City of Covington v. Covington Lodge No. 1, Fraternal Order of Police, 80-SC-830-TG
| Decision Date | 13 October 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 80-SC-830-TG,80-SC-830-TG |
| Parties | 112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3255 CITY OF COVINGTON, Appellant, v. COVINGTON LODGE NO. 1, FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
Otto Daniel Wolff, Asst. City Sol., City of Covington, Covington, for appellant.
Stephen D. Wolnitzek, Taliaferro, Smith, Wolnitzek & Schacter, Covington, for appellee.
The sole issue we address on this appeal is the validity of a compulsory arbitration provision in a collective bargaining agreement between a municipality and its police department.
In October of 1978 the City Commission of Covington adopted an ordinance authorizing the execution of a collective bargaining agreement with Covington Lodge No. 1, Fraternal Order of Police, which had served as the representative of most of the Covington police. The agreement, which terminated on July 1, 1980, was duly signed by both parties. It contained a provision for the negotiation of a successive agreement, prior to the expiration of the old one. It also provided for binding arbitration in the event the parties could not agree as to any or all terms of a new contract. While the parties were negotiating a new agreement, the police bargaining agent, on June 12, 1980, invoked the binding arbitration provision of the existing contract. The city declined to participate in arbitration and on July 9, 1980, litigation commenced. The police sought specific performance and damages for breach of contract and a permanent injunction. The city answered, alleging that the binding arbitration provision as to future agreements was illegal and unconstitutional. On December 2, 1980, the Kenton Circuit Court entered finding of facts, conclusions of law and a judgment which upheld the contract and ordered the city to begin arbitration. The city appealed to the Court of Appeals. Because of the importance of the issues involved, we granted a joint motion to transfer the appeal to this court. 609 S.W.2d 930.
On this appeal, the city argues that: (1) the binding arbitration provision is illegal because it is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power by the city, (2) the binding arbitration provision denies the voters in the city the right to cast effective votes in city elections, (3) the provision for arbitration of future disputes is against public policy and is revocable, and (4) the provision that the Fraternal Order of Police is the exclusive bargaining agent of the police is illegal in this Commonwealth. The Kentucky Municipal League, amicus curiae, argues that the binding arbitration agreement is violative of § 162 of the Kentucky Constitution because it binds the city beyond the term of the legislative body making the agreement. Because we decide this issue on the question of the delegation of legislative powers, it is not necessary to discuss the other issues.
It is basic constitutional law that the legislative functions of a municipal corporation rest in the discretion and judgment of the municipal body intrusted with them, and that body may not refer the exercise of those powers to the discretion and judgment of its subordinate. A fortiori a municipal corporation may not delegate to private individuals legislative or discretionary functions confided to it by the state legislature. 56 Am.Jur.2d, Municipal Corporations, §§ 196, 197. Delegation of administrative powers, however, is permissible. Kentucky follows this principle. In Lowery v. City of Lexington, 116 Ky. 157, 75 S.W. 202, 203 (1903), we said, "(P)ublic powers conferred upon a municipality, to be exercised by its council when and in such manner as it shall judge best, are incapable of delegation." (emphasis added). See also, City of Bowling Green v. Gaines, 123 Ky. 562, 96 S.W. 852, 854 (1906) in which we opined, (emphasis added).
The statement of the principle is relatively easy. The difficulty lies in making a determination as to whether a particular matter is legislative or administrative. If the power to be exercised prescribes a new policy or plan, it is legislative, and may not be delegated. If it pursues a plan already adopted by the legislative body, it is administrative and may be delegated, City of Newport v. Gugel, Ky., 342 S.W.2d 517 (1961). In Miller v. Covington...
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