Transit Authority of Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government v. Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 639, By and Through Dickerson, LEXINGTON-FAYETTE
Citation | 698 S.W.2d 520 |
Decision Date | 05 September 1985 |
Docket Number | LEXINGTON-FAYETTE,No. 84-SC-1124-TG,84-SC-1124-TG |
Parties | TRANSIT AUTHORITY OFURBAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT, Movant/Appellant, v. AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, LOCAL 639, By and Through its President, Kenneth DICKERSON, who brings this action on behalf of himself and all other members of said Union, Movant/Appellee. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
Robert F. Houlihan, Donald P. Wagner, Mary Beth Griffith, Stoll, Keenon & Park, Lexington, for movant/appellant.
Arthur Brooks, Brooks, Kauffman & Fitzpatrick, Lexington, Joseph J. Pass, Jr. Jubelirer, Pass & Intrieri, P.C., Pittsburg, Pa., for movant/appellee.
David L. Gittleman, Gittleman & Barber, D. Patton Pelfrey, Charles E. Allen, III, Kenneth E. Lauter, Brown, Todd & Heyburn, Louisville, for amicus curiae Transit Authority of River City.
David A. Schneider, Ziegler & Schneider, PSC, Covington, for amicus curiae, Transit Authority of Northern Kentucky.
The question is whether or not a clause in a collective bargaining agreement entered into between the Transit Authority of Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government and Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 639, which provides for binding interest arbitration is enforceable. Fayette Circuit Court held the contract enforceable and, upon motion, the appeal from the judgment was transferred to this court. We reverse the judgment.
The Transit Authority provides a variety of transportation services to the public, including local bus service. It was created pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 96A, of the Kentucky Revised Statutes. The Transit Authority entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the union which contained the following provision:
(Emphasis added.)
Prior to March 31, 1984, the Transit Authority and the Union commenced negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement without success. On March 28, 1984, the union invoked the arbitration clause set out above in an effort to submit to arbitration all of the terms to be included in a new collective bargaining agreement. The Transit Authority declined to submit the issue to arbitration upon the ground that it, as a municipal corporation, could not delegate its authority to determine policy and to fix wages and salaries to an arbitrator.
Section 162 of the Kentucky Constitution provides:
"No county, city, town or other municipality shall ever be authorized or permitted to pay any claim created against it, under any agreement or contract made without express authority of law, and all such unauthorized agreements or contracts shall be null and void."
In City of Covington v. Covington Lodge # 1, Fraternal Order of Police, Ky., 622 S.W.2d 221 (1981), we held invalid a clause in a contract entered into by the City of Covington and the Lodge, which represented members of the police department, which provided for binding arbitration in the event the parties could not agree upon the terms of a new contract. This holding was premised upon the proposition that the City Council, by statute, was given control of the police department and could not delegate its authority to determine such matters as wages, bonuses, vacations, seniority, overtime, supplemental pay, and like matters to an arbitrator. The opinion in City of Covington expressly declined to consider the impact of Section 162 of the Constitution.
City of Covington deals with a unit of government which, without question, is a municipality, a city government with a legislative council. It is contended by the appellee that the Transit Authority is not such a municipality, that it has no legislative authority, and that it is more in the nature of a private corporation.
The real question to be decided here is whether the Transit Authority falls within the classification of a municipal corporation whose policy-making function cannot be delegated.
K.R.S. 96A.020 provides that a transit authority shall constitute an agency and instrumentality for accomplishing essential governmental functions of the public body or public bodies creating and establishing the same, and shall be a political subdivision and a public body corporate.
K.R.S. 96A.040 provides that the activities and affairs of a transit authority shall be managed, controlled, and conducted by a board to be appointed as prescribed by statute.
K.R.S. 96A.070(6) provides that the board shall fix the salaries, wages, or other compensation of the affairs, agents, and employees of the transit authority.
This court has heretofore classified agencies of government similar in nature to the Transit Authority as municipalities so as to limit the power of the governing body to delegate its powers.
In George W. Katterjohn & Son v. Board of Education, 202 Ky. 690, 261 S.W. 257 (1923), a school board was held to be a municipal corporation without power to pay a bonus to a contractor for the early completion of a building.
In Board of Park Commissioners of Ashland v. Shanklin, 304 Ky. 43, 199 S.W.2d 721 (1947), we held that the maintenance of parks by a municipality is a governmental function and that a Board of Park Commissioners created by statute to have the care, management, and custody of the parks and grounds used for park purposes was without authority to enter into a lease which would surrender its sole and exclusive control of the management of a part of the public property under its jurisdiction. We said:
In Rash v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District, 309 Ky. 442, 217 S.W.2d 232 (1949), we held a sewer district created under statutory authority to be a municipality:
In Louisville Extension Water District v. Diehl Pump and Supply Co., Ky., 246 S.W.2d 585 (1952), a water district was created under a statute which provided, as the statute provides in this case, that the water district commission shall be a body corporate for all purposes. We held that the district was a political subdivision and that in the execution of contracts with third parties it must observe the same formalities required of counties and municipalities.
It seems clear that the Transit...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Raines v. Independent School Dist. No. 6 of Craig County
... ... Page 304 ... authority to reprimand a teacher? We answer in the ... through 6-103.4, the power to admonish, suspend, dismiss ... the dismissal of non-tenured teachers, a local school district is preempted from negotiating a ... The agency of government, a political subdivision, and its governing board ... No. 812 v. Central W. Va. Transit Auth., 365 S.E.2d 76, 80 (W.Va.1987); ... 18 Transit Auth. v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 698 S.W.2d 520, 523 (Ky.1985) ... ...
-
Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle v. Division 587, Amalgamated Transit Union
...118 Wn.2d 639 ... 826 P.2d 167, 140 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2594 ... In addition, Metro has the authority to bargain with the Union under the Public ... a declaratory judgment with the King County Superior Court on December [826 P.2d 169] 21, ... millions of dollars from the federal government under the UMTA. These funds have been dispersed ... regulations which may be adopted under the urban mass transportation act ... ". RCW 35.58.2794 ... Jackson Transit Auth. v. Local Div. 1285, Amalgamated Transit Union, 457 U.S ... ...
-
City of Bethany v. Public Employees Relations Bd. of State of Okl.
... ... Firefighters, AFL-CIO/CLC, Local 2085, Appellees ... No. 81003 ... Supreme ... Appeal From the District Court of Oklahoma County; Charles L. Owens, District Judge ... of Firefighters, Local 2085 (the Union) and the appellant, the City of Bethany (the ... is then not binding on the municipal authority would be to deny the right to engage in effective ... with the provisions of Section 51-107 through 51-110 of this title, except that the arbitration ... Transit Auth. v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 698 S.W.2d ... ...
-
City of Louisa v. Newland
... ... The city was properly sued in the county in which it was located. Willis v. City of ... a contract between the city and the police union illegal because it contained a provision for ... necessity' for the delegation of the authority as had been found permissible in Miller v ... terms and prices which are established through advertising and competitive bidding. Arbitration ... this Court, City of Covington, supra, and Transit Authority of Lexington-Fayette Urban County nment v. Amalgamated Transit Union, Ky., 698 S.W.2d 520 (1985), that ... ...