORSICANA v. WILLMANN et al.

No. A-1899.

Supreme Court of Texas.

January 5, 1949.

Error to Court of Civil Appeals of Tenth Supreme Judicial District.

Suit by Charles Willmann and others against the City of Corsicana to enjoin the City from putting in force an ordinance attempting to extend the City's territorial limits. Judgment for the defendants was reversed by Court of Civil Appeals, 213 S.W.2d 155 and defendants bring error.

Judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, and judgment of the District Court reversed.

J. C. Jacobs, of Corsicana, for petitioner.

Pevehouse & McCall and A. V. McCall, all of Corsicana, for Chas. Williams et al.

Tyson, Dawson & Dawson and L. B. Dawson, all of Corsicana, for Hayes Bonner et al.

BREWSTER, Justice.

This cause is a consolidation of two suits filed by Willmann et al., respondents, against City of Corsicana, petitioner, to enjoin it from enforcing two annexation ordinances, which would extend its limits to include lands owned by respondents. A trial court judgment denying relief was reversed by the court of civil appeals, and judgment was rendered granting the injunctions. 213 S.W.2d 155.

Petitioner became a home-rule city by charter adopted in 1917. It is attempting the annexations in question by ordinance alone, that is, without resort to any statutory procedure. Whether the ordinances are valid depends upon a construction of Sec. 2, of petitioner's charter, which reads: "The said limits of the City of Corsicana may be extended so as to take in other territory, by ordinance duly passed by the Commission, in the manner and form as prescribed by the general laws of the State of Texas." Our decision turns on the effect to be given the concluding phrase, "in the manner and form as prescribed by the general laws of the State of Texas." Petitioner contends that the phrase was used to prescribe the manner and form of any annexation ordinance it might pass; respondents insist that it prescribes the manner and form by which annexation itself may be accomplished.

In support of its contention petitioner invokes the doctrine of Last Antecedent. Under that canon of statutory construction a qualifying phrase must be confined to the words and phrases immediately preceding it to which it may be applied without impairing the meaning of the sentence; but the rule is neither controlling nor inflexible. It may be rebutted by the circumstances. It should not be applied without regard to the meaning of the language read as a whole. It is not applicable when a further extension is clearly required by the intent and meaning of the context. 50 Am.Jur., p. 258, sec. 269.

There are circumstances which strongly indicate that petitioner's charter does not mean to refer to the general laws of this state for the manner and form of an annexation ordinance. In the first place, such a reference would be futile. In oral argument counsel for both sides stated that there are only two articles of our statutes that relate in any sense to the manner and form of city ordinances, namely, Arts. 1012 and 1013, R.S.1925, Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. Arts. 1012, 1013. So, under petitioner's construction, if its commission wanted to pass an annexation ordinance it would find by turning to Art. 1012 that the style of the enactment must be "Be it ordained by the City Commission of the City of Corsicana", which may be omitted when the ordinance is published in a book. If the commission then felt the need of further information it would learn by reference to Art. 1013 that penal ordinances must be published in the official paper before they can become effective; that ordinances not required to be published take effect after passage unless otherwise provided; that if a city desires to publish its ordinances in book form it need not include any ordinance theretofore published; and that those so published are admissible in evidence without further proof. It is quite obvious, therefore, that the general laws furnish no help whatever as to the manner and form of passing an annexation ordinance. So we cannot agree that the framers of petitioner's charter or the people of Corsicana when they adopted it intended to refer its legislative body to the statutes for information, knowing that none could be found there. We cannot ascribe to them a purpose so vain.

On the other hand, Section 13 of petitioner's charter is explicit on the passage of an ordinance. It reads: "The Commission shall adopt such rules for the * * * enactment of ordinances as it may see fit, and a majority vote shall be sufficient for the passage of all ordinances and resolutions, unless otherwise provided, and all meetings of the Commission shall be public, except when in executive session. No ordinance shall be passed until it has been read at two separate meetings of said Commission, one of which must be a regular meeting, and said meetings shall be not less than seven days apart, and shall not become a law until signed by the Mayor and attested by the City Secretary, unless the Mayor fails and refuses to sign said ordinance within ten (10) days, in which event the City Secretary shall report said fact to the Commission, and said ordinance shall be read at a third meeting, and if a majority of the Commission vote to pass said ordinance, it shall become a law, without the signature of the Mayor. The ayes and noes shall be recorded in voting on all ordinances, and said ordinances shall be published at least once, in some newspaper of general circulation in the City of Corsicana...