City of Crookston v. Erickson

• Decision Date: 15 April 1955
• Docket Number: Nos. 36313--36315,s. 36313--36315
• Parties: CITY OF CROOKSTON, Respondent, v. Kensel S. ERICKSON et al., Respondents below, Virgil Elliot Erickson et al., Appellants.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 909

69 N.W.2d 909

244 Minn. 321

CITY OF CROOKSTON, Respondent, v. Kensel S. ERICKSON et al., Respondents below, Virgil Elliot Erickson et al., Appellants.

Nos. 36313--36315.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

April 15, 1955.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Under M.S.A. § 117.02, subd. 2, 'taking' by condemnation proceedings includes every interference with the ownership, possession, enjoyment, or value of private property.

2. Where no part of an owner's land is taken under condemnation proceedings

but, because of the taking and use of adjoining land, damage is caused to the owner's land, the damage is not compensable unless the consequential injury is peculiar to the adjoining owner's property and not of a type suffered by the public as a whole.

3. Where part of an owner's land was taken and used with adjoining land taken from others as site for a municipal sewage treatment and disposal plant which allegedly reduced the market value of the owner's remaining land, Held, that the depreciating effect of the entire disposal plant should have been considered in determining damages to the remaining land if the use of the land taken constituted an integral and inseparable part of a single use to which all the land condemned was subjected.

4. Rule of Adams v. Chicago, B. & N.R. Co., 39 Minn. 286, 39 N.W. 629, 1 L.R.A. 493, permitting an owner to recover the reduction in market value of his remaining land caused by nearby improvement only to extent that damage is attributable to the use of the land taken from him, is hereby modified.

5. Where city condemned a strip of land for the purpose of acquiring a right-of-way leading to a sewage disposal plant on nearby property, Held, as a matter of law, that the sewer pipes beneath the condemned strip do not constitute an integral and inseparable part of the nearby disposal plant project.

6. In condemnation proceedings, the existence of a unitary use giving rise to a right to recover consequential damages to the uncondemned portion of the unit is generally a fact question.

H. O. Chommie, Thief River Falls, for appellants.

L. A. Erickson, Crookston, for respondent.

CHRISTIANSON, Justice.

This case presents separate appeals by property owners from judgments entered pursuant to the jury's award of damages in condemnation proceedings instituted by the city of Crookston. The land condemned is located just outside the southern limits of Crookston and was acquired as the site for a proposed new sewage treatment and disposal plant for that city. We are concerned here mainly with three parcels of land which for convenience will be referred to as tracts A, B, and C. ¹

Tract A is heavily wooded land bounded on the west by the Red Lake River and contains approximately nine acres. The city condemned the fee to the whole of this tract and, although the amount of the jury's award therefor is questioned, its primary importance insofar as these appeals are concerned is that all the structures which the city proposes to erect in connection with the disposal plant are to be located thereon. Tract A was owned by Virgil Erickson.

Tract B, which was owned by Abel and Hulda U. Erickson, is a rectangular parcel containing approximately 15.17 acres. The northwest corner of tract B juts into tract A, thereby forming part of the south and part of the east boundary of tract A. Tract B extends east toward Minnesota street and its eastern boundary abuts onto Minnesota street. The city condemned the fee to approximately six and one-half acres of tract B. We will refer to the portion condemned by the city as tract B--1 and the remaining portion of tract B, consisting of approximately eight and seven-tenths acres, as tract B--2. Tract B--1 is the west portion of tract B and contains the corner which juts into tract A. If the present plans are carried out, none of the structures comprising the sewage disposal plant will be located on tract B--1. It is conceded that the highest and most profitable use of tract B is for suburban residential development.

Father to the east, and across Minnesota street from tract B, lies tract C, which is also owned by Abel and Hulda U. Erickson. It consists of 7.28 acres. The west portion of tract C which fronts on Minnesota street is high ground, but the east part slopes down to the Red Lake River and often floods in the spring. The city condemned the fee to a strip 33 feet wide in the east or low portion of tract C to acquire a right of way through which to run the main sewer line leading to the treatment and disposal plant to be erected on trct A. The sewer line is laid under the surface but there are manholes at regular intervals. The Ericksons contend that the highest and most profitable use of tract C is for suburban residential development. However, this is denied by the city.

The disposal plant structures, all of which are to be located on tract A, will be built partly above and partly below the ground level. The portion of the structures above ground level will not rise above the level of the treetops. Stated briefly, the function of the treatment and disposal plant will be to accept raw sewage from the main sewer line running beneath the strip which the city condemned in tract C. The solids will be separated from the liquids and, after passing through a drying process, will be sold for fertilizer and hauled away in trucks. The liquids will be purified and discharged into the Red Lake River.

The principal question presented for decision is the correctness of the position adopted by the trial court that the reduction in the market value of the uncondemned portions of tracts B and C caused by the mere proximity of the sewage treatment and disposal plant is not a factor for the jury's consideration in awarding damages. Some of the assignments of error deal with the trial court's refusal to permit expert witnesses to testify concerning the reduction in market value of tract B due to the psychological effect upon potential buyers for residential purposes created by the proximity of the sewage treatment plant. Others challenge the court's refusal to instruct the jury that it should consider the reduction in value due to psychological factors in making its award.

1. Minn.Const. art. 1, § 13, provides:

'Private property shall not be taken, destroyed or damaged for public use without just compensation therefor, first paid or secured.'

M.S.A. § 117.02, subd. 2, defines 'taking' by condemnation proceedings in this state to include 'every interference, under the right of eminent domain, with the ownership, possession, enjoyment, or Value of private property.' (Italics supplied.) This court has previously held that 'interference with the value of property' is broad enough to include the erection of structures which may later in fact reduce the value of ownership or enjoyment of property. State v. Bentley, 231 Minn. 531, 543, 45 N.W.2d 185, 192; see, Burger v. City of St. Paul, 241 Minn. ---, ---, 64 N.W.2d 73, 78. However, we find no prior decision of this court which has considered the precise question of consequential damages presented here.

2. At the outset, it might be well to examine a few of the basic rules governing the compensability of so-called 'consequential' damage. Where no part of an owner's land is taken but, because of the taking and use of adjoining property, damage is caused to an owner's land, the damage is not compensable unless the consequential injury is peculiar to the adjoining owner's property and not of a type suffered by the public as a whole. Locascio v. Northern P.R. Co., 185 Minn. 281, 240 N.W. 661; Vacation of Part of In re Town of Hibbing, 163 Minn. 439, 204 N.W. 534, 205 N.W. 613; see, Feltz v. Central Nebraska Public Power & Irr. Dist., 8 Cir., 124 F.2d 578. However, in cases where there is a partial taking, the injured owner is not required to show that the injury is peculiar to his remaining property. It is sufficient that the damage is shown to have been caused by the taking of part of his property even though it is damage of a type suffered by the public as a whole. State v. Rascoe, 181 Tenn. 43, 178 S.W.2d 392; see, Lamont v. West Penn Power Co., 300 Pa. 78, 84, 150 A. 155, 157; 4 Nichols, Eminent Domain (3 ed.) § 14.1. This is true even where the claimed damage to the remaining property is due to the Use to which the property taken will be devoted by the taker. However, an important qualification of this rule must here be noted. Recovery is generally limited solely to the damage caused by the taker's use of the land acquired from the owner of the remainder area. Stated in another way, the owner of the remainder area is not ordinarily entitled to recover for damage caused his remaining land by the taker's use of...